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Projecting future health care expenditure at European level: 





Predicting the future evolution of health care expenditure is one of crucial challenges facing 
the European Union and its Member States in the context of the demographic and social 
changes taking currently place in Europe. To correctly assess the risk of rising health care 
spending over the next couple of decades and establish adequate policy responses to the 
challenges, it is essential to devise a reliable method to estimate future health care 
expenditure. However, the complexity of the systems and multiplicity of factors affecting 
both total and public spending make this a highly complicated task, where results will always 
be surrounded by considerable uncertainties.  
To tackle this issue a major project was undertaken by the European Commission and 
Economic Policy Committee which aimed at projecting future public health care expenditure 
in twenty seven Member States of the European Union and Norway over the period 2007-
2060. A unique internationally comparable database has been established and a model built 
allowing to project health care spending in a common, coherent framework of 
macroeconomic variables and a set of projections covering a number of other age-related 
items of public social expenditure. The model incorporates the most recent developments in 
demography and epidemiology and draws on new insights from health economics, allowing 
the comparison of the risks and challenges facing both individual countries' health care 
systems and European society in its entirety. 
This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the theoretical background, practical 
aspects of projecting health care expenditure and the actual results of the projections 
undertaken in the context of long-term budgetary projections.    2  
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1.  INTRODUCTION  
Predicting future evolution of health care expenditure is one of crucial challenges facing the 
European governments in the context of the demographic and social changes taking currently 
place in Europe. As a public good provided, at least in basic terms, free of charge to the whole 
population, health care is a major and constantly growing component of public finances. 
Expenditure on health care has been growing, both in absolute and relative terms (as 
percentage of GDP and of total government outlays) ever since governments took up 
responsibility for universal provision of health care. Furthermore, it is expected to continue 
growing over the decades to come in the context of ageing populations and growing public 
expectations on the accessibility and quality of care, unless substantial structural reforms in 
the way health care is provided and financed are enacted.  Since significant increase is 
expected also in public expenditure on pensions, long-term care and other age-related 
components of social spending, the European governments face the growing risk of 
undermining long-term sustainability of their public finances. 
To correctly assess this risk over the next couple of decades and establish adequate policy 
responses to the challenges, devising a reliable method to estimate future health care 
expenditure (as well as other components of public spending) is essential. However, the 
complexity of the systems and multiplicity of factors affecting both total and public spending 
make it a complicated and highly uncertain task. Several researchers have attempted to model 
the financial structure of health care systems and use it to project future evolution of health 
care expenditure. Although much effort has been invested in modelling the interactions 
between a number of demographic, social and economic factors affecting health care 
spending, the large majority of studies remained limited to analysing the features of 
individual national systems. While very useful in a single-country framework, such an 
approach is however not sufficient in an international context of a monetary and economic 
union. Given the large variability of the systems, financing methods and in-built incentives, 
the main challenge is to reconcile the obvious need for the precision of the model reflecting as 
many systemic features as possible with the comparability across the systems.  
Tackling this issue has been the main idea behind the large project undertaken by the 
European Commission and Economic Policy Committee which aimed at projecting future 
public health care expenditure in twenty seven Member States of the European Union and 
Norway. A close collaboration between the Commission services and the delegates of the 
Member States allowed the establishment of a unique internationally comparable database 
and to build a model allowing to project health care spending in a common, coherent 
framework of macroeconomic variables and a set of projections covering a number of other 
age-related items of public social expenditure. The model incorporates the most recent 
developments in the demography, epidemiology and health economics, allowing the 
comparison of the risks and challenges facing both individual countries' health care systems 
and the European society in its entirety. 
This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the theoretical background, practical 
aspects of projecting health care expenditure in a unique multinational context and the actual 
results of the projections undertaken in the context of long-term budgetary projections. 
Section 2 provides a short overview of the project. Section 3 provides the literature overview 
and a discussion of the factors affecting health care expenditure. Section 4 describes the 
methodology against the background of the similar exercises undertaken at national and   5  
international level. Section 5 presents the actual results of the projection exercise, their 
possible interpretation and unavoidable limitations. Section 6 concludes by suggesting a 
number of policy recommendations which can be drawn from the exercise.     
2.  THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION/ECONOMIC POLICY COMMITTEE PROJECTIONS OF THE 
ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY IMPACT OF AGEING POPULATIONS 
2.1.  Health care expenditure: a historical perspective. 
The governments of all EU Member States are heavily involved in the financing, and in some 
cases in the provision, of health care
1. Consequently, health care spending is a major, and 
growing over time, source of fiscal pressure, see Table 1.  
Total health care spending, both public and private, increased rapidly during the 1960s and 
1970s and at a slower rate, in the 1980s. It picked up again in the 1990s in most Member 
States and continued growing in the first decade of the 21
st century. In 2006 it amounted on 
average to 9% of GDP in the EU, but the countries differed considerably ranging from 5% in 
Estonia and Romania to almost 11% of GDP in France and over 10% in Germany and 
Austria. Taken by itself public spending on health care rose as a share of GDP during the 
1970s in the countries for which data are available. In the 1980s and 1990s, the increasing 
trend slowed down, and even reversed in a few countries, due to overall budgetary 
consolidation efforts. It picked up again in the late 1990s and especially in the 2000s to reach 
an average level of 6.7% of GDP in 2006 (ranging from less than 3% of GDP in Cyprus to 
almost 9% of GDP in France). A convergence or catch-up process is evident across countries, 
with the largest increases over time occurring in countries with the lowest initial levels
2. 
Health care spending has also been growing as a share of total primary government spending, 
especially during the 1990s, suggesting that health budgets fared better than other expenditure 
items during periods of fiscal consolidation. Currently it accounts for between 12% and 15% 
of government outlays in most EU countries, although the dispersion is wide ranging from 6% 
in Cyprus to almost 18% in Germany.  
                                                 
1   This may reflect shared view on the economic rationale for public sector involvement in health care 
markets based on efficiency and equity considerations. Health care markets suffer from the typical problems of 
insurance markets such as adverse selection (which may make it difficult for persons with higher health risks to 
obtain affordable coverage leading to a sub-optimal consumption of health care services), moral hazard 
(whereby the insured person may have an incentive to over consume health care services as they do not bear the 
full cost) and asymmetric information (whereby health care providers may be in a position to induce the demand 
for treatment and extract economic rents). 
2   For example, public spending on health care in Portugal grew from 1.5% of GDP in 1970 to 7.2% of 
GDP in 2006, in Spain from 2.3% to 6.0% and Greece from 2.3% to 5.9%. A similar trend is expected to take 
place in the Newly Acceded Member States of the Central and Eastern Europe due to the increasing living 
standards, although the range of growth will be probably smaller given the significant role of publicly provided 
health care in the pre-transition period.   6  
Table 1 Past trends in health care spending (public and private) in EU Member States, 
1970-2006 
1970 1980 1990 2000 2006 1980 1990 2000 2006 1980 1990 2000 2006
BE : : : 6,6 6,8* : : 77 64* : : : 14,7
BG : : : 3,6 4,1 : : 58 57 : : : 10,9
CZ : : 4,6 5,9 6,1 : 98 91 88 : : 14,1 13,8
DK : 7,9 6,9 6,8 8,1 89 83 82 84 14,9 12,3 12,7 15,7
DE 4,4 6,6 6,3 8,2 8,1 79 76 80 77 : : 18,2 17,9
EE : : : 4,1 3,8 : : 77 74 : : : 10,9
IE 4,1 6,8 4,4 4,6 5,5 82 72 73 77 : 10,2 14,7 16,3
EL 2,3 3,3 3,5 4,7 5,9 56 53 59 62 : : 10,1 14,0
ES 2,3 4,2 5,1 5,2 6,0 79 78 72 71 : : 13,2 15,5
FR 4,1 5,6 6,4 8 8,8 80 76 79 80 12,3 12,9 15,5 16,6
IT : : 6,1 5,8 6,9 : 79 72 77 : 11,6 12,7 14,2
CY : : : 2,4 2,8 : : 42 44 : : : 6,8
LV : : : 3,3 3,6* : : 55 57* : : : 6,4*
LT : : : 4,5 4,3 : : 69 70 : : : 8,1
LU 2,8 4,8 5 5,2 6,6 92 93 90 86* : 13,2 13,9 17,1
HU : : : 4,9 5,9 : : 71 71 : : 10,6 11,3
MT : : : 4,9 6,5* : : 72 77* : : : :
NL : 5,1 5,4 5 6* 69 68 63 61* 9,3 9,8 11,4 :
AT 3,3 5,1 6,1 7,6 7,8 69 73 77 76 10,3 11,9 14,7 15,7
PL : : 4,4 3,9 4,3 : 92 71 70 : : 9,4 9,9
PT 1,5 3,4 3,8 6,4 7,2 64 64 73 70 : : 14,9 15,3
RO : : : 3,4 3,5 : : 74 77 : : : 7,5
SI : : : 6,2 6,0 : : 74 72 : : : 11,4
SK : : : 4,9 5,0 : : 89 68 : : 9,7 13,6
FI 4,1 5 6,2 5,1 6,2 79 81 71 76 12,4 13,0 10,6 12,7
SE 5,8 8,2 7,4 7 7,5 92 90 85 82 : : 12,6 13,7
UK 3,9 5 4,9 5,6 6,9 89 83 80 81 11,0 12,0 14,3 15,7
*2005
Sources: OECD Health Data 2009, Eurostat
Public health expenditure as % of GDP
Public health expenditure as % of 
total health expenditure
Public health expenditure as % of 
total government outlays
 
The prospect of a rapidly ageing population in Europe has added to concerns about the impact 
of rising health care spending on government finances. Following the exercises carried out in 
2001 and 2006
3, the Economic Policy Committee and the European Commission has recently 
published a major report examining the impact of ageing populations on public spending (see: 
European Commission and Economic Policy Committee, 2009).  
2.2.  The projection exercise – an institutional context 
The new set of age-related public expenditure projections has been performed for all twenty-
seven EU Member States and Norway
4 and covered spending on pensions, health care, long-
term care, education, and unemployment transfers for the period from 2008 to 2060. The 
projections were endorsed by the ECOFIN Council of 5 May 2009, and accompanied the 
Commission Communication
5. The projection exercise was carried out jointly by the 
European Commission’s Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs and the 
national authorities via the Ageing Working Group attached to Economic Policy Committee. 
An overview of the projection exercise is presented on Graph 1. Its unique value-added and 
                                                 
3    Economic Policy Committee (2001) and Economic Policy Committee and European Commission 
(2006). 
4   Norway has a status of observer in the Ageing Working Group. 
5    Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions - Dealing with the impact of an ageing 
population in the EU (2009 Ageing Report), COM/2009/0180 final.   7  
strength stems from the fact that it brought together experts from both international 
organisations and national authorities. In this way, cross-country comparability has been 
assured, while at the same time due account has been taken of country specific circumstances 
and the large diversity of national social protection and health care systems.  
Graph 1 Overview of the EPC/Commission economic and budgetary projection exercise 
 
Source: European Commission and the EPC. 
The projections are generally - and for the reference scenario in particular - made on the basis 
of “no policy change”, i.e. only reflecting enacted legislation, but not possible future policy 
changes (although account is taken of provisions in enacted legislation that enter into force 
over time). The projections are made on the basis of legislation enacted by July 2008. They 
are also made on the basis of the current behaviour of economic agents, without assuming any 
future changes in behaviour over time: for example, this is reflected in the assumptions on 
participation rates which are based on the most recently observed trends by age and gender. 
While the underlying assumptions have been made by applying a common methodology 
uniformly to all Member States, for several countries adjustments have been made to avoid an 
overly mechanical approach that leads to economically unsound outcomes and to take due 
account of significant country-specific circumstances.  
The starting point in the projection exercise was a common population projection for 27 EU 
Member States and Norway produced by Eurostat (EUROPOP2008, for methodological 
details see: Lanzieri 2009 and Eurostat 2007). In the next step, the Commission and Ageing 
Working Group agreed a common set of underlying economic assumptions, most importantly 
on the evolution of the labour market variables and productivity. By combining the 
population projections with the economic assumptions, a projection was made for GDP 
growth potential for all Member States up to 2060. Following this, the underlying population 
and GDP growth projections were used to project public spending on five categories of 

















































benefits   8  
using the models established by the Member States' authorities. Projections for spending were 
also made for health care, long-term care, education and unemployment transfers, this time 
using common models developed by the European Commission. The final step was to 
aggregate all the projections to get an overall picture of how ageing will affect public 
spending. 
The budgetary projection exercise is linked to the assessment of long-term sustainability of 
public finances
6 and serves as a tool to measure the economic and budgetary consequences of 
ageing in the general context of the fiscal surveillance and promotion of structural reforms. 
With the populations getting older and in many cases smaller over time, old-age dependency 
rates are projected to increase considerably over the coming decades. This tendency, 
combined with regular growth in public spending on health and long-term care due to extra-
demographic factors, puts a growing pressure on the public budgets, financed by 
contributions from a stagnating size of active population. This trend, observed in the past 
decades and expected to continue in the future, requires substantial and rapid reforms to be 
undertaken by policymakers at national level in order to avoid a dramatic worsening of the 
fiscal stance.   
3.  FACTORS DRIVING HEALTH CARE SPENDING  
3.1.  A number of demographic and non-demographic drivers of spending 
Unlike public spending on pensions, which are solely determined by demographic 
developments and the institutional setting of the pension scheme, expenditure on health care 
is driven by a complex set of interrelated demand and supply side factors. While a widespread 
belief links the average health care expenditure to the age of an individual, several studies 
show that the demand for and use of health care depends ultimately on the health status and 
functional ability of citizens. While age is a useful indicator of the health status of an elderly 
person (which is shown by the steep upward slope of age-related expenditure profiles), it is 
not the causal factor. Therefore several other factors should be taken into account when 
projecting future developments of health care spending. Those factors can be classified in at 
least two different ways: following their character/properties and the type of economic agent 
they involve on the one hand, and distinguishing between factors that affect demand and 
supply side of health care provision on the other hand. 
                                                 
6 For details see: European Commission (2009)   9  
Graph 2 Classification of factors underlying developments in health care expenditure 
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Source: own compilation   
Given these considerations, reliable projections of future public expenditure on health care 
need to include not only demographic changes, but also a series of non-demographic factors. 
However, given limited data availability in many of the quoted areas not all of them can be 
modelled in the projection exercise. In addition, it is equally important is to understand the 
complexity of the network of interrelated factors and to approximate the degree of uncertainty 
related to each of them. 
3.2.  Demographic trends in Europe. How do they affect health care spending? 
Current demographic trends in Europe are worrisome. Although, with fast developments in 
medical science, technology and treatment techniques, an average European lives ever longer 
and - arguably – healthier, constantly growing share of the elderly in total population raises 
urgent concerns about financial and organisational efficiency of health care and social 
security systems. This trend is projected to continue in the foreseeable future, although at a 
different pace across countries, which offers a certain room for different types of reforms and 
policy actions in the face of the ageing challenge.  
In order to understand the complexity of the demographic processes, the main factors 
underlying them in the recent decades need to be analysed. As agreed in most studies, growth   10  
in the share of the elderly has been driven mainly by declining fertility rates and falling 
mortality rates (which increase life expectancy) affecting people of practically all age groups.  
As stated, population ageing is driven by falling fertility rates. While surveys indicate that the 
desired fertility has remained roughly constant in recent years, the number of children born 
(real fertility) has continued falling due to increased female labour market participation, 
improving women’s education, changing lifestyles, diffusion of contraceptives and lack of 
access to childcare facilities (for wider discussion on trends in fertility, see: McDonald 2000 
and 2002). Those developments are accompanied by a trend of postponement of childbearing, 
whereby the women give birth to their first child later in life. 
These findings are confirmed by empirical evidence in most European countries. Over the last 
three decades of the 20
th century (1970-2000) fertility rats fell practically in all European 
countries (on average from 2.3 in 1970 to 1.5 in 2000)
7, although a slight recovery has been 
observed in a number of countries over the first decade of 21
st century. There have been a 
clear convergence trend, as the countries with the highest initial fertility rates (Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal, the Netherlands, where fertility rates exceeded 3 in the 1960s) have seen them 
falling considerably faster than the countries where they were initially relatively lower 
(Hungary, Czech Republic, Finland, Sweden, Luxembourg). Consequently, the fertility rates 
are currently well below the natural replacement rate of 2.1 required to maintain the 
population size and age structure in all EU Member States, even if they vary considerably 
across individual countries (from over 2 in Ireland and France to about 1.3 in Slovakia, 
Romania and Hungary).  
The debate on the future trends in fertility rates across European countries remains open.  
Although several authors argue that falling trend will continue, quoting e.g. the low fertility 
trap hypothesis
8, most forecasts expect the unfavourable current trend to reverse in the 
decades to come (see Graph 3), although not enough to stabilise the population size and age 
structure. According to Eurostat's demographic projections (see: Lanzieri 2009 and Eurostat 
2007) fertility rates are projected to increase between 2008 and 2060 in all countries except 
Ireland, France (expected to fall), Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the UK (expected to remain 
constant) and from 1.52 in 2008 to 1.64 in 2060 on average. Given the assumption of 
convergence in the average median age at childbearing, the rise will be sharper in EU12 (from 
1.36 to 1.54) than in EU15 (from 1.64 to 1.72)
9.  
                                                 
7 EU27, unweighted average. These and the following data have been taken from Eurostat database. 
8 This hypothesis, proposed by Lutz and Skirbekk (2005), points at three interconnected mechanisms which 
can potentially lead to a continued downward trend in the number of births in Europe. A demographic 
mechanism works through the fall in the number of potential mothers in line with the decrease in the population 
size. A sociological mechanism is related to the partially irreversible change in the family size that young people 
perceive as normal or optimal. Finally, an economic mechanism consists of the changing balance between the 
consumption aspirations (the standard of living experienced in the parental home) of young people and expected 
income per capita in a family consisting of a given number of persons.     
9 All over the text the abbreviations EU12 or RAMS (Recently Acceded Member States) refers to twelve 
countries which joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007 (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia), while EU15 refers to fifteen countries 
which had been EU members by then (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, the UK).   11  
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Also mortality rates have shown a clear downward trend over the recent decades, leading to a 
constant increase in life expectancy
10. Having compared available data from the past 160 
years, Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) observed that life expectancy has been growing in a linear 
way, at an almost constant pace of about 3 months per year. Similar conclusion on the linear 
trend in life expectancy was drawn by White (2002) who analysed a group of 21 high-income 
countries over the period 1955-1996. According to Suzman et al. (1992), in 18 countries of 
Western Europe life expectancy at birth increased by an average of 6.3 years between 1960 
and 1990. During the same period, life expectancy at the age of 60 increased by 3.5 years 
among women and 1.7 year among men. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the analysis 
of the more recent EU data: between 1980 and 2007 life expectancy at birth increased on 
average by some 6.2 years for men and 5.8 years for women (weighted average of the 
countries for which the data are available
11). Again, large variation is noticeable across the 
European countries, with a clear division between EU15 and EU12 Member States. Central 
and Eastern European Recently Acceded Member States, although comparable in terms of life 
expectancy to the EU15 in the past decades (1960-1980), have subsequently lost distance and 
performed much worse than their Western European counterparts. Over the period 1980-
2007, men in those countries gained only 3.5 years (compared to 6.9 years in the EU15), 
while women 4.7 years (compared to 6.0 years). However, this gap is expected to narrow 
down again in the decades to come, as convergence in lifestyles, levels of consumption and 
quality of social services will drive mortality rates down. This is reflected in Eurostat's 
demographic projections where, while mortality rates are projected to keep falling and, 
accordingly, life expectancy is projected to continue its rising trend in all EU Member States 
(for details see: Lanzieri 2009 and Eurostat 2007), a strong convergence between EU15 and 
EU12 is assumed to take place. Consequently, between 2008 and 2060 life expectancy at birth 
is projected to grow in EU12 by 11.2 years for males and 8.6 years for females, while only by 
7.6 years for males and 6.5 years for females in EU15 (see Graph 4 and annex 2.2 for more 
detailed information).   
                                                 
10 Nevertheless, some researchers challenge the thesis of the linear increase in the life expectancy, arguing 
that there is a biological limit to the human life, see e.g. Fries (1980, 1983, 1989, 1993) or Carnes and 
Olshansky (2007). 
11 BE, BG, CZ, DK, DE, GR, ES, LT, LU, HU, MT, AT, PT, RO, SK, FI, SE. These and the following data 
have been taken from Eurostat database.   12  
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The main reasons for increases in life expectancy have been changing over time. Until the 
1970s-1980s, gains in life expectancy at birth mainly resulted from decreases in mortality 
rates of new-borns and children, mainly due to improvements in hygiene and better nutrition 
of children. Then, in more recent decades a new trend emerged, one of fast falling mortality 
among the elderly which resulted in a rapid increase in the total number of people in their 
eighties and nineties and which, at least partially, explains the diverging trends between EU15 
and EU12 countries. 
Such dramatic fall in mortality among the elderly population may be explained by a number 
of factors. The greatest gains have been observed in treating the most common causes of 
death, such as heart disease (which accounts for 25-50% of deaths) and stroke (10-25%), 
while therapies for cancer – the second most frequent cause of death – have still not resulted 
in a significant improvement (Brody et al., 1992, Nusselder and Mackenbach, 1997). Changes 
in socio-economic conditions, universal access to medical care, nutrition, housing, sanitation 
and living habits (Fogel, 1994), as well as successes with community education and 
preventative health programmes have obviously also played a role.  
Generally speaking, if maintained over the coming decades, the presented trends in fertility 
and mortality may lead to important changes in the age structure of the population and have 
far reaching consequences on the macroeconomic situation in Europe.  
According to the Eurostat demographic projections, the population in the EU27 will be both 
smaller and older in 2060 than it is in 2008 (see Table 2 and Graph 5). Total population is 
projected to increase by 2%, but 13 countries, mainly in the Central and Eastern European 
EU12 countries is expected see their population shrink. The general picture also hides 
significant divergences in the demographic trends between individual countries. Large 
changes are also expected in the age structure of the population. A large majority of countries 
are expected to experience a drop in the size of both young (0-14) and working age 
population (15-64). The share of the latter, main contributor to the social protection systems is 
projected to fall dramatically from 67% to 56% of total population. Again, the Recently 
Acceded Member States will be mostly affected, with a decrease from 70% to 53% of total 
population. While younger cohorts shrink, the share of elderly (65+) and very old (80+) 
population is projected to grow in all countries and on average by 13% (from 17% to 30%) 
and 8% (from 4% to 12%) p.p. respectively.    13  
Table 2 Overview of the projected changes in the size and age structure of the population, in 
millions 
2008 2060 % change 2008 2060 % change 2008 2060 % change 2008 2060 % change
BE 10,7 12,3 15 1,8 1,9 7 7,0 7,1 1 1,8 3,3 80
BG 7,6 5,5 -28 1,0 0,7 -36 5,3 3,0 -44 1,3 1,9 42
CZ 10,3 9,5 -8 1,5 1,2 -21 7,4 5,2 -30 1,5 3,2 110
DK 5,5 5,9 8 1,0 1,0 -5 3,6 3,5 -4 0,9 1,5 74
DE 82,2 70,8 -14 11,3 8,9 -21 54,4 38,9 -29 16,5 23,0 39
EE 1,3 1,1 -15 0,2 0,2 -20 0,9 0,6 -31 0,2 0,3 51
IE 4,4 6,8 53 0,9 1,1 27 3,0 3,9 29 0,5 1,7 245
GR 11,2 11,1 -1 1,6 1,4 -10 7,5 6,2 -18 2,1 3,5 68
ES 45,3 51,9 15 6,6 6,7 1 31,1 28,4 -9 7,5 16,8 123
FR 61,9 71,8 16 11,3 12,0 6 40,3 41,2 2 10,2 18,6 82
IT 59,5 59,4 0 8,3 7,2 -14 39,2 32,7 -17 12,0 19,4 63
CY 0,8 1,3 66 0,1 0,2 42 0,6 0,8 40 0,1 0,3 251
LV 2,3 1,7 -26 0,3 0,2 -34 1,6 0,9 -43 0,4 0,6 48
LT 3,4 2,5 -24 0,5 0,3 -39 2,3 1,3 -42 0,5 0,9 66
LU 0,5 0,7 52 0,1 0,1 35 0,3 0,4 35 0,1 0,2 153
HU 10,0 8,7 -13 1,5 1,1 -27 6,9 4,8 -30 1,6 2,8 71
MT 0,4 0,4 -1 0,1 0,1 -23 0,3 0,2 -23 0,1 0,1 131
NL 16,4 16,6 1 2,9 2,5 -15 11,1 9,6 -13 2,4 4,5 87
AT 8,3 9,0 8 1,3 1,2 -2 5,6 5,2 -8 1,4 2,6 83
PL 38,1 31,1 -18 5,9 3,5 -40 27,1 16,3 -40 5,1 11,3 120
PT 10,6 11,3 6 1,6 1,4 -11 7,1 6,3 -11 1,8 3,5 88
RO 21,4 16,9 -21 3,3 1,9 -40 15,0 9,1 -39 3,2 5,9 85
SI 2,0 1,8 -12 0,3 0,2 -19 1,4 1,0 -32 0,3 0,6 83
SK 5,4 4,5 -16 0,9 0,5 -40 3,9 2,4 -39 0,6 1,6 154
FI 5,3 5,4 2 0,9 0,9 -5 3,5 3,0 -14 0,9 1,5 72
SE 9,2 10,9 18 1,5 1,8 16 6,0 6,2 3 1,6 2,9 80
UK 61,3 76,7 25 10,7 12,7 18 40,7 45,0 11 9,9 19,0 92
NO 4,7 6,0 27 0,9 1,0 11 3,1 3,5 11 0,7 1,5 121
EU27 495,4 505,7 2 77,5 71,0 -9 333,2 283,3 -15 84,6 151,5 79
EU15 392,2 420,5 7 62,0 60,9 -2 260,7 237,7 -9 69,5 121,9 75
EU12 103,2 85,2 -17 15,5 10,1 -35 72,6 45,6 -37 15,1 29,5 96
Total population Young population (1-14) Working-age population (15-64) Elderly population (65+)
 
Source: Eurostat 
Graph 5 Total population of 27 EU Member States in 2008 (actual data) and 2060 (Eurostat 
projections) according to age (in thousands of persons) 
 
Source: European Commission and EPC (2009) 
3.3.  Is age or health status a more important driver of spending on health care? 
On the basis of available evidence one can argue that cost of health care increases with age, 
but it is health status of an individual (and - in aggregate terms - of the population), rather 
than age itself, which is the ultimate driving factor. 
The macroeconomic evidence on the relationship between age and health care costs is 
ambiguous. While some studies have brought no evidence on significant relationship   14  
(Gerdtham et al. 1998, Getzen 1992, Leu 1986, O'Connell 1996), the others argue that the age 
structure of the population is an important regressor for average health care expenditure per 
capita (Hitiris and Posnett 1992, Gerdtham et al. 1992a). What is undoubtedly true and shown 
by a large amount of cross-sectional data is the positive relationship between age of an 
individual and spending on his/her health care. Empirical evidence, based on the data from a 
set of industrialised countries, shows that total health care provided to an average person of 
over 65 years of age costs from 2.7 to 4.8 times (according to Anderson and Hussey 2000) or 
from 2.8 (Germany) to 5.3 (Japan)
12 times (according to Reinhardt 2000) as much as health 
care provided to an average person aged 0-64. According to the other calculations, 35-50% of 
total health expenditure is spent on elderly people (Jacobzone 2002).  
Differences have been documented between the subsets of elderly cohort. Both Fuchs (1998b) 
and Cutler and Meara (1999) have provided evidence that per capita health expenditures 
amongst the those aged (+85 years old) are twice as high as for the age group 75-84 years, 
and three times as high as for the group 65-74 years.  
A very important issue is whether the ratio of health spending between different age cohorts 
remains stable over time. Some studies (e.g. Productivity Commission 2004, Health Canada 
2001) conclude that it does. However, other studies reject this finding. Cutler and Meara 
(1997 and 1999), Fuchs (1998a), and Andersson and Hussey (2000) provide the evidence that 
health care spending for elderly has been increasing over recent decades at a faster pace than 
for the younger cohorts leading to growing gaps in costs between different age groups. Using 
recent data on health care from several countries, Grignon (2003) finds that the age profile of 
health care expenditure became more ‘rectangular’
13 over the period 1992-1997. As this trend 
seems to be persistent over time, he argues that one should not assume constancy of age-
related expenditure profiles over the long-term when making projections. To address this 
problem, one needs to explain the exact relationship between the age and expenditure, or 
more precisely to divide the total impact of ageing into two separate effects: a ‘pure’ age 
effect and an effect linked to state of health.  
Indeed, recent research has proven that a one-way causal relationship between age and 
spending on health care is too simplistic. Over time, there is no clear link at the aggregate 
level between levels of spending on health care and the demographic situation of societies 
(Jacobzone 2002). In fact, several studies have found that the impact of ageing on increase in 
health expenditures is limited to as little as a few percentage points of this increase 
(Newhouse 1992; L’Horty et al. 1997; Cutler 1995). 
Grignon (2003) concludes that, on the basis of recent data, the major factor which explains 
the relationship between age and health spending is morbidity: each consecutive disease 
                                                 
12 The very high value in Japan should be regarded with a great deal of caution. The reason is probably the 
fact that legal arrangements in Japan create incentives for older people to stay in hospitals (where they are 
entitled to much more allowances and privileges than in the out-patient treatment). This results in a phenomenon 
of ‘bed blockers’, confirmed by the data: in 2002 the average length of stay in in-patient care (done mostly by 
the elderly) amounted to 37.5 days, while in the other OECD countries it was below or around 10 days. (OECD 
Health Data 2004)  
13 Literally ‘le creusement du profil’ which means that the elderly consume more and more health care 
relatively to the younger cohorts. Not to be confused with the rectangularisation of the survival curve, which 
means growing survival rate/falling mortality rate of each age cohort (the term currently applies in practice to 
the oldest cohorts, as in case of the younger people mortality has already reached marginal rates and the further 
improvement is virtually not visible).   15  
increases yearly spending by a growing amount
14. At the same time, expenditure tends to be 
much higher if a person has a complementary insurance coverage. Given the fact that 
insurance coverage is much narrower among the elderly than among the young (either they 
are not used to use insurance services, or they do not find them profitable enough), this 
phenomenon reduces the divergence in spending between the two age categories. 
Consequently, having accounted for the two previous factors, the author finds that health 
spending is negatively rather than positively correlated with the age.  
Most statistical data and empirical evidence tend to confirm the findings on the 'age structure' 
of health care provision costs. This is also the case of the most recent data provided by the EU 
Member States in the framework of the long-term budgetary projection exercise. The data 
have been reported in the form of age-related expenditure profiles, showing the average 
spending on health care for each gender and age cohort (see Box 1). When analyzing the data, 
caution should be exercised, as the age profiles suggest a correlation between age and 
developments in health care spending over one’s lifespan, while in fact health status rather 
than age is the causal factor which drives changes in health care spending. Moreover, one 
should bear in mind that age-related expenditure profiles, rather than being direct measures of 
morbidity or the need for health care services, are the sum of those and other demand and 
supply factors that affect health care use, such as availability of services and treatments and 
age-related rationing.  
Box 1 Age-related expenditure profiles – empirical data used in the projections 
In the framework of the 2009 AWG budgetary projections, age-related expenditure profiles have been 
provided by twenty four countries (BE, BG, CZ, DE, EE, ES, FR, IT, CY, LV, LT, LU, HU, MT, NL, 
AT, PL, PT, SI, SK, FI, SE, UK, NO). The data have been gathered according to the precise guidelines 
based on the System of Health Accounts classification of health care activities
15 and, if necessary, 
adjusted to correspond to the official OECD/Eurostat figures on public health care expenditure
16. For 
the countries which have not provided the data on per capita spending profiles, the average EU15 or 
EU12 age profiles
17 have been used, adjusted according to the same mechanism.  
Graph 6 and Graph 7 show the age-related expenditure profiles for Member States for which data is 
available and for the average of EU15 and EU12 (RAMS). Table 3 presents the key figures on age-
related expenditure profiles, for a number of older age cohorts. Based on these data several 
conclusions can be drawn: 
•  in nearly all Member States, and for EU15 and EU12 aggregates, age-related expenditures for older 
cohorts are considerably higher for males than for females, while for the younger cohorts the 
opposite applies, although the gap is much less pronounced;  
•  nominal spending on health is much higher in EU15 than in EU12 countries. EU15 countries spend 
about 5-6 times more (expressed in euros) on an average elderly person, than EU12 countries. The 
                                                 
14 e.g. for a man of 65 years of age first illness increases, ceteris paribus, the yearly spending by 360€, the 
second one by 620€, and the fourth one by 1830€. See: Grignon (2003), p.3. 
15 OECD (2000), A System of Health Accounts.  
16 The shape of the profiles (proportion between per capita costs of any two cohorts) has been kept constant, 
while the nominal level has been adjusted in a way that the sum of per capita costs multiplied by the population 
of each cohort equalled total public health care expenditure in 2007.  
17 Two separate average profiles are used because, as visible on graph 7, there is a clear difference in the 
shape of the curve between the Old and the Recently Acceded Member States. The share of GDP per capita 
spent on health care is comparable up to the age of 60-65, but the shape shows an increasing gap in spending on 
people in their older ages   16  
gap is less pronounced in real terms (expressed in comparison to GDP per capita), but still 
significant. Moreover, the gap between the two groups of countries grows noticeably with age. 
While the difference in real spending between EU15 and EU12 for the cohort aged 60-64 is around 
1-1.5% of GDP per capita, it grows up to 5-7% of GDP for the cohort 90-94. 
•  expressed as a share of per capita GDP, there is a visible difference in the age-related spending 
profiles between EU15 and EU12 countries
18. First, in most EU15 countries, spending peaks at 
between 15 and 20% of per capita GDP compared to between 5 and 15% in most EU12 countries. 
Second, peak spending occurs somewhat later in EU15 countries in the cohort aged 85 to 90 
compared with the EU10 where it occurs in the 75-80 cohort. Thirdly, there appears to be a much 
sharper tailing-off in spending for the oldest age-cohorts in EU12 countries, which is not so much 
visible in the average figures influenced by the data from ‘outlying’ countries (Malta, Estonia, and 
Slovenia). 
Graph 6 Age-related expenditure profiles for individual EU Member States, males and 
females





















































































































































































Source: National data 
                                                 
18 A significant exception is Malta where the shape of the age profile resembles much more that of the 
average EU15 country. This is why Maltese data have not been taken into account when calculating EU10 
average profile. Furthermore, in all scenarios where composite age profiles are used both Malta and Cyprus have 
been assigned the EU15, rather than EU10 average profile.   17  
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Source: National data 
Table 3 Comparison of the age-related expenditure profiles 
in euros
as % of 
GDP p.c. in euros
as % of 
GDP p.c. in euros
as % of 
GDP p.c. in euros
as % of 
GDP p.c. in euros
as % of 
GDP p.c. in euros
as % of 
GDP p.c. in euros
as % of 
GDP p.c. in euros
as % of 
GDP p.c.
BE 3677 11,8 5876 18,8 7165 22,9 7633 24,4 3581 11,5 5155 16,5 6359 20,3 6713 21,5
BG 276 7,3 333 8,9 304 8,1 184 4,9 276 7,3 333 8,9 304 8,1 184 4,9
CZ 1468 11,8 1986 15,9 2452 19,7 2535 20,3 1233 9,9 1549 12,4 1909 15,3 2026 16,3
DK 3684 8,8 5793 13,9 7859 18,8 8739 20,9 3372 8,1 5073 12,1 6870 16,4 7773 18,6
DE 2987 10,1 4833 16,4 6330 21,5 6812 23,1 2624 8,9 4100 13,9 5661 19,2 6246 21,2
EE 949 8,2 1323 11,4 2101 18,1 3116 26,9 733 6,3 896 7,7 984 8,5 1085 9,4
IE 4182 9,7 6577 15,3 8923 20,7 9921 23,1 3828 8,9 5760 13,4 7800 18,1 8825 20,5
EL 1449 7,1 2279 11,1 3091 15,1 3437 16,8 1326 6,5 1995 9,7 2702 13,2 3057 14,9
ES 2324 9,8 3075 13,0 4156 17,6 4197 17,8 2108 8,9 2842 12,0 2985 12,6 2937 12,4
FR 3415 11,1 5045 16,4 7250 23,6 7522 24,5 3415 11,1 5045 16,4 7250 23,6 7522 24,5
IT 2439 9,4 3795 14,6 4055 15,6 3262 12,6 1945 7,5 2845 11,0 3094 11,9 2774 10,7
CY 1241 6,2 2359 11,8 1836 9,2 1878 9,4 876 4,4 1315 6,6 1186 5,9 1182 5,9
LV 488 5,6 656 7,5 680 7,8 426 4,9 409 4,7 533 6,1 488 5,6 292 3,3
LT 633 7,6 864 10,4 948 11,5 750 9,1 523 6,3 687 8,3 687 8,3 506 6,1
LU 6144 8,1 9756 12,9 12254 16,1 13113 17,3 6065 8,0 8740 11,5 11457 15,1 11402 15,0
HU 1042 10,2 1457 14,3 1683 16,5 1271 12,5 967 9,5 1283 12,6 1428 14,0 1289 12,7
MT 998 7,5 1732 13,0 3105 23,4 5953 44,8 863 6,5 1601 12,1 3651 27,5 5031 37,9
NL 2289 6,7 3689 10,8 4940 14,4 5132 15,0 2227 6,5 3283 9,6 4324 12,6 4451 13,0
AT 3473 10,6 5175 15,7 6766 20,6 6738 20,5 3135 9,5 4552 13,9 5979 18,2 5960 18,1
PL 608 7,5 855 10,6 782 9,7 582 7,2 508 6,3 650 8,1 600 7,4 473 5,9
PT 1757 11,4 2593 16,9 3577 23,3 4575 29,8 1236 8,1 1778 11,6 2659 17,3 3773 24,6
RO 349 6,1 501 8,8 585 10,3 650 11,5 304 5,4 408 7,2 482 8,5 488 8,6
SI 1590 9,5 2383 14,3 2981 17,9 3212 19,2 1486 8,9 2038 12,2 2496 15,0 2548 15,3
SK 1022 10,1 1364 13,4 1210 11,9 1181 11,6 998 9,8 1253 12,3 1121 11,0 1101 10,8
FI 2777 8,2 4025 11,9 6748 19,9 7954 23,5 2603 7,7 3444 10,2 5139 15,2 5888 17,4
SE 3593 9,9 5294 14,5 7037 19,3 6238 17,1 3577 9,8 4806 13,2 6660 18,3 6316 17,3
UK 2179 6,6 5585 16,8 9160 27,6 14644 44,1 2179 6,6 5585 16,8 9160 27,6 14644 44,1
EU15 46370 9,1 73391 14,4 99312 19,5 109916 21,6 43221 8,5 65003 12,8 88099 17,3 98282 19,3
EU12 10662 8,3 15812 12,3 18667 14,5 21738 16,9 9176 7,1 12546 9,7 15334 11,9 16205 12,6
females males
60-64 70-74 80-84 90-94 60-64 70-74 80-84 90-94
 
Source: National data 
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3.4.  Trends in morbidity and mortality 
There is an ongoing debate in the literature on the extent to which health status (or morbidity) 
of the population may change over time in relation to the growing life expectancy. 
Traditionally, a decrease in mortality rates was considered to reflect the improvement in the 
health status of the population, i.e. a decrease in morbidity. Since reliable empirical evidence 
(life-tables, precise data on mortality, disability and morbidity) became available, this simple 
relationship is no longer supported by the data. As the alternative explanations have been 
sought for the counter-intuitive findings, different theories have emerged, reflecting different 
views over the possible drivers of change and expected future developments. Three main 
hypotheses which are quoted in the literature differ mainly by the driver deemed responsible 
for the observed decline in mortality rates in the old age and, consequently, by the expected 
impact on the difference between total and healthy life expectancy.  
The expansion of morbidity hypothesis was established by Gruenberg (1977), Olshansky et 
al. (1991) and Verbrugge (1984) and empirically supported by Guralnik (1991). It assumes 
that the increases in longevity are achieved mainly by the growing capabilities of medicine to 
prevent fatal outcomes of degenerative diseases, while the pattern of disease remains broadly 
constant. Therefore, mortality rates decrease over time but, assuming inability of medicine to 
cure age-related pathologies, prevalence rates increase as people live longer and become, with 
the age, more vulnerable to chronic diseases. Moreover, a chronic disease can act as a risk 
factor for other illnesses (for example, a disease suffered earlier in lifetime can have negative 
consequences later on: a non-fatal disease may not translate directly into higher mortality, but 
into higher morbidity and disability). Consequently, as their life expectancy increases, people 
spend most of those additional years of life in bad health or, in other words, a higher 
proportion of people with health problems survive to an advanced age. 
Overall, this hypothesis can be considered as a pessimistic one, which is illustrative of what 
could happen if there were no improvements in the disease pattern over the lifespan.   
The compression of morbidity hypothesis proposed by Fries (1980, 1983, 1989, 1993), 
assumes that increases in life expectancy are driven mainly by changes in underlying patterns 
of disease and people live longer because the onset of chronic degenerative diseases is being 
postponed to later ages. This can be due to improved living conditions, healthier life style or 
the fact that more and more chronic diseases may be curable. However, according to the 
hypothesis, humankind has a genetically determined — albeit individually variable — limit to 






                                                 
19 This hypothesis has been challenged later by several authors (see: Oeppen and Vaupel 2002, Robine and 
Vaupel 2002, Robine et al. 2005)   19  
morbidity and disability will be gradually compressed at very old ages (into the last years of 
life) and the number of years spent with diseases or disabilities will decrease over time
20. 
Thus, healthy life expectancy grows by more than total life expectancy
21. 
The dynamic equilibrium/postponement of morbidity hypothesis was proposed by Manton et 
al. (1995). It posits that the postponement of death to higher ages due to falling mortality is 
accompanied by a parallel postponement of morbidity and/or disability. Consequently, 
healthy life expectancy grows broadly at the same rate as total life expectancy (the number of 
years spent in bad health remains the same). The term ‘dynamic equilibrium’ is meant to 
capture the overall changes in life expectancy and severe disability, and as such it is a 
simplified version of a more sophisticated theory proposed earlier by Manton (1982), which 
argued that an increased survival may lead to an increase in the number of years spent in bad 
health. However, the time spent with severe morbidity and disability remains approximately 
constant due to the fact that medical treatments and improvement in lifestyles reduce the rate 
of progression from less severe to more severe – and disabling – disease states. Thus, not 
everybody will enjoy the benefits of all gains in life expectancy being spent in full health. 
Instead, part of the gains in life expectancy may be spent in moderate health and the 
prevalence of chronic illnesses may increase; however, severe disability which is connected 
to the most costly part of health care services may be postponed to the final phase of life 
(meaning that age-related disability rates could decline). These effects may cancel out so that 
the average number of years spent in morbidity would remain unchanged. 
The three presented hypotheses are schematically illustrated on Graph 8
22, where the lighter 
shaded areas show the years spent in good health (healthy life years) and dark shaded area 
years lived with disability/morbidity. 
                                                 
20 In fact, the growth rate of disability-free life expectancy may be temporarily lower than growth rate of 
total life expectancy, but when total life expectancy is approaching the limit, further improvements in health of 
population lead to fast increase in disability-free life expectancy. 
21 It is worth mentioning that simple but not exclusive distinction between compression and expansion of 
morbidity has been developed to include all possible states of the world. Robine and Mathers (1993) proposed 
for example a wider classification, based on the concept of life expectancy with and without disability and its 
relations with total life expectancy. According to them, an increase in life expectancy without disability can be 
called absolute compression of morbidity/disability; a decrease in life expectancy without disability – absolute 
expansion of morbidity/disability; a decrease in proportion of life spent with disability together with an increase 
in the number of years with disability – relative compression of morbidity/disability; and an increase in 
proportion of life spent with disability together with a decrease in the number of years with disability – relative 
expansion of morbidity/disability.    
22 For an overview of existing theories see: Nusselder (2003)   20  
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The answer to the question of which hypothesis best reflects reality depends on the causal 
relationship between morbidity and mortality. If mortality decline is the result of positive 
health developments, it is accompanied in most cases by an increase in the number of years 
spent without morbidity and disability. If, on the other hand, reduced mortality is only the 
result of postponing death without any (or much) improvement in health, the extra years will 
be spent mainly in bad health.  
Recent studies have not provided strong evidence confirming or discarding any of the above 
hypotheses. Opinions on future directions depend on whether one takes:  
•  a pessimistic view, where the extension of life expectancy is due only to the improvement 
of survival technologies and therefore is achieved at the cost of the permanent loss of 
health. All years of life gained in this way will be spent in bad health, thus the expenditure 
savings gained thanks to lower mortality (and lower death-related costs) will be offset by 
increased health care and long-term care spending; 
•  an optimistic view, where the increase in life expectancy is the result of better health. At 
each age people are healthier and thus fewer of them die. This leads obviously to decrease 
in health care spending because of fall in both death-related costs and health care costs. 
Evidence provided has differed significantly over time, across countries, and also across 
sexes. Jagger et al. (2009) have analysed the data from thirteen European countries over the 
period 1995-2001. They have found an overall increasing trend in life expectancy, but 
considerable heterogeneity in trends in health expectancy. Batljan and Lagergren (2000) 
found that even if existing state of research does not allow for any conclusive statements, 
most empirical data support the hypothesis of morbidity postponement. Howse (2006), on the 
other hand, suggests that morbidity compression hypothesis can be hardly supported by recent 
data. 
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3.5.  Death-related costs 
Another approach offering an alternative explanation of the differences in health care 
spending across age cohorts is linked to the existence of so-called death-related costs. As 
available data suggests, a primary factor behind the increase in costs as people become older 
is not the age itself, but the nearness of death. As shown in many studies, the largest part of 
life-long health care costs is borne in the ultimate period of a person’s life, in the last few 
years or even months before one's death. According to this hypothesis health expenditure on 
older age groups is high, not so much because their morbidity or disability rates are higher, 
but because a larger percentage of the persons in those age cohorts die within a short period 
of time.  
There is a growing stock of empirical research analysing and quantifying the impact of these 
‘death-related costs’. The first to find a positive relationship between health care costs and the 
remaining time to death were Roos et al. (1987). Their findings were confirmed by a number 
of further studies by e.g. Lubitz and Riley (1993), Cutler and Meara (1999), Zweifel et al. 
(1999), Serup-Hansen et al. (2002), Batljan and Lagergren (2004)
23. 
The time 'close to death' is defined differently in different studies. In most cases, the analysis 
covers only the last one or two years of life. Some authors, e.g. Zweifel et al. (1999) and 
Caisse Nationale (2003), argue that the correlation between time to death and health care 
spending exists only during the last two years of life and practically disappear once the time 
span broadens to three or more years from the moment of death. Such an assumption is 
rejected, however, by Batljan and Lagergren (2004), who investigate impact on health care 
and long-term care spending further away from the moment of death. According to their 
findings, the impact, although much weaker, exists even up to six years before death.  
Cutler and Meara (1999), Zweifel et al. (1999) and Steinmann et al. (2005), using respectively 
US and Swiss data, argue that, controlling for health status and proximity to death, age itself 
does not have an effect on health care spending. Instead, there is a transmission mechanism in 
which the intermediate variable between the age and health care consumption is health status 
(higher morbidity and disability incidence at higher ages) and proximity to death. 
Another question refers to the pattern according to which death-related costs change with age 
of a person. The hypothesis of the constancy of per capita costs over the lifespan can be 
explained in the following way. While the medical treatment to save a young person’s life is 
on average much more costly than the treatment needed to save an older person, many more 
young people die in accidents which impose little or no costs for health services. Therefore, 
the two effects may offset each other, at least partially.  
However, this hypothesis has been challenged by many authors. Seshamani and Gray (2004a), 
using the British data, indicate that the age does matter, although do not question the 
importance of proximity to death as an explanatory variable for increase in health care 
spending. Brockmann (2002) strongly supports this critique, arguing that in Germany hospital 
care expenses on the elderly decrease significantly with age and the expenditure curve for 
non-surviving patients drops almost linearly until it flattens out at the highest ages. 
Furthermore, most available studies on European data agree on the direction of the evolution 
of the ratio of costs borne by a decedent and those borne by a survivor over the lifespan. 
                                                 
23 A good overview of the existing empirical studies is provided in Reitano (2006).   22  
Although Madsen (2004), Busse et al. (2002), Ahn et al. (2005), Gabriele et al. (2005), Riedel 
et al. (2002) vary significantly in relation to the nominal value of the ratio, they all agree that 
it increases sharply from birth to the age of 10-20 when it reaches its peak and gradually falls 
thereafter to approach 1 at the highest ages for which data exist. Finally, Lubitz and Riley 
(1993) agree that the ratio decreases with age for the elderly (65+)
24, but find no conclusive 
evidence as far as the whole lifespan is concerned. These observations, confirmed also by 
Grignon (2003) using French data and Levinsky et al. (2001) using US data, may be 
explained by three phenomena: 
•  health care rationing done by doctors, for either utilitarian (devoting limited resources 
on the treatment of younger age cohorts) or professional reasons (e.g. less knowledge 
about the treatment of the elderly, the higher probability of death among older 
patients); 
 
•  voluntary restraining from receiving health care by older people who find the 
investment in health will not pay back any more; 
 
•  generation effect which reflects differences in perceived needs, mentality and habits 
between older and younger generations. 
 
Another key question is whether this ratio changes over time, but it remains unanswered, 
mostly due to the lack of longer time series needed for reliable intertemporal comparisons. 
Most researchers (e.g. Lubitz and Riley 1993, Garber et al. 1998), argue that the ratio remains 
broadly constant for each age group respectively. However, others, like Zweifel et al. (1999) 
show evidence of its strong decreasing trend over time.  
Overall, the literature indicates that the higher share of a gender/age group is in its terminal 
period of life, the higher is its average health care and long-term care expenditure. This is an 
important conclusion for the possible consequences of population ageing on health care and 
long-term care costs.  
The inclusion of death-related costs in calculating health care expenditure deserves a special 
consideration in the context of the ageing population. The rationale behind it stems from the 
fact that the last years of life, irrespective of how long people live, are associated with high 
health care costs, but as population ages the share of those in terminal phase of their life gets 
smaller and smaller in each age cohort. Consequently, the effect of ageing on spending is 
smoothened as decline in the number of people who, in a given age group, have few 
remaining years of life results in the fall in average health care cost for all age groups, except 
for the oldest age cohorts
25. 
 
                                                 
24 The opposite conclusion is drawn by Roos et al. (1987). Using Canadian data, they conclude that total 
health costs among decedents increase with age. This result is probably due the data sources used which cover 
not only acute care and visits to physicians, but also stays in the nursing homes, which as an element of long-
term care is very closely correlated with age.  
 
25 This observation shows that the proposed method is theoretically consistent with dynamic equilibrium 
hypothesis, according to which falling mortality rate (and thus growing life expectancy) for each age cohort is 
associated with a parallel decline in morbidity/disability rate, which results in a fall in health care spending in 
each age cohort.   23  
 
Box 2 Death-related costs – empirical data 
To quantify the significance of death related costs, data is needed on the difference in health care costs 
borne by decedents (people who are going to die within a predefined short period of time) and 
survivors (people who are not in their terminal phase of life). As mentioned above, some data are 
available in the academic studies, but only at the national or regional level. Unfortunately, given the 
lack of common methodology there are considerable differences between the datasets as regards 
technique of measurement, the degree of precision, sample size, time and space coverage, definition of 
decedent and survivor status, and other characteristics. Moreover, no study provides an estimate of 
death-related costs covering total health care spending (inpatient care + outpatient care + day care + 
home care). Instead, most studies provide data only on inpatient hospital care expenditure per capita 
which is then taken as a proxy for total health care expenditure per capita.  
To address high risk of incomparability of the data gathered from academic sources, Member States 
gathered in the Ageing Working Group were asked to provide data on death-related costs available in 
their official databases. Thirteen Member States provided the data, whose general characteristics for 
males and females respectively are summarised in Table 4 and Table 5. In particular, it shows the ratio 
of spending on a person of a particular age who dies within one year compared with a person who 
survives that period. For example, spending on health care provided to an average male child aged 0-4 
who dies within a particular year is on average 25.9 times higher compared with an average child of 
the same age who survives.  
There appears to be a clear pattern of decline in the ratio of spending on decedents to survivors with 
age. Moreover, while the ratios diverge widely across countries at younger age cohorts, there is less 
dispersion amongst older age cohorts where most deaths occur. However, due to different 
methodologies of data gathering, calculation (e.g. ratio of decedents to survivors differs when 
calculated on the basis of per capita and per patient spending) and coverage (e.g. either only hospital 
patients or also other cases taken into account), the data varies significantly across the Member States. 
For example, Spain and Austria appear to be outliers for both males and females across all age cohorts, 
with a respectively much lower and higher ratio compared with other countries
26.  
                                                 
26 The Spanish case provides an example of how sensitive are the results to changes in the methodology of 
calculating death-related costs. The ratio used in the projections (ranging from around 7 for the age cohorts 5-35 
to 1.3 for the 80+) is calculated by dividing per patient cost of decedents (patients) by the per patient cost of 
survivors (patients). Meanwhile, using a different methodology of dividing the per discharge cost of decedent 
(discharges) by the per capita cost of survival discharges, gives extremely different results, ranging from 228 for 
age cohort 10-14 to 7 for the 80+. Slightly different is the case of Austria. Given lack of precise information 
about costs borne by people dying outside hospitals, Austrian statistics include two sets of data according to two 
opposite (extreme) assumptions: in the first case deaths occurring outside hospitals are assumed not to generate 
any costs at all, while in the second case death cases outside hospitals are assumed to cause the same costs as 
those in hospitals. The ratio of costs borne by decedents to those of survivors shows similar decreasing pattern 
with age, but differs significantly in value between the two situations: while in the first dataset it ranges from 
74.2 for age cohort 10-14 to 3.1 for the 85+, in the second dataset it amounts to 121.6 for the aged 10-14 and 7.3 
for the 85+. 
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Table 4 Ratio between cost borne by a decedent and a survivor, by age cohort - males  
BE CZ DK DE ES FR IT NL AT PL FI SE UK EU average
0-4 14,0 34,5 10,6 29,2 4,8 6,5 68,0 31,7 34,7 25,7 28,6 15,9 14,6 24,5
5-9 23,0 55,3 10,6 29,2 7,8 6,5 79,5 39,6 34,7 47,0 32,1 15,9 14,6 30,5
10-14 37,7 74,0 10,6 29,2 6,8 6,5 73,1 26,9 53,1 40,7 25,7 15,9 14,6 31,9
15-19 12,1 31,0 10,6 29,2 4,8 6,5 38,7 21,6 53,1 29,5 12,9 15,9 14,6 21,6
20-24 10,0 17,1 10,6 29,2 4,4 6,5 26,0 47,4 39,2 23,0 10,0 15,9 14,6 19,5
25-29 9,0 19,1 10,6 30,8 4,4 6,5 29,0 38,0 39,2 27,4 8,6 15,9 14,6 19,5
30-34 14,6 23,1 10,6 30,8 3,8 6,5 30,4 25,3 35,6 21,2 8,6 15,9 14,6 18,5
35-39 11,0 20,2 10,6 31,0 3,6 6,5 40,5 26,7 35,6 18,3 9,3 15,9 14,6 18,8
40-44 12,7 19,2 10,6 31,0 3,1 6,5 35,3 17,0 28,0 13,6 11,4 15,9 14,6 16,8
45-49 10,9 16,8 10,6 21,1 2,9 8,3 30,9 15,1 17,6 11,1 11,9 15,9 14,6 14,5
50-54 8,8 11,0 10,6 21,1 2,8 8,3 21,1 14,2 15,2 8,9 9,8 15,9 14,6 12,5
55-59 8,5 8,1 10,6 17,6 2,6 3,3 17,1 8,8 12,1 7,8 6,4 15,9 14,6 10,3
60-64 7,3 7,2 8,0 17,6 2,5 3,3 12,1 8,3 9,8 6,6 4,7 15,9 14,6 9,1
65-69 5,6 5,4 8,0 12,0 2,3 2,4 8,5 6,4 8,5 5,6 4,3 15,9 14,6 7,7
70-74 4,5 4,3 4,8 12,0 2,2 2,4 6,2 5,1 6,2 4,5 3,7 15,9 17,9 6,9
75-79 3,3 3,5 4,8 6,6 2,0 2,8 4,5 4,1 4,6 3,9 2,8 15,9 20,5 6,1
80-84 2,6 2,8 2,4 6,6 1,7 2,8 3,3 3,4 3,3 3,3 2,1 15,9 21,9 5,6
85-89 2,0 2,3 2,4 4,3 1,7 1,8 2,5 3,0 2,7 3,0 1,7 15,9 21,8 5,0
90-94 1,7 2,3 1,8 4,3 1,7 1,8 1,7 2,5 2,0 2,9 1,3 15,9 20,4 4,6
95-99 1,3 2,3 1,8 4,3 1,7 1,8 1,7 2,0 2,0 3,0 1,3 15,9 17,6 4,4
100+ 0,7 2,3 1,8 4,3 1,7 1,8 1,7 2,0 2,0 3,0 1,3 15,9 17,6 4,3  
Note: A decedent is defined here as a person who will die within one year, a survivor – as a person who will 
survive at least one year. The Swedish study analyses the effect of the end of life up to six years prior to death, 
but does not differentiate between age cohorts.   
Source: DG ECFIN calculations based on national sources  
Table 5 Ratio between cost borne by a decedent and a survivor, by age cohort - females  
BE CZ DK DE ES FR IT NL AT PL FI SE UK EU average
0-4 19,2 43,5 10,6 29,2 4,4 6,5 79,5 79,1 58,4 39,7 28,6 13,7 15,2 32,9
5-9 39,7 48,2 10,6 29,2 4,8 6,5 163,0 60,0 58,4 50,3 32,1 13,7 15,2 40,9
10-14 15,0 42,5 10,6 29,2 7,8 6,5 101,4 43,3 78,2 49,3 25,7 13,7 15,2 33,7
15-19 13,0 26,2 10,6 29,2 6,6 6,5 46,7 24,7 78,2 37,3 12,9 13,7 15,2 24,7
20-24 15,5 26,2 10,6 29,2 6,0 6,5 32,5 33,2 32,7 26,1 10,0 13,7 15,2 19,8
25-29 8,2 28,7 10,6 30,8 7,2 6,5 25,5 10,4 32,7 24,5 8,6 13,7 15,2 17,1
30-34 11,7 32,0 10,6 30,8 7,1 6,5 28,4 18,9 33,7 25,6 8,6 13,7 15,2 18,7
35-39 13,5 25,7 10,6 31,0 5,6 6,5 37,2 23,5 33,7 23,0 9,3 13,7 15,2 19,1
40-44 15,5 20,4 10,6 31,0 3,9 6,5 40,7 18,1 27,9 20,5 11,4 13,7 15,2 18,1
45-49 11,3 17,1 10,6 21,1 3,1 8,3 31,5 17,2 20,7 15,1 11,9 13,7 15,2 15,1
50-54 12,2 13,6 10,6 21,1 3,1 8,3 26,9 15,5 16,5 12,3 9,8 13,7 15,2 13,8
55-59 10,7 10,7 10,6 17,6 3,0 3,3 23,7 12,9 14,9 10,9 6,4 13,7 15,2 11,8
60-64 8,0 10,0 8,0 17,6 2,8 3,3 16,8 12,4 12,4 9,3 4,7 13,7 15,2 10,3
65-69 6,8 6,8 8,0 12,0 2,5 2,4 11,9 8,3 10,1 7,4 4,3 13,7 15,2 8,4
70-74 5,0 5,1 4,8 12,0 2,2 2,4 8,2 6,4 7,4 5,6 3,7 13,7 17,2 7,2
75-79 3,5 3,7 4,8 6,6 2,0 2,8 5,4 4,6 4,9 4,4 2,8 13,7 18,2 6,0
80-84 2,4 2,9 2,4 6,6 1,6 2,8 3,8 3,1 3,5 3,7 2,1 13,7 18,2 5,1
85-89 1,7 2,2 2,4 4,3 1,6 1,8 2,6 2,5 2,7 3,3 1,7 13,7 16,9 4,4
90-94 1,4 2,2 1,8 4,3 1,6 1,8 1,7 2,0 2,3 2,8 1,3 13,7 14,7 4,0
95-99 1,1 2,2 1,8 4,3 1,6 1,8 1,7 1,7 2,3 2,6 1,3 13,7 11,8 3,7
100+ 1,0 2,2 1,8 4,3 1,6 1,8 1,7 1,7 2,3 2,6 1,3 13,7 11,8 3,7  
Note: A decedent is defined here as a person who will die within one year, a survivor – as a person who will 
survive at least one year. The Swedish study analyses the effect of the end of life up to six years prior to death, 
but does not differentiate between age cohorts.   
Source: DG ECFIN calculations based on national sources 
3.6.  Economic growth as a driver of health care spending 
GDP is considered to be one of the main factors behind evolution in health care spending
27. It 
has been shown (Newhouse 1977 and 1992; Leu 1986; Hitiris and Posnett 1992; Getzen 
1990; Murthy and Ukpolo 1994; Okunade and Murthy 2002; Productivity Commission 2004) 
that countries with higher GDP per capita, spend more on health care than the ones with lower 
income, not only in absolute terms, but also in relative terms (as percentage of their GDP). In 
                                                 
27 The opposite causal relationship: health status of the population being one of underlying forces driving 
economic growth has been also analysed in many studies (for a comprehensive overview, see: Suhrcke et al. 
2005), but is out of scope of the present paper focusing on health care expenditure.    25  
particular, Newhouse (1977) found that aggregate income explains about 92 per cent of the 
variance in the level of health-care expenditure between countries.  
However, due to the lack of data, the relationship between GDP and health care spending 
have been much more difficult to prove empirically in a dynamic setting of longitudinal 
studies (Kanavos and Mossialos 1999, Blomqvist and Carter 1996) than in the international 
comparisons. In fact, variations in health care expenditure can, only to a very limited extent, 
be attributed to the fluctuations of GDP growth over time. Only a few studies (e.g. Barros 
1998, Roberts 1999, Getzen 2000) have been able to prove that, due to the lack of other 
reliable variables, GDP is the only factor to have a significant impact on health expenditure 
growth.  
While it is broadly acknowledged that higher national income translates into higher health 
care expenditure (both total and public), the coefficient of correlation, or the income elasticity 
of demand for health care remains an apple of discord among the researchers. 
Most macroeconomic studies based on aggregate data (e.g. Gertler and van der Gaag 1990, 
Schieber 1990, Gerdtham et al. 1992, Getzen and Poullier 1992, Fogel 1999) find health care 
demand highly elastic, with coefficient exceeding one. This finding can be explained by 
considering health care as a ‘luxury good’ with an income elasticity exceeding one (Murillo et 
al. 1993; for a survey of literature on income elasticity of health care elasticity see: Kanavos 
and Mossialos 1996). Such view was first proposed by Newhouse (1977) who argued that at 
the margin the demand for health care is related more to ‘caring’ (subjective components of 
health) than to ‘curing’ (physical health). Moreover, to add a temporal dimension, one may 
argue that health care would be considered a luxury good in poorer countries, and a normal 
good (with unitary or lower elasticity) in the richest industrialised countries, which would 
explain a catch-up process of the poorer countries to the high standards of health care already 
achieved by the richer ones. The 'luxury good' concept has been challenged in the most recent 
studies (e.g. Baltagi and Moscone 2010) which, using the panel data, have estimated income 
elasticity as significantly lower than one. 
Value of elasticity of health care expenditure is a fundamental issue when making expenditure 
projections. Budgetary projections look at aggregate measures, which in terms of incentives 
differ from health care consumption seen from a microeconomic perspective of an individual. 
The elasticity of an individual’s spending on health care in relation to income depends on 
whether a treatment/medicine is covered by a universal or facultative insurance. If an 
individual has health insurance, marginal spending on health care does not depend on his or 
her income: consequently the income elasticity of health care spending could be close to or 
even below zero. On the other hand, the situation may be reversed if a treatment or drug is not 
covered by universal insurance. In such case, health care may be considered as a luxury good, 
especially having in mind that treatments which are not covered by social insurance are those 
which in most cases do not save people’s life, but just ‘improve the quality of life’.  
None of the two situations described above reflect public spending at an aggregate level. On 
the one hand, as public health care spending is not part of a pooled fund and must be entirely 
covered by revenues, there is no moral hazard, no incentives for government to spend more, 
as is the case for individuals purchasing services and goods that are covered by universal 
insurance. This is why correlation between health care spending and income is much stronger 
at an aggregate than at an individual level. On the other hand, given budgetary constraints and 
caps on spending, public expenditures are not linearly correlated to GDP, especially in   26  
periods of fluctuating economic growth, when health budgets may depend on the political 
agenda rather than economic rationale. 
These arguments explain Getzen’s (2000) case that ‘health care is an individual necessity and 
a national luxury’. In other words, while individual income elasticities in the presence of 
health insurance are typically near or even less than zero, national health expenditure 
elasticities are commonly equal or greater than one. This hypothesis was supported 
empirically by comparing the results of several earlier studies focussing at both micro and 
macro level.  
An increase in health care expenditure exceeding income growth can also be explained 
looking as supply rather than demand side of health care. A phenomenon, called Baumol 
effect
28, is typical for the sectors which, due to the specific, mainly labour intensive 
technology of production, are characterised by a slow labour productivity growth. It is due to 
the fact that the increase in wages, which grow in line with the wages in overall economy, 
exceeds the output growth. The outcome is that the relative prices of the sector's production 
grow over time and its share in overall household or nation's consumption expenditure grows 
over time. The role and size of the effect has been studied in a number of studies (see e.g.: 
Nordhaus 2006, Hartwig 2007, Pomp and Vujić 2008)    
3.7.  Technology and medical progress 
Technological developments and constant evolution in the state of the art of medical science 
are arguably major factors affecting the level and rate of change in health care spending (see 
e.g. Jacobzone 2002; Fogel 2002; Fuchs 1998a). Medical technology can be defined as ‘the 
drugs (pharmaceuticals and vaccines), medical equipment, health-care procedures, supportive 
systems, and the administrative systems that can tie all these disparate elements together’
29, 
although given the overwhelming presence of IT technologies in virtually all spheres of 
health care, it is practically impossible to draw its precise borders. According to the earliest 
studies investigating the issue (Newhouse 1992, Cutler 1995), technology was supposed to 
account for between 50% and 75% of health care costs increases, the figure estimated as the 
residual left after the effects on expenditure of demographical change, income and the other 
quantifiable factors have been accounted for. Recently, with health care spending driven less 
and less by labour costs; these figures may be even higher. Indeed, Dormont et al. (2006) 
have found that over the period 1992-2000 in France the impact of changes in medical 
practices on increase in health care expenditure has been not only 3.8 times stronger than the 
effect of changes in the age structure of the population (+12.9% compared to +3.4%) but also 
more than offset the positive effects of changes in morbidity (-9.7%). 
More recent studies have attempted to focus directly on technology-driven changes in health 
care spending. Cutler and Meara (1997) and Fuchs (1998b) analysed the utilisation of 
frequently used technology-based medical procedures in the US. Both observed their rapid 
spread over the recent years, which led them to the conclusion that the diffusion of existing 
methodologies, rather than the emergence and implementation of new technologies, is major 
driving force behind the increase in medical spending. Similar conclusions, although using 
another proxy for technological development, were drawn by Okunade and Murthy (2002). 
They found empirical evidence that per capita health care expenditure responded to total 
                                                 
28 See: Baumol (1976) 
29 OECD (1998), p.9.   27  
(private and public) R&D spending and health R&D spending in the US during the 1960-
1997 period. 
An interesting feature of many medical innovations is that they can have two opposite, 
cancelling-out effects: simultaneously reducing unit costs and increasing total spending, as 
stated among others by Wanless (2002). Falling unit costs are the result of more efficient 
equipment and treatment practices. On the other hand, lower prices increase demand for 
health care, by making it more affordable for wider parts of population. Already existing 
treatment methods or drugs are modified to become cheaper and used by higher numbers of 
patients. The other ones, which have not been used in the past because the prices were 
prohibitively high, become available just because their prices fall to affordable levels. In such 
cases, reductions in unit cost may lead to such an increase in demand that the total spending 
rises.    
In practical terms, this phenomenon has been demonstrated by Cutler and Huckman (2002). 
Based on an example of a treatment for coronary artery disease (percutaneous transluminal 
coronary angioplasty, PTCA), they find that growth in the use of this technological 
innovation over the last two decades has led to higher total spending despite its decreasing 
unit cost. However, the magnitude of this increase was reduced by between 10% and 20% due 
to the substitution of PTCA for the older technologies. In addition, the increased use of PTCA 
appears to be a productivity improvement. 
Although less likely, the opposite effect may also take place. If demand for a given treatment 
is highly inelastic (thus a reduction in price, due to e.g. appearance of new competitive 
methods, does not lead to an increase in demand), then progress in technology and new 
discoveries may result in a fall in total spending. Furthermore, if the diffusion of new medical 
technologies leads to a lower prevalence of given diseases (or generally improves people’s 
health), it may result in lower need for specific treatments over the long term. One may view 
this as a trade off between current and future spending. Furthermore, technological progress 
does not only concern direct treatment techniques or more sophisticated drugs. Another 
aspect of the same process is an increasingly efficient organisation and administration of 
health care provision (better and faster access to the information on each patient, more 
effective division of work between different specialists), which has a definitely positive 
impact on spending, reducing the costs of health care provision. Still, even if the negative 
impact of technology on health care spending is theoretically possible, most empirical studies 
tend to argue in favour of the opposite pattern. 
Even if technology is considered to have the greatest impact on the health care spending, the 
patterns of its development and diffusion remain largely unknown. Although innovation can 
be basically considered as a constant process, groundbreaking discoveries affecting strongly 
health care spending are to a large extent unpredictable. Moreover, the issue of technological 
progress in the health care sector must be tackled in the knowledge that most new inventions 
take place in one country – the United States – which managed to create an efficient system of 
economic incentives for research and development, supported by government policy aiming 
at fostering close links between industry and academia, and protecting strong property rights 
of the new inventions. In this context, the development of medical technologies is highly 
dependent on the institutional and economic incentives provided to the researchers by the US 
government, which in turn are strongly influenced by the political and social situation in that 
country (Weisbrod, 1991). Further diffusion of technology depends in turn on the supply side 
factors: generous insurance payouts, state regulation of technology, degree of provider   28  
interaction or more general economic incentives related to the national governments’ and 
health-care systems’ propensity to pay for the modern technologies (see e.g. Cutler and 
McClellan, 1996),.  
Analysing all the above arguments, one must bear in mind that the impact of technology 
depends to a considerable degree on the legal and institutional framework for the provision 
and financing of health care which differ widely across the countries. Hence, in order to be 
able to fully assess the consequences of new technologies on health care expenditure, one 
needs a thorough international comparative analysis of health care systems' structure, 
institutions and embedded incentives driving patients', providers' and payers' decisions. 
3.8.  Institutional setting of health care system 
As mentioned above, the large differences in health care expenditure across different 
countries cannot be explained entirely by the demographic, economic or technological 
differences. Legal and institutional architecture of health care provision and financing is 
undoubtedly an important factor influencing the public and private spending in the sector. 
However, high complexity of the system and variety of its features makes it very difficult to 
quantify and compare across the countries. 
A number of classifications, stressing different aspects of system's architecture have been 
proposed in the literature
30. Most of them are constructed along following dimensions: 
•  health care coverage (to what extent population, wide range of services and cost of care 
are financed from public sources) 
•  financing mechanisms (institutions responsible for collection, pooling and distribution 
of funds) 
•  rules of remuneration of the providers (mechanisms to establish price and quantity of 
provided goods and services) 
                                                 
30 The OECD has established a general classification (according to the main characteristics of the schemes: ownership 
and management of the entities providing health care as well as the way of financing them) in which health care systems 
have been divided into three groups: 
(i) the public-integrated model links budgetary financing with public health care providers. It mainly concerns 
hospital care, with staff being employed as public-sector employees, while ambulatory doctors and other health care services 
providers are often private or independent contractors. This model facilitates universal coverage and aggregate cost 
containment as the health care spending is built into overall government budget limits. However, it may be less conducive to 
induce economic incentives favouring quality and efficiency.  
(ii) the public-contract model combines public payers (either a State agency or social security fund) with private 
health care providers. The advantages with respect to the other models are not unequivocal. While the single payer enjoys 
strong position against providers and can negotiate lower prices and better quality of services, the functioning of independent 
providers requires stricter regulation and supervision by public authorities and incurs higher administrative costs.  
(iii) the private insurance/provider model involves private insurance entities contracting private health care 
providers. Coverage may be mandatory or voluntary. With the strongest competitive base among the mentioned approaches, 
the model has the potential to guarantee wide responsiveness to patient needs and incentives for quality improvement, 
although the evidence of this having happened is mixed. An important additional drawback is the difficulty in ensuring price 
and cost control.   
See: OECD (2004b), pp.22-25. 
According to another classification, focussing on the way the health care systems are financed rather than on the ownership 
structure and contractual relations, the following three models can be constructed:   
(i) public tax-financed systems (so-called Beveridge model), 
(ii) systems financed through compulsory social security contributions (so-called Bismarck model)   
(iii) mixed or predominantly private financing (voluntary health insurance, out-of-pocket payments, various co-
funding schemes). 
See e.g. Busse et al. (2006).   29  
•  competition between providers and insurers (contractual relations between patients, 
providers and payers) 
 
There have been several attempts to specify the relationship between different health care 
models and the spending on health care. Although much work has been done to characterise 
and compare different health care systems, no conclusive evidence has been available so far 
as for their impact on total and public expenditure or their relative technical, allocative or 
procedural efficiency. A broad and simplified rule of thumb is that social health insurance 
countries tend to spend slightly more on health care than the national health service systems 
financed through general taxation (see e.g. Busse et al., 2006). This may be due to a number 
of features, characterising each function of the national health system, from the collection of 
resources through pooling them to the remuneration of providers
31.  
The statistical relationship between the financing mechanism and health care expenditure has 
been analysed by a number of authors, but the results are far from being conclusive. 
Gerdtham et al. (1992a and 1992b) concluded that public financing of health care services is 
associated with lower expenditures per capita, and that countries with fee for service as the 
dominant form of remuneration have higher expenditures. This is probably due to the strict 
control over health care providers in public-integrated systems. The opposite conclusions can 
be drawn from a series of studies analysing the institutional drivers of total health care 
expenditure. L’Horty et al. (1997) and Gerdtham (1992) found the positive correlation 
between health care spending and public insurance coverage. Leu (1986) argued theoretically 
that an increase in public health care provision may lead to an increase in total health care 
expenditure due to two possible effects: a reduction in the perceived price of health care on 
the part of consumers, and lower incentives for minimising costs in the public. Bac (2004) 
provided empirical evidence: an increase by 1 per cent of the share of health spending borne 
by the households' leads to the reduction in total spending by 1.4%. 
Some researchers, analysing mainly the US data, show that organisational differences 
between health care systems affect spending through an effect on the rate of adoption of new 
technologies by health care providers. Two general hypotheses have been formulated, 
namely: (i) competition amongst financing entities discourages the adoption of technology by 
all hospitals in an attempt to reduce costs, and (ii) competition rationalises the adoption of 
technology in hospitals. Cutler and Sheiner (1997) showed, using empirical evidence from 
several US states, the strong negative correlation between enrolment in managed care 
schemes
32 and the medical cost growth. This relationship works through the process of 
                                                 
31 To quote just a few possible arguments, one can mention that social health insurance is characterised by 
the existence of defined benefits to which all insured are entitled and which must be provided independently of 
their costs. Such benefit catalogues do not exist in most tax-financed systems, which leaves the authorities with 
a limited room to decide on the quantity and quality of services purchased according to their financial situation. 
Moreover, a closer analysis of inpatient care sector shows that the number of impatient admissions per 100 
population and year and particularly the length of stay is much higher (by 9% and 81% respectively) in social 
health insurance countries than in tax-financed systems, due to the predominant per-diem fees typical for the 
former type. Therefore, the main factor explaining the difference in inpatient expenditure per capita may be the 
high number of patients admitted for inpatient treatment and lengthy treatments rather than high costs per 
admission. Finally, administrative costs tend to be higher in a system with a number of relatively small insurance 
funds competing for customers and negotiating individually with health care providers. 
32 Managed care scheme is a system of health-care delivery that aims to control costs by assigning set fees 
for services, monitoring the need for procedures such as tests and surgical operations, and stressing preventive 
care.    30  
medical technology diffusion: States with high managed care enrolment used to be 
technology leaders in the early 1980s, but in the 1990s, due to limited acquisition of the new 
technologies, they were only average performers. Opposite conclusions were drawn by 
Bokhari (2000), who examined the effect of increased competition among Health 
Maintenance Organisations
33 on hospital competition in the US. Using data on one costly 
technology, cardiac catherisation, he showed that the hospitals are more likely to adopt costly 
technologies as the health insurance market becomes more competitive.  
3.9.  Health care resources  
An interesting question is whether there is a relationship between the stock of physical and 
human resources in the health care sector and health expenditure. The issue is complex given 
that supply and demand factors are not completely independent. As Schulz (2005) points out, 
high density of health care services induces high utilisation rates, while waiting lists tend to 
reduce them. Some authors (Bac and Balsan 2001; Rochaix and Jacobzone, 1997) have thus 
attempted to model a hypothesis according to which the increase in health care offer (e.g. 
constant increase in the number of private practitioners) entails an increase in demand. 
Theoretically, such a relationship results from the asymmetry of medical information between 
a doctor and a patient as well as low price sensitivity of patients due to the universal 
insurance coverage. This hypothesis has not been confirmed by empirical evidence, even if it 
is supposed that it may prove valid above all in the countries where doctors are paid on a fee-
for-service basis.  
Several empirical studies (e.g. Getzen 1990, Murthy and Ukpolo 1994) have attempted to find 
statistical correlation between the number of doctors and/or nurses and health expenditure. 
The results were not conclusive. While most studies (e.g. Bac 2004) linked increase in the 
number of physicians with growing costs, others, like Gerdtham et al. (1992a), found that an 
increase in the number of physicians per capita would reduce total spending.  
A closely related question touching upon the issue of public policy of health care provision is 
to what extent the commitment of public authorities to provide health care to all citizens 
affects public health spending. In previous decades a considerable part of the increase in 
public spending on health was linked to the establishment of universal access for entire 
population. With near-universal coverage of health insurance and health care provision 
achieved in all EU Member States, access may be a lesser source of cost pressure in the 
future. However, some Member States continue to take targeted measures aimed at vulnerable 
groups in the population. Also, in some countries, universal and comprehensive health 
insurance does not automatically lead to equitable access to services, and measures have been 
taken to tackle the lack or misdistribution of health care (e.g. lack of skilled professionals in 
rural areas, shortages for nurses or certain specialised physicians) or to improve the timeliness 
of services and reduce waiting lists. 
                                                 
33  Health Maintenance Organisation (HMO) is a type of prepaid medical service in which members pay a 
monthly or yearly fee for all health care, including hospitalization. Most HMOs involve physicians engaged in 
group practice. Because costs to patients are fixed in advance, preventive medicine is stressed, to avoid costly 
hospitalization.  
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4.  METHODOLOGIES USED TO PROJECT HEALTH CARE SPENDING 
4.1.  Comparison of model-types  
There are several theoretical methods which can be used to produce projections of spending 
on health care. They can be divided into three general groups according to the specific needs 
of the projections exercise and the availability of the data (Comas-Herrera et al. 2005): 
•  time series-based methods: this group of methods is the least demanding in terms of data 
requirements, as it consists of extrapolating into the future the trends observed in the past. 
Those methodologies are most appropriate when there is clear and undisturbed trend of a 
single variable and when structural breaks are not expected. The larger the number of 
potential explanatory variables, the less reliable are these methods as the impact of 
possible structural changes in the future cannot be taken into account. Therefore, given the 
complexity of the network of interrelated factors affecting health care expenditure, such 
methods seem unfeasible to project spending in the long-term;  
•  macro-simulation models:  these models (also called cell-based models) consist in 
disaggregating the overall population into a number of groups having a common set of 
features. Each cell represents another combination of the characteristics. As the number of 
individuals in the cell changes so do weights and the aggregate value of the endogenous 
variable. The focus of the study is on the total population or its subgroups: changes 
reflected by the model concern those groups rather than the individual components of each 
one of them; 
•  micro-simulation models: observe individual units (individuals, families, households) and 
their characteristics, instead of measuring changes in aggregate values. Two subgroups 
may be distinguished: while static models concentrate on the state at a certain point in 
time, dynamic models investigate changes over time and in response to context changes. 
Thanks to this feature, the latter can be used to predict the effect of the alternative events 
over the lifetime. A specific variant of micro-simulation model which has been 
successfully used health care spending projection exercises at national level are the health-
based predictive models, described shortly in Box 3 below.      
Box 3 Health-based predictive models 
Various studies used a methodology to project spending on health care using the data on total health 
care spending, the share of costs spent on the respective care sectors, and the data on the incidence of 
diagnostic group in the population
34.  
High potential value added characterises the studies based on the actual data on the health status of the 
population. Such projections use the information on individual patients gathered by hospitals, doctors, 
or public administration bodies to construct the aggregate indicators measuring health status or health 
care utilisation at local, regional or national levels.  
                                                 
34 The valuable tool allowing for consistent classification of diseases and international comparisons is the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD, 10
th revision) which regroups over 2000 diseases and health 
problems into 22 chapters including several blocks each. For more specific information, see: World Health 
Organisation (2003), International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems.10th 
Revision. Version for 2003; available at: http://www3.who.int/icd/vol1htm2003/fr-icd.htm    32  
While the methodologies can differ in details, all of them are based on the Patient Classification 
Systems (PCS) which consist of a set of rules which assign each patient or medical case to a specific 
group. Those groups, characterised by principal diagnosis, presence of a surgical procedure, age, 
presence or absence of significant co-morbidities or complications, and other relevant criteria are 
known as Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) (US Congress, 1983).  
 
This health-based approach has been used in several studies, e.g.: Holly et al. (2004) for Switzerland, 
Meerding et al. (1998) for the Netherlands, Executive NHS (1996) for the UK, Australian Institute of 
Health and Welfare (1996) for Australia and Moore et al. (1993) for Canada
35. 
 
In Holly et al. (2004) each patient is assigned, via a Patient Classification System, to a single, mutually 
exclusive group of patients that are expected to consume similar amounts and types of hospital 
resources. Econometric estimation provides expenditure profile for health care (and long-term) 
expenditure based on age, sex and Diagnosis Related Groups. Then, past trends and assumptions about 
future developments are used to project incidence by groups and costs of treatments for the same 
group, which are further applied to the above expenditure profiles to calculate future spending on 
health care. 
 
Meerding et al. (1998) have used slightly different methodology. For each healthcare sector, key 
variables are identified which are representative of healthcare use in that sector (e.g. bed days for 
nursing care; specialist-specific outpatient visits for outpatient care; patient consultations or 
emergency department visits for general practitioners; consultations and procedures for dental care, 
etc.) The probability distribution of those variables was derived from sector specific registries and 
sample surveys. Then total care activity of each sector was disaggregated by sex, age groups and 
diagnostic groups creating a three-dimensional matrix. For each entry, the average cost was calculated 
using an assumption that the distribution of costs is the same as the distribution of the key variables 
for a given sector. This way the share of costs spent on each diagnostic group in each sex and age 
group could be calculated as the proportion of the key variable in the relevant entry times the total 
costs for the sector. The results of such estimation need to be interpreted with caution, because of a 
huge uncertainty related to the data on diseases incidence. 
 
As said before, disaggregation of costs into different Diagnosis Related Groups requires a rich and 
reliable epidemiological data gathered at the doctor or hospital level. Consequently, the projections 
using this kind of methodology are feasible so far only in a few countries with best developed 
reporting systems, and are practically incomparable across countries.  
Another difficulty to deal with is embedded in the process of assigning a given cost to the treatment of 
a given disease. The reasons for that may be numerous: 
•  the same disease may be treated in a different way according to the diagnosis, available 
methodology and the budget constraints; 
•  the same treatment may have positive (synergic) or negative effects on another diseases which the 
patient suffers; 
•  many surveys underestimate the secondary/tertiary diagnoses (which determine most cases of some 
diseases) while paying too much attention on the results of primary diagnoses;  
•  some diagnoses may simply not be correct. 
                                                 
35 The previous version of ICD (9
th revision) was used.   33  
To conclude, the health-based predictive models are theoretically significantly more reliable than the 
simple methodologies based only on demographic developments. However, they require a 
considerable amount of data which, even if existent at the national level, can not be guaranteed quality 
and consistency. Consequently, even though presenting good perspective for future studies, they 
cannot be considered as a reasonable option for currently run international projection exercise. 
 
4.2.  Limited options for EU-wide health care expenditure projections  
The choice of the methodology used to project future expenditure on health care and long-
term care depends on the availability and comparability of data on the one hand and the 
reliability of the expected results on the other hand.  
While several alternative micro-simulation models are used to produce projections of 
spending on health care at the national level, the possibilities to apply them in the specific EU 
setting are very limited.  
The main reason why micro-simulation models are not feasible in an international setting is 
the unavailability of the data and lack or limitations in its comparability across the Member 
States. The main difficulty consists in gathering detailed micro data, especially on 
epidemiological variables and/or on the individual health history, which requires a 
sophisticated IT patient registration and classification system, and comparable measurement 
and calculation standards. This issue was addressed at national level by Wanless (2002), who 
proposed a complex model to project spending within the UK's National Health Service 
(NHS). His method, instead of projecting the evolution of possible drivers of health care 
spending in the future, includes the benchmark of health status (expressed in terms of 
prevalence of given diseases, people's healthy behaviour and performance of public health 
services) expected to be achieved by a given time in the future. The model combines the 
assumption of reaching the targets with the expected evolution of exogenous demographic 
and economic variables to obtain total expenditure growth needed to achieve a given state of 
public health.  
The use of the proposed model is not feasible in an international setting as it is practically 
impossible to establish the politically consistent social and health targets for 25 different 
Member States. Since the authority over health care organisation and provision lies entirely in 
the national authorities' hands, no attempt to predict development of the policy-contingent 
variables is feasible at the international level.  
Another crucial difficulty in running fully comparable projections of health care spending 
across the Member States is the considerable diversity of the health care systems across the 
EU countries, since both ownership and management structure of the health care entities and 
the way they are financed affect cost effectiveness and the total level of spending on health 
care.  
On the other hand, a time series-based method, even though the easiest to perform and the 
least demanding in terms of input data, cannot be considered as a viable solution either. Given 
a large number of interrelated factors affecting health care spending and very complex 
network of reciprocal relationships between them and health expenditure, simple 
extrapolation of past trends cannot provide reliable projection results. Moreover, as recent 
data shows, public spending on health care is to a large degree a policy-driven variable and 
follows only to a very limited degree past trends, which makes the time series-based method 
even less feasible solution.    34  
To sum up, the comparison of existing broad model-types used to project the spending on 
health care suggests that an optimal choice and a satisfactory compromise between the needs 
for reliability and feasibility are the macro-simulation models. The practice confirms this 
thesis, as the bulk of projections made at both national and international level (see for 
example: Pellikaan and Westerhout (2004), Grignon (2003), The Boards of Trustees (2004), 
OECD (2006) and Wanless (2002)) can be classified as belonging to this model-type. All of 
those studies follow the similar methodology which consists in decomposing the population 
into gender, age, or differently characterised cohorts and assigning each of them a given per 
capita spending. Then, following different assumptions on developments in demographic and 
macroeconomic variables, various scenarios are produced to illustrate stylised possible trend.  
Since age and gender are the main dimensions according to which the population is 
decomposed into cohorts, size and structure of the population play the central role in the 
proposed methodology. However, as discussed above, demand for and use of health care 
depends ultimately on the health status and functional ability of (elderly) citizens, rather than 
on their age. While age is a useful indicator of the health status of an elderly population 
(which is illustrated by the steep upward slope of age-related expenditure profiles), it is not 
the causal factor per se. Therefore, following the discussion in section 2, one can establish a 
simplified list of the variables, both demographic and non-demographic, that affect health 
care spending from both demand and supply side and that should be taken into consideration 
while projecting future developments in public health care spending (see Table   for an 
overview of the drivers of spending and how they have been captured within the budgetary 
projection exercise).   35   
Table 6 The drivers of health care spending: how they are incorporated in the projection exercise 
Demand side factors 
  Mechanism/channel through which health 
care spending is affected 
Evidence in literature on likely impact on 
spending 
Addressed in projections   Likely  effect  on 
projection results 
Size and age 
structure of the 
population 
Population size and age structure determines 
the overall number of persons who 
potentially need some health care services. 
Morbidity rates tend to increase sharply at 
older ages, although age itself is not the 
causal factor.  
Population projections show a large increase 
in the number of older persons, who are the 
main consumers of health care. Lower 
mortality/ consumption of health care is .  
Pure demographic  scenario 
plus  high life expectancy 
scenario. 
The ‘pure’ effect of an 
ageing population will 
lead to strong pressure 
for increased spending.  
Health care status 





Changes in age-specific morbidity rates, 
driven by social, environmental and 
technological determinants of health, will 
alter the demand for health care.  
No clear cut evidence on the trends in 
healthy life years as compared to total life 
expectancy. Three hypotheses are available: 
morbidity expansion, dynamic equilibrium 
and morbidity compression. 
Constant health scenario and 
improved health scenario. 
Future improvements of 
health care status will 
lower the projected 
impact on spending 




Large share of total health care spending is 
concentrated in the final phase of life linked 
to approaching death. When the mortality 
rate (number of deaths in a given age cohort) 
declines, per capita health care costs 
decrease.  
Large body of evidence confirming the 
existence of death-related costs, and that the 
ratio of spending between decedents and 
survivors declines with age. No clear 
evidence on whether the importance of 
death-related costs has changed over time. 
Death-related cost scenario.  Increase in health care 
spending is spread over 
longer time period. 
Total spending is lower  
as compared to pure 
demographic scenario. 
Income  Health care expenditure depends on the 
national income and tends to increase faster 
than GDP, due to the increase in real living 
standards, features of health care as a luxury 
good and/or Baumol effect.  
 
Studies at micro level show income 
elasticity of demand greater than 1 but 
neutral at an aggregate level.  
Real convergence process may lead to an 
increase in health care spending as a result 
of absolute increase in demand and a shift 
towards high quality medical goods and 
services demanded in fast growing 
economies. 
Income elasticity  scenario 
considers an income elasticity 
of demand greater than 1 for 
all Member States. Cost 
convergence scenario 
considers the convergence in 
age-related expenditure 
profiles in EU12 to EU15 
levels. 
Projected increases in 





Investment in health promotion and disease 
prevention increases expenditure in short 
term, but potentially reduces future costs by 
improving health status of the population. 
No clear cut evidence: a detailed case-by-
case analysis shows varying levels of cost-
effectiveness for different activities and 
interventions. 
Not modelled.   
                     36   
 
Supply side factors 
  Mechanism/channel through which health 
care spending is affected 
Evidence in literature on likely impact on 
spending 
Addressed in projections   Likely  effect  on 
projection results 
Technology  Technology can lower unit costs of 
providing more efficient treatment, but can 
push up total spending by making new 
treatments available for more persons. 
Technology can lower the demand for health 
care if early or less invasive interventions 
improve health care status and lower future 
health care needs: alternatively, it can 
increase future health care needs by 
increasing the survival probabilities of 
persons with chronic or multiple health 
conditions. 
Not clear cut. Evidence to date suggests that 
technology has pushed up overall spending as 
increased demand appears to have outweighed 
unit cost savings. However, there is 
considerable uncertainty on future prospects.   
Prospective technological developments could 
radically alter treatment possibilities and the 
health care sector is starting to catch-up with 
other sectors on the deployment of IT.  
Technology scenario based on 
the econometric analysis of past 
trends in health care spending. 
A trend coefficient, remaining 
after the impact of demographic 
changes and income has been 
accounted for, is considered as 
the effect of technological 
progress and used in the 
projections of future 
expenditure.     
Progress in medical 
technology is 
expected to push up 
costs compared to 
pure demographic 
scenario. 
Relative costs in 
the health care 
sector 
Total health care spending driven by the 
evolution of unit costs for key components 
(wages, capital investment and 
pharmaceuticals) relative to the economy as 
a whole.  
Unclear due to data limitations and prevalence 
of non-market pricing in the health care sector. 
Wages often covered by collective agreements 
and pharmaceutical prices are regulated. 
Evidence from US points to high price 
inflation for pharmaceuticals but this may be 
driven by incentives embedded in their market 
structure.  
Labour intensity scenario based 
on an assumption that health 
care is a labour intensive sector, 
fast cost growth scenario – a 
sensitivity test on the unit cost 
growth. 
Can push up (if 
assumed cost driver 
grows faster than 
GDP per capita) or 
reduce (otherwise) 
projected spending 







Overall spending on health is determined by 
policy choices on access to health care 
systems and on quality (waiting times, 
patient choice etc.) The evolution of 
spending is also determined by the 
effectiveness of aggregate budgetary control 
measures (e.g. spending caps) and micro 
incentives for patients and health care 
professionals favouring rational use of 
resources. Real convergence process also 
plays a role in designing appropriate health 
policy setting. 
Improved access has been major driver of 
spending in past decades. Governments face 
strong pressure to provide access to new 
medical treatments and to improve quality of 
services, and existing projections from 
national sources show that policy choices have 
a major impact on health care spending. 
Aggregate budgetary control measures appear 
to have stemmed increases in health care 
spending in the 1990s, but long-term 
effectiveness will require appropriate micro 
incentives. 
Not modelled.   37 
4.3.  Methodology allowing for a wide range of driving factors to be taken into 
consideration  
For the reasons discussed in the previous section, a macro-simulation model has been 
chosen to project future health care expenditure in the framework of the long-term 
budgetary projections run by the Ageing Working Group. Given wide range of 
underlying factors and channels through which they affect spending, several projection 
scenarios have been run in order to tackle the issue from a variety of different angles, 
rather than attempting to construct an all-encompassing projection methodology to 
capture all demographic and non-demographic factors.  
The basic methodology used in the pure demographic scenario is a very simple one (see 
Graph   below)
36. The common elements of all scenarios are the macroeconomic 
assumptions agreed by the Ageing Working Group and population projections 
(EUROPOP2008) provided by Eurostat. The age and gender-specific per capita 
expenditure provided by the Member States is applied to the demographic projections to 
calculate nominal spending on health care. To keep it constant in real terms a stylised 
deflator is then applied.  
The adjustments reflecting the effects of different factors on health care spending are 
applied by correspondingly adapting one of three main items of input data: demographic 
projection scenario, development over time of age-related expenditure profiles, and 
pattern of unit cost developments (driven in most cases by the macroeconomic variables). 
Graph 9 Schematic presentation of the projection methodology 
Sources of 
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Source: European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009) 
In order to reflect a wide variety of factors affecting health care spending a number of 
alternative scenarios have been run. The scenarios have been grouped into four broad 
categories according to the driving force being modelled and, broadly speaking, the way 
the basic methodology is adjusted. The four categories are: demography, health status, 
income, and unit costs. An overview of all scenarios is presented in Table 7 below. 
  
                                                 
36 For the formal expression of the projection methodology, see annex 1.   38 



















































































































GDP per capita GDP per capita GDP per capita GDP per capita GDP per capita GDP per capita GDP per capita GDP per worker
GDP per capita 
+ 1 p.p. during 
the period 2008-
2017
GDP per capita 
+ extra yearly 
rate of growth* 
in 2007 linearly 







1,1 in 2007 
converging to 1 
by 2060
111
Below 1* in 
2007 
converging to 1 
by 2038/2060
1,1 in 2007 
converging to 1 
by 2060
* precise values resulting from the technology impact regression estimates. Two alternative variants of convergence period. 
Scenarios on demography Scenarios on health status Scenarios on income effects
Scenarios on unit cost 
developments
Source: EPC and European Commission 
4.3.1.  Scenarios on demography 
The scenarios on demography aim at disentangling pure effect of demographic changes 
on public health care spending, i.e. eliminating the effect of other, both demand and 
supply factors. They also show how sensitive public expenditure on health care is to 
changes in underlying demographic trends. 
Pure demographic scenario attempts to isolate the ‘pure’ effects of an ageing population 
on health care spending. It assumes that age-related spending per capita on health care in 
the base year remains constant in real terms over time. Since health care spending, 
assumed to proxy the morbidity rate, remains constant for each age cohort as life 
expectancy increases, all gains in life expectancy are assumed to be spent in bad health, 
while the number of years spent in good health remains constant. In this regard, this 
scenario follows the expansion of morbidity/disability hypothesis quoted in the literature. 
The constant age profile is applied to the population projections with an assumption that 
the costs evolve in line with GDP per capita. The evolution of expenditure levels under 
this assumption can be considered to be neutral in macroeconomic terms – if no change 
in the age structure of the population occurred, the share of health care sector in GDP 
would remain the same over the projection period even if the size of the population 
changed.  
Comparison of the results of pure demographic scenario with those of higher life 
expectancy scenario shows the changes in public spending on health care resulting from 
a stylised change in demographic trends.  It uses high life expectancy demographic 
scenario, which assumes the mortality rates to fall faster than in the baseline scenario so 
that life expectancy at birth is 1 year higher by the end of projection period. Since 
assuming of the same relative fall in mortality rates across all age cohorts does not only 
increase the absolute number of people at each age, but additionally raise the share of the 
older age cohorts in total population, it should, at least theoretically, have a considerable 
impact on age-related expenditure items. 39 
4.3.2.  Scenarios on health status 
Pure demographic scenario which takes into account solely changes in the size and 
structure of the populations seemingly abstracts from any changes in health status of the 
population. While it assumes the age-related expenditure profile constant over time, it 
may overlook the positive developments in health linked to the fall in mortality rates 
already embedded in the underlying demographic projections. As such, it may be 
considered as the practical expression of the expansion of morbidity/disability hypothesis 
discussed in section 2.4, which may be too pessimistic in that it implicitly assumes that 
all the gains in life expectancy up to 2060 would be spent in bad health. In order to 
address this caveat three health status scenarios have been run. 
The constant health scenario is inspired by the dynamic equilibrium hypothesis and 
captures the potential impact of possible improvements in health status of elderly 
citizens. It assumes that the number of years spent in bad health during a life time in 
2060 is identical to that in 2007, i.e. all future gains in life expectancy are spent in good 
health. As morbidity rate is assumed to fall precisely in line with falls in mortality rate, it 
is modelled by progressively shifting the age-related expenditure profile of the base year 
outwards in direct proportion to the projected gains in age and gender specific life 
expectancy, embedded in the baseline population projection. This procedure is illustrated 
in Graph 9 below by the straight dark line, which illustrates the age-related expenditure 
profile that would be applied in the year 2060. In practical terms, an average person 
which will reach a given age x in 2060 will be assumed to have the same level of 
morbidity, and therefore use the same amount of health care as does today a person of 
age x-n, where n is the increase in life expectancy at the age of x between now and year 
2060. Obviously, this increase is the highest for the youngest cohorts (EU27 average 
increase of 8.5 years for a new-born male and 6.9 years for a new-born female) and 
decreases gradually with age. Still, given quite steep profile of per-capita spending for 
the older cohorts (increase from 8-9% of GDP per capita for the cohort 60-64 to 19% 
(females) and 21% (males) of GDP per capita for the cohort 90-94), a reduction in per 
capita spending corresponding to a 5-5.5 year gap (which is an average increase in life 
expectancy at age 65) will amount to an considerable amount of 2% of GDP per capita
37.        
The  improved health scenario is inspired by the compression of morbidity/disability 
hypothesis in that it assumes that the number of years spent in bad health during a 
lifespan falls while total life expectancy increases. In other words, the morbidity rate is 
assumed to fall faster than mortality rate. Given the lack of empirical evidence on 
possible extent of changes, the stylised picture of this process is achieved by 
progressively shifting the age-related expenditure profile of the base year along the age 
axis by more (by a stylised factor) than the projected gains in age and gender specific life 
expectancy. Given the lack of a precise empirical indication of what the scale of possible 
'compression' is, a factor of 2 is assumed, providing a mirror picture of morbidity 
expansion hypothesis on the positive side of the constant health scenario deemed neutral 
in macroeconomic terms. It is illustrated by dotted line on Graph 10 and is expected to 
have a considerable impact on health care spending, amounting to about twice the effect 
of constant health scenario. However, its results should be analysed with great caution, 
                                                 
37 The example above illustrates the average EU15 profile. The analogous mechanism applied for 
EU12 results in a less pronounced change. Given that age profile is much flatter (per capita spending 
increases from 7-8% of GDP per capita for age cohort 60-64 to 13-17% (for females and males 
respectively) for age cohort 90-94), the shift of age profile equal to an increase in life expectancy 
corresponds to 1.0-1.3% of GDP per capita. 40 
remembering that the scenario is a purely stylised one and illustrates a highly optimistic 
theoretical hypothesis, supported by a limited number of empirical studies. 
Graph 9 Illustration of the different scenarios on future morbidity/disability and longevity 











































































year 2007 = year 2060 (pure demographic scenario)
year 2060 (constant health scenario)
year 2006 (improved health scenario)
Fall in age-specific morbidity rate / unit cost
Shift of the age profile in line w ith grow th in life expectancy
 
Source: DG ECFIN 
An alternative method to project health care spending taking into account probable 
improvement in health status resulting from the evolution of mortality rates is the death-
related costs scenario which links health care spending to the number of remaining years 
of life. As discussed above, there is strong evidence that a large share of total spending 
on health care during a person’s life is concentrated in the final years of life. Therefore, 
as life expectancy increases and smaller share of each age cohort are in their terminal 
phase of life, health care expenditure calculated using constant expenditure profiles may 
be overestimated. The reasoning behind the death-related costs theory resolves to similar 
arguments as in the constant health scenario presented above: over time there is a 
growing gap between two basic assumptions. On the one hand, the assumption of 
constant age profiles which is a central element of pure demographic scenario implies 
constant morbidity rates and constant health care spending at each age. On the other 
hand, falling mortality rates embedded in the population projections lead to a fall in the 
share of those in terminal phase of their lives in each age cohort which, in accordance 
with the theory, accounts for a disproportionately large share of total health care 
spending. To address this inconsistency, an average profile of death-related costs by age 
has been constructed based on available data supplied by the Member States (see Table 4 
and Table 5)
38. Subsequently, with the use of this profile, age and gender specific unit 
costs of health care in each country have been differentiated between decedents (those 
who die within a calendar year) and survivors in each country. Then, using age and 
                                                 
38 The figures are available for a limited number of countries and vary considerably across them, 
therefore it has been decided to use the same, average profile for all Member States participating in the 
projection exercise.  41 
gender-specific mortality rates population of each age group has been split into the group 
of decedents and survivors and the respective unit costs have been applied to each one.  
4.3.3.  Scenarios on income effects 
An important factor driving demand for and expenditure on health care is national 
income. While the correlation between income and demand at the individual level is 
affected by universal coverage of health insurance often providing incentives for 
excessive use of some services, the correlation is much more visible at the aggregate 
level. Several studies tend to suggest that health care spending rises broadly in line with 
economic growth. The responsiveness of health care spending to the national income, 
and therefore projected growth in health care spending due to future evolution of 
macroeconomic variables depends to a large extent on the income elasticity of demand 
for health care. As proven by empirical data, ‘health care is an individual necessity and a 
national luxury’ and in aggregate terms it is likely to have high, exceeding unity, income 
elasticity. 
According to the literature, international variations in the aggregate health care spending 
can be broadly explained by the differences in the level of economic development. 
Investment in new technologies, more sophisticated and effective treatment methods, 
higher standards of living, public expectations for higher quality of treatment – all those 
factors contributing to the rise in expenditure are more prevalent in the most developed 
countries, but also spread to the other ones as the gaps in real income between countries 
shrink due to the real convergence processes. 
Both presented mechanisms have been modelled in the two income scenarios. The first 
one, income elasticity scenario shows the effect of elasticity exceeding unity on the 
evolution of total spending over time. In practical terms, it is identical to the pure 
demographic scenario except that the income elasticity of demand is equal to 1.1 in the 
base year and converges in a linear manner to 1 by the end of projection horizon in 2060. 
The elasticity coefficient at the beginning of the period has been chosen arbitrarily, 
although taking account of empirical evidence on developments in this value over the 
recent decades (see e.g. Getzen 2000) in light of which it can be considered as a 
relatively conservative assumption. 
The second discussed mechanism has been modelled in the cost convergence scenario 
which is meant to capture the possible effect of a convergence in real living standards 
(which emerges from the macroeconomic assumptions behind projection exercise) on 
health care spending. It covers only the Recently Acceded Member States (EU12) since 
in most of them current spending on health care (both in nominal terms and as a % of 
GDP per capita) is well below the levels observed in EU15 countries. By keeping 
constant the flatter 2007 age-related expenditure profiles as the basis of the health care 
projections, the projected budgetary impact of ageing will be less evident in the EU12 
countries compared to EU15. Cost convergence scenario assumes therefore that the 
average age-related expenditure of EU12 countries in the base year 2007 progressively 
increases to the average age-related expenditure profile of EU15 countries by 2060. Such 
simplified assumption implies that the underlying growth in per capita spending would 
have to accelerate considerably in the Recently Acceded Member States. Still, since the 
current gap in per capita spending is significant mainly for the older age cohorts (see 
Graph 7), the rate of increase would vary considerably across the age groups and the 
extra spending would concentrate just in the older cohorts. Indeed, if the convergence of 
EU15 and EU12 age profiles was to be achieved by 2060, per capita spending would 42 
grow to a non-negligible extent only for the cohorts aged 70 and more. For example, to 
complete the convergence process by 2060 would require an average extra yearly 
increase in spending per capita of 0.3% for males and 0.6% for females for the age cohort 
70-74, and about 0.5% and 0.8% respectively for age cohort 90-94.  
4.3.4.  Unit cost scenarios 
A number of other factors have a direct or indirect effect on public spending on health 
care. Most of the supply side factors affect the evolution of unit cost of health care 
provision. It can be either driven by the market forces (e.g. increase in prices of resources 
and raw materials, cost of investments in research and technology or in fixed capital, 
market-driven rise in wages and salaries), or influenced by the institutional structure of 
the sector or state regulations (e.g. relatively fast growing wages covered by collective 
agreements or legally regulated prices of pharmaceuticals). However, most of those 
factors have not been explored thoroughly enough as to allow for a reliable measurement 
of their effects. In order to encompass the possible effect of several generally 
uncountable factors, three stylised scenarios have been proposed. Two of them use 
similar methodological tool, whereby the unit cost of health care spending is assumed to 
follow over time a development path varying from the basic GDP per capita growth rate. 
The third one uses a more sophisticated methodology, whereby an econometric analysis 
of past trends in health care expenditure drivers enables the estimation of the coefficients 
of correlation used later in projecting future evolution of costs.    
The fast cost growth scenario is a simple sensitivity test investigating the responsiveness 
of health care spending to a given change in the unit cost of health care provision, due to 
an undefined institutional, economic or political factor. It presents a purely stylised 
situation of the faster evolution of unit costs in the entire health care sector which can be 
an effect of any possible supply side factor, such as increased investment in 
technological development, growth in prices relative to the other sectors of the economy, 
stricter regulation of health care sector, etc. The methodology is identical to the pure 
demographic scenario, but
 instead of following GDP per capita rate of growth, unit costs 
are increasing by 1 percentage point above that rate in the first ten years of the projection 
exercise (2008-17) and thereafter, between 2018 and 2060, in line with the basic GDP 
per capita growth rate.  
The labour intensity scenario is an attempt to reflect the high labour intensity of health 
care sector and is constructed similarly to the pure demographic scenario except that 
costs are assumed to evolve in line with the evolution of GDP per worker or, in other 
words, labour productivity of a person employed in the economy (no information on the 
productivity in individual sectors is available). As wages are projected to grow faster 
than GDP per capita, this scenario provides an insight into the effects of unit costs in the 
health care sector increasing by more than in the economy as a whole. However, to 
consider the scenario feasible, two strong macroeconomic assumptions need to be 
established. First, wages must be assumed to be a key determinant of costs in the health 
sector, which is therefore supposed to be highly labour intensive. Second, wages in the 
health sector must grow at the same rate as wages in the whole economy, and wages in 
the whole economy generally follow the trend of economy-wide productivity. If both 43 
conditions are met, expenditures per head are assumed to grow at the same rate as 
productivity in the whole economy
39. 
 
4.3.5.  Scenario on the impact of technology 
The  technology scenario is an attempt to incorporate the empirical evidence on the 
impact of technological progress on health care expenditure into the projections. Based 
on the econometric specification, the past impact of income and technology
40 has been 
estimated and the results introduced in the projection calculations.  
The econometric model, presented in detail in Dybczak and Przywara (2010), estimates 
health care expenditure developments against demographic and economic explanatory 
variables. Featured demographic variables are the shares of old (over 80) and young 
(below 20) people in total population, while the real GDP per capita is interpreted as a 
measure of overall economic wealth. The regression has been run for all the countries 
being members of the EU and OECD (EU15, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia plus Norway, given its participation in the projection exercise) but, as the 
individual results differed significantly and the length of time series for the four RAMS 
was deemed insufficient, it has been decided to use the same EU27 coefficients obtained 
on the basis of the pooled fixed effect regression (see Table 6) in the further calculations.  
Table 6 Pooled fixed effect regression estimates.  
HCE_TOT HCE_PUB
EU cons 0.30 0.49
GDP 0.68 *** 0.65 ***
OVER 80 0.02 0.01
BELOW 20 -0.01 * -0.01 *
trend 0.02 *** 0.02 ***
EU_15 cons 0.69 0.76
GDP 0.65 *** 0.67 ***
OVER 80 -0.02 -0.08 **
BELOW 20 -0.01 ** -0.02 ***
trend 0.02 *** 0.02 ***
RAMS cons 3.04 * 5.88 ***
GDP 0.56 ** 0.50
OVER 80 0.16 *** 0.23 ***
BELOW 20 0.01 -0.03 **
trend 0.03 *** 0.03  
Note: *** statistically significant at 1% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, * statistically 
significant at 10% level 
Source: Dybczak and Przywara (2010) 
 
                                                 
39 This also implies that either the health care sector does not benefit from productivity gains and that the volume 
of care services provided does not increase; or alternatively that both productivity in the health care sector, and the 
volume of services provided grow in line with the rate of economy-wide productivity growth. 
 
40 Following the conclusions of numerous studies, suggesting that technology accounts for the largest share of 
health care expenditure growth (see section 2.7.) entire non-demographic and non-income-driven expenditure growth 
has been attributed to the broadly defined medical technology. This simplified approach is mainly due to the lack of 
data on the other supply side factors, such as institutional setting, price system etc. Thus, the factor considered as 
technology includes also the other non-quantifiable supply-side drivers of costs. 44 
The coefficient corresponding to GDP, statistically significant for both EU and EU15 
(including Norway)
41, is interpreted as elasticity of health care expenditure with respect 
to GDP. The value is positive, but significantly lower than unity, which suggests a 
seemingly counterintuitive result, given the theoretical considerations on income 
elasticity. However, such an outcome can be, explained by the fact that part of the 
income effect is captured by the trend coefficient, representing the impact of all 
unspecified factors, mainly the medical technology developments. Since the latter 
depends on the investment potential of a country's economy, it is strongly related to the 
national income. This way the combined effect of economic growth and non-monetary 
aspects of medical progress is split in the model between the income and trend 
coefficients. 
Those two coefficients are further used in the standard projection model. In the base year 
an extra yearly increase in unit costs due to technology (and other supply-side effects) is 
added (its value is of about 2%) and the income elasticity is as low as 0.65. Over time, as 
the sector is expected to converge towards a steady state development, the two effects are 
disappearing simultaneously, reaching zero extra cost growth and unity elasticity by 
2038 or 2060 (two alternative variants are considered to estimate the sensitivity of the 
results to the assumed convergence time).   
4.3.6.  Reference scenario 
As argued in the previous sections, actual spending on health care is a combined result of 
the whole set of interrelated demographic and non-demographic factors. Therefore, the 
scenarios presented above should not be considered as a reliable prediction of the future, 
but rather as the sensitivity tests, providing marginal analysis of the separate effect of 
individual factors. Furthermore, given the complexity of those interconnections and 
difficulties in defining the most probable course of development in the underlying 
variables, the probability of predicting the actual development is very limited and subject 
to high risk. While one possible solution to tackle this problem would be to use 
stochastic rather than deterministic method of projections, its main value added would be 
the ability to quantify the level of uncertainty, intrinsically linked to the modelling 
procedure. Nonetheless, even if highly risky, an attempt to merge a series of quantifiable 
factors into a single setting and estimate the joint effect of probable combination of 
underlying factors is a potentially very informative challenge, especially in the context of 
the public policy of health care provision, which needs to be based on the most reliable 
forecasts of the expected development in the whole range of health-related variables. 
Obviously, the crucial issue in constructing the optimal scenario is the right choice of 
factors and their expected development path. However, as discussed above, several 
arguably significant factors are either not sufficiently defined or quantified (e.g. impact 
of technology, epidemiological analysis of population's health status) or too complex to 
be reduced to a single variable or a small set of them (e.g. organisation of health care 
systems). Facing such dilemma, the Ageing Working Group took a pragmatic approach 
by choosing a set of a few relatively well known and unquestionable factors and 
calculating their combined impact on health care expenditure. It has been decided to 
combine the pure demographic impact of ageing population with the neutral assumption 
on the evolution of health status (which is broadly supported by the empirical evidence 
                                                 
41 As mentioned, given very small size of the RAMS database (only four countries of this group are 
members of the OECD while available time series are very short), the results of this specification should 
be interpreted with caution 45 
on the death-related costs) and the assumption on the moderate impact of national 
income on the health care spending (chosen on the basis of the past trends). In practical 
terms, it has been assumed that morbidity rate evolves at half mortality rate over the 
whole projection period, or in other words, that half of extra years of life gained through 
higher life expectancy are spent in good health. Furthermore, income elasticity of 
demand is assumed to equal 1.1 in the base year and converge to unity by 2060.   
5.  RESULTS OF THE PROJECTIONS 
Table 7 below presents a summary of the projected changes in health care spending 
between 2007 and 2060, measured in % of GDP and expressed as a difference from the 
pure demographic scenario, for all proposed scenarios. The purpose of such presentation 
setting is straightforward: the difference from the pure demographic scenario illustrates 
the individual impact of each analysed factor on total health care expenditure. The 
following sections present and discuss briefly the results of each scenario (detailed 
results are presented in annex 2) and attempt to draw general conclusions on the driving 
forces of health care expenditure. 
Table 7 Overview of projected changes in health care spending as % of GDP between 2007 












BE 7,6 1,5 0,5 -1,1 -2,1 -0,3 0,4 : 0,7 0,6 0,6 0,6
BG 4,7 0,7 0,3 -0,7 -1,3 -0,1 0,4 3,4 0,9 0,4 0,4 0,4
CZ 6,2 2,3 0,5 -1,2 -2,1 -0,3 0,5 0,6 1,5 0,6 0,6 0,6
DK 5,9 1,2 0,4 -0,9 -1,7 -0,2 0,3 : 0,5 0,5 0,5 0,5
DE 7,4 2,0 0,5 -1,1 -2,0 -0,5 0,4 : 0,8 0,7 0,7 0,7
EE 4,9 1,2 0,5 -0,9 -1,5 -0,2 0,5 2,1 1,1 0,4 0,4 0,4
IE 5,8 2,0 0,4 -1,0 -1,8 -0,3 0,3 : 0,9 0,6 0,6 0,6
EL 5,0 1,5 0,3 -0,7 -1,3 -0,2 0,3 : 0,9 0,5 0,5 0,5
ES 5,5 1,8 0,3 -0,8 -1,4 -0,3 0,3 : 0,8 0,5 0,5 0,5
FR 8,1 1,4 0,4 -1,0 -1,9 -0,3 0,4 : 0,7 0,7 0,7 0,7
IT 5,9 1,2 0,3 -0,7 -1,4 -0,2 0,3 : 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,5
CY 2,7 0,9 0,3 -0,8 -1,3 -0,1 0,2 4,0 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3
LV 3,5 0,7 0,3 -0,6 -1,0 -0,1 0,3 4,5 1,0 0,3 0,3 0,3
LT 4,5 1,2 0,4 -0,9 -1,5 -0,2 0,4 3,0 1,3 0,4 0,4 0,4
LU 5,8 1,3 0,4 -0,9 -1,7 -0,3 0,4 : -0,2 0,5 0,5 0,5
HU 5,8 1,7 0,7 -1,5 -2,4 -0,4 0,5 1,3 1,2 0,5 0,5 0,5
MT 4,7 3,8 0,6 -1,5 -2,7 -1,2 0,4 1,6 1,2 0,6 0,6 0,6
NL 4,8 1,1 0,3 -0,7 -1,3 -0,2 0,2 : 0,7 0,4 0,4 0,4
AT 6,5 1,7 0,4 -1,0 -1,8 -0,4 0,3 : 0,9 0,6 0,6 0,6
PL 4,0 1,3 0,6 -1,9 -3,6 -0,1 0,4 3,6 1,0 0,4 0,4 0,4
PT 7,2 2,2 0,6 -1,2 -2,2 -0,5 0,4 : 0,9 0,7 0,7 0,7
RO 3,5 1,4 0,4 -0,7 -1,3 -0,2 0,4 3,9 1,4 0,3 0,3 0,3
SI 6,6 1,9 0,4 -1,0 -1,8 -0,3 0,5 0,6 2,2 0,6 0,6 0,6
SK 5,0 2,3 0,4 -1,1 -1,9 -0,3 0,6 1,9 1,4 0,5 0,5 0,5
FI 5,5 1,4 0,5 -1,2 -1,8 -0,2 0,3 : 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,5
SE 7,2 0,9 0,4 -0,9 -1,7 -0,2 0,3 : 0,8 0,6 0,6 0,6
UK 7,5 2,2 0,6 -1,2 -2,1 -1,0 0,4 : 0,6 0,7 0,7 0,7
NO 5,6 1,6 0,4 -1,0 -1,8 -0,3 0,3 : 1,0 0,5 0,5 0,5
EU27 6,7 1,9 0,5 -1,0 -2,0 -0,5 0,4 : 0,8 0,6 4,6 2,4
EU15 6,9 1,8 0,5 -1,0 -1,9 -0,5 0,4 : 0,7 0,6 4,7 2,5


















Source: European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009) 
5.1.  Impact of demographic changes on health care spending 
The results presented in Table 8 below show that demographic developments are 
expected to push public spending on health care up by between 0.7 and 3.8 percentage 
points of GDP in most Member States between 2007 and 2060, and by 1.9% of GDP on 
average. As expected, large part of that increase is projected to materialise up to 2030, as 
it is over the first half of the projection period that fastest population growth and ageing 
process is expected to occur. Despite their less favourable demographic prospects 
(convergence to lower fertility and lower mortality rates), public spending on health is 46 
projected to grow by slightly less in the EU12 than in the EU15 countries. This reflects 
both lower initial level of spending (4.7% compared to 6.9% of GDP in 2007) and their 
flatter age-related expenditure profiles.  
Table 8 Pure demographic scenario – projection of public health care spending as 
% of GDP, 2007-2060 
2007 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060
Change 
2007-2060
BE 7,6 7,7 8,0 8,5 8,8 9,0 9,1 1,5
BG 4,7 4,8 4,9 5,0 5,3 5,4 5,4 0,7
CZ 6,2 6,3 6,8 7,3 7,8 8,2 8,5 2,3
DK 5,9 6,0 6,4 6,8 6,9 7,1 7,1 1,2
DE 7,4 7,6 8,1 8,6 9,1 9,4 9,4 2,0
EE 4,9 5,0 5,2 5,4 5,7 6,0 6,2 1,2
IE 5,8 5,9 6,1 6,5 7,0 7,5 7,8 2,0
EL 5,0 5,1 5,3 5,6 6,0 6,3 6,4 1,5
ES 5,5 5,6 5,8 6,3 6,9 7,2 7,3 1,8
FR 8,1 8,2 8,6 9,0 9,3 9,5 9,5 1,4
IT 5,9 5,9 6,2 6,6 6,9 7,1 7,1 1,2
CY 2,7 2,8 2,9 3,1 3,2 3,4 3,6 0,9
LV 3,5 3,5 3,6 3,7 3,9 4,0 4,1 0,7
LT 4,5 4,5 4,8 5,0 5,3 5,5 5,7 1,2
LU 5,8 5,9 6,1 6,5 6,8 7,0 7,1 1,3
HU 5,8 5,8 6,1 6,5 7,0 7,3 7,5 1,7
MT 4,7 4,9 5,7 6,5 7,4 7,9 8,5 3,8
NL 4,8 4,9 5,3 5,6 5,8 5,9 6,0 1,1
AT 6,5 6,6 7,0 7,5 7,9 8,2 8,2 1,7
PL 4,0 4,1 4,4 4,7 5,0 5,2 5,4 1,3
PT 7,2 7,3 7,7 8,1 8,6 9,1 9,4 2,2
RO 3,5 3,5 3,7 4,0 4,4 4,7 4,9 1,4
SI 6,6 6,7 7,2 7,7 8,2 8,4 8,6 1,9
SK 5,0 5,1 5,6 6,1 6,6 7,1 7,3 2,3
FI 5,5 5,6 6,0 6,5 6,7 6,8 6,9 1,4
SE 7,2 7,2 7,5 7,7 7,9 8,0 8,1 0,9
UK 7,5 7,6 7,9 8,4 9,0 9,4 9,7 2,2
NO 5,6 5,7 6,1 6,6 6,9 7,2 7,3 1,6
EU27 6,7 6,8 7,1 7,5 8,0 8,4 8,6 1,9
EU15 6,9 7,0 7,3 7,7 8,2 8,5 8,7 1,8
EU12 4,7 4,7 5,0 5,4 5,7 6,0 6,3 1,6  
Source: Based on European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009) 
Health care spending is sensitive to changes in the assumptions on demographic 
developments, which is visible in the results of the high life expectancy scenario. Faster 
decline in mortality rate resulting in life expectancy at birth 1 year higher at the end of 
projection period leads to a relatively strong change in projected expenditure: an 
additional increase in public health expenditure by between 0.3 and 0.7% of GDP (i.e. on 
average by an extra 30% over what is projected in the pure demographic scenario) is 
expected to occur in all Member States of the EU. 
5.2.  Scenarios on health status 
The choice of the assumptions on the future developments in health status of the 
populations strongly affects the expected evolution of health care expenditure. As 
expected, improved health care status will attenuate future pressure on health care 
spending. If it is assumed that healthy life expectancy increases at the same pace as the 
projected gains in total age-specific life expectancy (constant health scenario), then the 
projected increase in health care spending due to ageing (represented by pure 
demographic  scenario) would be more than halved (in an extreme case of Poland 
expenditure is even projected to decline in real terms). Indeed, public spending on health 
care in the constant health scenario is projected to increase by only 0.8% of GDP in 
EU15, and 0.3% in the EU12. It is considerably less than 1.8% and 1.6% of GDP 
increase projected for EU15 and EU12 in the pure demographic scenario.  
An interesting observation is that in constant health  scenario most of the projected 
expenditure savings compared with the pure demographic scenario appear to materialise 47 
in the first half of the projection period. It can be seen on Graph 10 below which shows a 
very slow rise in health care expenditure up to 2030. 
Furthermore, if healthy life expectancy is assumed to increase twice as fast as total life 
expectancy (improved health scenario), practically all the budgetary impact of an ageing 
population will be offset by positive developments in health status. Indeed, public health 
care spending is projected to fall in seventeen analysed countries (by most, 2.2% of GDP 
in Poland) and increase only in eleven. On average, expenditure is falling by 0.2% of 
GDP in EU27 but by as much as 0.8% of GDP in Recently Acceded Member States.  
Taking death-related costs into account when projecting future health care spending 
leads to a sizeable reduction in expenditure as compared to the pure demographic 
scenario over the whole projection period. Public spending on health care is projected to 
increase on average by 1.4% of GDP, i.e. about 0.5 p.p. of GDP less than in pure 
demographic scenario. However, the impact of this methodological adjustment varies 
significantly across countries, which is illustrated by the gap between pure demographic 
and death-related costs scenarios ranging from less than 0.1% of GDP in Latvia and 
Bulgaria, to more than 1% in Malta and the UK). Broadly speaking, the projected change 
in public spending on health care lies between the results of the pure demographic and 
the constant health scenarios. According to theory, the discussed scenario reflects the 
dynamic equilibrium hypothesis, thus its results should be similar to those of constant 
health scenario. In reality, however, several data and methodological inaccuracies can 
justify the considerable gap between the two scenarios. The most important caveats to be 
taken into account are: incomparability of data on death-related costs with the stylised 
assumptions on the morbidity rates, the fact that death-related costs are affected by 
terminal illnesses only and do not reflect developments in other kinds of morbidity, and 
the fact that data on death-related costs covers only the expenditure borne in the final 
year of life, thus artificially shortening the period when the health care use is statistically 
linked to one’s death. As in the other health scenarios, the projected increase in spending 
is somewhat lower in EU12 than EU15 countries due to lower initial levels of spending 
but also to their flatter age-related expenditure profiles. 
Graph 10 Comparison of health care expenditure projections (% of GDP, EU27 average) 
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Source: based on European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009) 48 
5.3.  Scenarios on income effects 
As discussed above, there is strong empirical evidence on the links between per capita 
national income and public expenditure on health care as a share of GDP. The strength of 
the correlation is determined by the income elasticity of demand. The latter, according to 
both theoretical consideration and empirical evidence is likely to exceed unity but 
converge to this value as countries extend coverage of health insurance and the public 
provision of health care goods and services becomes universal. This mechanism is 
broadly reflected in the income elasticity scenario, which assumes income elasticity to 
converge from 1.1 in 2007 to 1 by the end of the projection period. 
As expected, higher responsiveness of health care spending to the national income results 
in proportionately higher expenditure linked to each percentage point of GDP per capita 
growth, even though this effect declines as elasticity converges to 1 at the end of 
projection period. Given the agreed assumptions, total spending on health care is 
projected to increase on average by 2.3% of GDP, i.e. 0.4% of GDP more than in the 
pure demographic scenario. In nominal terms EU15 can expect a slightly higher increase 
than EU12 (2.1% compared to 2.0% of GDP), but in terms of percentage increase 
spending in EU12 countries is projected to marginally exceed that in EU15.      
Another way to model the convergence of real income levels and real living standards is 
to illustrate the effect of those processes on the unit cost of health care provision. Even if 
per capita spending on health care in EU12 countries (both in nominal terms and as a 
percentage of GDP per capita) is currently well below the levels observed in EU15 
countries, the expected effect of the long-term convergence process is to raise them to the 
comparable levels. Therefore, the cost convergence scenario assumes that the average 
age-related expenditure in the EU12 countries progressively shifts to the average 
expenditure of EU15 countries over the projection period.  
The results of the scenario show, as expected, a fast convergence in spending on health 
care as a share of GDP towards the levels observed in the EU15 countries. Average 
health care spending of the EU12 countries would reach 9.0% of GDP in 2060, which in 
fact exceeds the EU15 average of 8.7% of GDP. This can be explained by the 
persistently lower efficiency (the same amount of services provided for a higher cost) of 
health care systems in the Recently Acceded Member States. On average, spending on 
health care is projected to increase by 2.7 p.p. of GDP above what is projected with 
constant national age-related expenditure profiles, with most of the increase occurring at 
the end of the projection period. This result suggests that effective managing of 
expectations regarding health care services in EU12 could play a significant role in 
controlling health care spending in these countries.  
5.4.  Unit cost scenarios  
Health care spending does appear to be sensitive as regards the assumptions on unit 
costs. This is demonstrated by a simple sensitivity test showing the budgetary impact of a 
faster increase in the unit costs of health care provided to the population. A seemingly 
small change in the rate of growth (1 p.p. above the baseline rate over first ten years of 
the projection period) affects considerably the overall results: increase in health care 
spending is 0.6 p.p. of GDP higher than in pure demographic scenario.  
A more specific situation is demonstrated in the labour intensity scenario. If an increase 
in labour costs is considered as the main driver of health care spending (and therefore 
unit costs are projected to evolve in line with GDP per worker rate of growth), public 49 
spending on health care is projected to increase by between 1 and 5 percentage points of 
GDP between 2007 and 2060. As expected, dispersion of results appears higher than in 
pure demographic scenario but the projected expenditure increases are in most countries 
higher. For the EU27, average spending on health care is projected to increase by 2.7% 
of GDP by 2060 if costs evolve in line with GDP per capita compared with a projected 
increase of 1.9% of GDP if costs evolve in line with GDP per worker. Interestingly, the 
increase is considerably more pronounced in the Recently Acceded Member States, 
where growth in labour productivity is projected to exceed on average growth in GDP 
per capita, especially in the early years of the projection period, due to the ongoing 
process of real convergence of their economies with the rest of the Union. 
Table 12 presents the results of three scenarios on income effects and labour intensity 
scenario from a perspective of comparison between the West European EU15 countries 
and Recently Acceded Member States of the Central and Eastern Europe. It clearly 
shows that the demographic change is the only among the analysed factors that widens 
the gap in spending (expressed in % of GDP) between the two groups of countries, 
although the initial strong divergence is somewhat offset in the last decade of the 
projection period. Higher income elasticity is a smoothening factor, as it strengthens the 
positive impact on expenditure from faster income growth in the Recently Acceded 
Member States. An interesting trend arising from the results of the labour intensity 
scenario: labour productivity is expected to grow fast in the EU12 during the first 
decades of the 21
st century, but then to slow down considerably (compared to EU15, but 
also to GDP per capita) in 2050s and 2060s. Finally, the cost convergence scenario, 
which assumes a hypothetical situation where unit costs of health care in all EU12 
countries evolve to the average EU15 cost profile, show a fast increase in total spending 
in the former, leading to a complete convergence of the overall level of spending in all 
European countries that is achieved even before the end of the projection period. 50 
Graph 11 Gap between average health care spending in EU15 and EU12 projected 
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Source: based on European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009) 
5.5.  Technology scenario 
The technology scenario takes into account the impact of technological progress (and 
other supply-side factors) on health care expenditure observed over the recent decades. 
This effect is incorporated in the health care projection model, but given the expected 
convergence of the economy (and the health care sector) towards the steady state the 
impact  diminishes over time. The results of the scenario show a strong impact of the 
additional factors being taken into consideration. The effect is the strongest in the first 
decades of the projection period, and smoothens later on, as the assumed convergence 
reduces the impact. In the neutral
42 case of convergence taking place by the year 2060, 
EU27 average increase in public spending is more than three times as high as the pure 
demographic impact (6.3% against 1.9% of GDP). Moreover, even if the extra 
technology effect is assumed to disappear faster (over 30 years), the projected impact is 
still considerable (4.1% against 1.9% of GDP). 
The growth in expenditure due to technology factor, as compared to that calculated 
according to pure demographic and income elasticity scenarios are presented in Graph 12 
below. 
  
                                                 
42 No estimates are available for the speed of convergence towards the steady state. The effect that 
disappears gradually over the entire projection period is thus the most neutral assumption possible. 51 
Graph 12 Comparison of health care expenditure projections (% of GDP, EU27 average) 
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Source: based on European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009) 
Given the lack of reliable historical data on health care spending in Recently Acceded 
Member States, no individual coefficients have been used for EU15 and EU12, replaced 
by a single EU27 estimate. Consequently, the projected impact of technology on the two 
groups of countries does not account for the structural differences between them and the 
extra increase in spending attributed to the technological progress is similar (93% 
nominal increase in EU15 against 91% in EU12). Moreover, lack of reliable forecasts on 
the technological developments across countries does not allow for plausible 
assumptions being made in the model. In this context, one can envisage both further 
widening of the gap due to the higher starting point, experience curve effect and 
economies of scale taking place in the already highly developed economies of EU15, and 
the opposite process resulting from the spread of new technologies to lower technology-
intensive sectors and countries due to the completion of internal market, spillover effects 
and other positive externalities. In the face of such broad uncertainties, the presented 
neutral approach seems to be the most reasonable solution. 
5.6.  Reference scenario 
The reference scenario which presents a combined effect of a number of factors, mostly 
on the demand side (demographic changes, health status, and income elasticity) projects 
an average growth in public health care spending of 1.7% of GDP in the EU27 Member 
States, which equals approximately 25% of the initial (2007) level. The relative 
percentage increase varies considerably across countries, from 11% in Sweden and 15% 
in France to as much as 45% in Slovakia and 71% in Malta. The relative increase is on 
average slightly higher in the EU12 (30%) than in the EU15 countries (23%).  
As shown in the Table 9 below, the rate of growth in spending is projected to fluctuate 
over time. The fastest increase is expected for the period 2015-2040, when the post-war 
baby boom generation will reach the age of 60-70 associated with the highest per capita 
spending on health care. It is during those decades that between half and two thirds of the 
overall expenditure increase will be realised. After 2040, expenditure is expected to keep 
rising, although at considerably slower pace.  
The results of the reference scenario do not differ considerably from the pure 
demographic scenario. This can be explained by the fact that growing pressure stemming 52 
from increasing personal incomes and public expectations on the one hand, and the 
relaxation of health care needs and demand due to improved health status on the other 
hand, are likely to cancel each other out. However, since most of supply side effects 
which tend to aggravate the fiscal risks (costs of medical research, investment in new 
technologies, and over-regulation of the health care and pharmaceutical markets driving 
up prices) are not properly modelled in the projection exercise, the results are very likely 
to be underestimated. Given this reservation, the projection results, and in particular the 
reference scenario, should not be considered as a forecast of future developments in 
health care spending, but merely as a quantification of the combined impact of a set of 
measurable variables. 
Table 9 Projection results for the reference scenario 
Absolute change 
in % of GDP
2007 2010 2015 2020 2030 2040 2050 2060 2007-2060 2007-2015 2015-2040 2040-2060 2007-2060
BE 7,6 7,7 7,9 8,1 8,4 8,7 8,8 8,8 1,2 4 11 1 16
BG 4,7 4,8 4,9 5,0 5,1 5,4 5,5 5,4 0,7 5 9 1 16
CZ 6,2 6,4 6,7 6,9 7,4 7,8 8,1 8,4 2,2 7 18 7 35
DK 5,9 6,0 6,2 6,4 6,7 6,8 6,9 6,9 1,0 4 11 1 16
DE 7,4 7,6 7,9 8,1 8,5 9,0 9,2 9,2 1,8 6 14 2 24
EE 4,9 5,1 5,2 5,3 5,5 5,8 6,0 6,1 1,2 6 10 6 24
IE 5,8 5,9 6,0 6,1 6,5 6,9 7,3 7,6 1,8 3 16 9 30
EL 5,0 5,1 5,3 5,4 5,7 6,0 6,3 6,4 1,4 6 14 6 28
ES 5,5 5,6 5,7 5,9 6,3 6,8 7,1 7,2 1,6 3 20 6 30
FR 8,1 8,2 8,4 8,6 8,9 9,2 9,3 9,4 1,2 3 10 1 15
IT 5,9 5,9 6,1 6,2 6,5 6,9 7,0 6,9 1,1 4 13 1 19
CY 2,7 2,8 2,8 2,9 3,0 3,1 3,2 3,3 0,6 4 11 7 23
LV 3,5 3,5 3,6 3,7 3,8 3,9 4,0 4,1 0,6 5 9 4 18
LT 4,5 4,6 4,7 4,9 5,1 5,3 5,5 5,6 1,1 6 13 5 25
LU 5,8 5,9 6,1 6,2 6,5 6,8 7,0 7,0 1,2 5 13 2 21
HU 5,8 5,8 5,9 6,0 6,4 6,7 6,9 7,0 1,3 2 13 6 22
MT 4,7 4,9 5,3 5,6 6,4 7,2 7,6 8,0 3 , 3 1 23 61 27 1
NL 4,8 4,9 5,1 5,3 5,6 5,8 5,9 5,8 1,0 5 13 1 20
AT 6,5 6,6 6,8 7,0 7,4 7,8 8,1 8,0 1,5 5 15 2 24
PL 4,0 4,1 4,3 4,4 4,6 4,8 4,9 5,0 1,0 6 13 3 24
PT 7,2 7,3 7,5 7,6 8,0 8,5 8,9 9,1 1,9 4 14 7 26
RO 3,5 3,6 3,7 3,8 4,1 4,4 4,7 4,9 1,4 6 19 10 39
SI 6,6 6,8 7,1 7,3 7,8 8,2 8,4 8,5 1,9 7 16 3 28
SK 5,0 5,2 5,4 5,7 6,2 6,7 7,1 7,2 2,3 9 23 8 45
FI 5,5 5,6 5,8 6,0 6,3 6,5 6,5 6,5 1,0 6 12 -1 17
SE 7,2 7,3 7,4 7,5 7,7 7,9 8,0 8,0 0,8 3 6 1 11
UK 7,5 7,6 7,8 8,0 8,4 8,9 9,2 9,4 1,9 4 14 6 26
NO 5,6 5,7 5,8 6,0 6,5 6,8 6,9 7,0 1,3 3 16 3 24
EU27 6 , 76 , 86 , 97 , 17 , 47 , 98 , 28 , 4 1 , 7 3 1 4 7 2 5
EU15 6 , 97 , 07 , 27 , 37 , 78 , 18 , 48 , 5 1 , 6 4 1 3 4 2 3
EU12 4 , 74 , 84 , 95 , 15 , 45 , 75 , 96 , 0 1 , 4 5 1 5 7 3 0
Projected spending as % of GDP % change
Source: based on European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009) 
6.  MAIN POLICY CONCLUSIONS  
The results of the long-term budgetary projection exercise show that public spending on 
health care is driven by the developments  in a series of independent drivers and by 
policy decisions taken individually by the national governments. In this context, one can 
distinguish three areas where governments must take into account the impact of 
exogenous factors. First, limited growth in total population size together with a growing 
proportion of elderly will lead to ever higher demand for health care goods and services 
bringing about the need for increased financial and human resources. Second, 
developments in the medical science, technology and treatment techniques will require 
further investment, but may pay off over the medium and long term in two ways: either 
directly, by reducing the unit cost of treatment, or indirectly, by diminishing the number 
of chronically ill people and total spending devoted to them. Third, persisting high 
discrepancies in the degree of health care provision across the Member States associated 
with growing uniformity of needs and expectations will undoubtedly exert additional 
pressure on public expenditures in the countries offering the narrowest and incomplete 
coverage to their citizens. Although most underlying forces are exogenous to the 
deliberate government actions, public response to those challenges depends to a high 
degree on the policy stance at the national level and social preferences in each country 
about the degree of public provision of health care. 53 
In the context of this complex mix of independent and policy-driven variables facing the 
financial and health authorities of each country, the following conclusions can be drawn. 
First, all EU Member States' governments are heavily involved in the financing and/or 
provision of health care services, and universal access is virtually assured in all 
countries. There is, nevertheless, a wide variety of institutional arrangements, making it 
very difficult to draw general conclusions on detailed factors and policies driving 
expenditures. What is apparent, however, is that:  
•  increases in spending on health care as a share of GDP in past decades have not been 
strongly influenced by demographic developments, but rather by policy decisions to 
enlarge access, by the demand for better quality health care linked to growing income 
levels, and (albeit less conclusively) by technology (as falls in unit costs to date 
appear to have been more than offset by increased demand and quality 
improvements); 
•  there are very big differences across Member States in terms of per capita spending on 
and inputs to health care systems, which do not appear to be correlated with health 
care outcomes.  A priori, this suggests there is considerable scope for efficiency gains. 
It is, however, difficult to draw conclusions as to whether and how institutional design 
affects health care outcomes or efficiency. 
Second, even if demand for health care (and social care) depends ultimately on the health 
status and functional ability of (elderly) citizens, and not on age per se, ageing 
populations are expected to exert a strong pressure on higher public spending on health 
care. Indeed, the pure demographic effect of an ageing population is projected to push up 
health care spending by between 1 and 2% of GDP in most Member States, i.e. an 
increase by approximately 25% of current spending level. This will result from the very 
large projected increase (80%) in elderly cohorts with a higher prevalence of medical 
conditions, sometimes chronic, that require (expensive) health care services.  
Third, demographic change is only one of several factors driving health care spending. 
Simultaneously, a number of other non-demographic determinants are likely to be of 
equal if not higher significance in determining future spending levels. On balance, 
overall public spending looks set to increase in the context of an ageing society. 
However, there are upside and downside risks (possibly substantial) to the projected 
increase in public spending on health care as computed in a pure demographic scenario. 
In particular, the different approaches to projecting health care spending underline the 
critical role played by: 
•  the health status of the population: The projections illustrate that if most of the future 
gains in life expectancy are spent in good health and free of disability, this could 
offset more than a half of the projected increases in spending due to an ageing 
population (constant health scenario). Furthermore, a real decrease in the number of 
years spent in bad health may reduce spending even further. It should, however, be 
stressed that the projections are not modelled on the basis of a direct indicator of 
morbidity, but rather on the basis of stylised assumptions. This is an obvious 
shortcoming as morbidity patterns change over time (multi- and chronic diseases such 
as cardiovascular problems now outweigh infectious diseases) and demographic 
changes may possibly lead to new patterns of morbidity and mortality. For example, 
the increase in the share of persons surviving to very old ages (80+) may lead to an 54 
increase in the prevalence of chronic and degenerative diseases (e.g. neuro-
degenerative and musculoskeletal diseases); 
•  macroeconomic variables: Changes in per capita income could have an important 
impact on health care spending, especially if it is viewed as a luxury good. 
Introducing stylised effect of a 1.1 income elasticity converging to 1 over the whole 
projection period increases total spending by extra 0.4% over ‘pure demographic’ 
effect of ageing. This impact will arguably be stronger in the EU12 Member States 
which will face a particular challenge in balancing the demands of their citizens for 
wider access to health care services and for services of similar quality to that in the 
rest of the EU, with their capacity to pay; 
•  relative cost developments in the health care: The projection results show that 
spending levels are sensitive to the assumptions on evolution of unit costs in the 
health care sector. Leaving aside demographic factors, spending on health as a share 
of GDP could change as a result of several factors, e.g. unit costs (wages, 
pharmaceutical prices) growing faster than their equivalents in the economy as a 
whole, public policies to improve access to health or improve quality (reduce waiting 
lists, increase choice), rising income levels and the impact of technology on total 
health care spending. The current set of projections is not capable of disentangling the 
contribution of each factor, which suggests a possible avenue for future work; and, 
•  the effective incorporation of technology into health care system: As empirical 
evidence suggests, investment in technology is one of the main drivers of costs in 
health care system. However, obvious advantages resulting from the process of 
constant progress in medical science and technology (faster, more effective and less 
invasive, often more cost-efficient treatment, new diseases being treatable) provide an 
argument for further investment, accompanied by reliable feasibility studies and cost-
effectiveness control mechanisms allowing to select the best available solutions.   
Fourth, ageing will not only raise a policy challenge in terms of putting pressure for 
increased spending on health care. Of equal, if not more, relevance is the impact of 
ageing on the type of health care services that will be needed in the future. Morbidity and 
disability patterns are changing in the context of an ageing society, infectious diseases 
are replaced as the most prevalent conditions by chronic and degenerative diseases, and a 
key challenge for health care systems is to adapt accordingly. There may be a need to 
rebalance the various types of care (primary and secondary, outpatient and hospital care, 
classical health care, long-term care and social care). 
Fifth, given the foremost need for comparability of data across the Member States, the 
projection model necessarily abstracts from the organisational and institutional 
arrangements for the provision of health care services within Member States. As such, 
the projections do not take into account one of basic determinants of health care 
spending:  behaviour of patients, providers and payers which is driven by the incentives 
incorporated in the institutional setting and determines size and directions of the financial 
flows inside the health care system. According to 'a no-policy change' principle, the 
model should not include factors that can be adjusted through a political process. 
Nevertheless, given the importance of organisational arrangements and incentive 
structure in health care, a thorough comparative analysis should be carried out in order to 
understand the relationships between institutions and trends in expenditure. The same 
applies to the public preventive actions to tackle obesity, smoking and drug abuse which 
potentially could have large effects on the health care status of citizens, and thus on 55 
future spending needs. However, even in this case, the evidence of the effectiveness of 
preventive schemes is mixed and warrants further analysis. 
Sixth, the present health care projection exercise contributes to the process of 
understanding the driving forces behind the evolution of public spending on health care 
by including a series of new approaches which are aimed at quantifying several 
previously omitted factors such as the health status of the elderly, the elasticity relative to 
the national income, death-related costs or the role of technology. Caution should be 
exercised, however, as there is no conclusive evidence on the scale of the likely impact 
of these factors. Overall, considerable progress has been made in extending the 
projection methodology for health care on demographic and health factors that tend to 
lower health care spending. Meanwhile the supply-side, mostly non-demographic driving 
forces that could potentially increase spending have been investigated to a much lesser 
extent. Although the analysis of past trends allowed for an approximate estimation of the 
contribution of technology and other supply-side factors, the question on the future role 
of respective factors in total health care expenditure remains broadly unanswered. 56 
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ANNEXES 
1.  METHODOLOGIES USED TO PROJECT HEALTH CARE SPENDING  
1.1.  Pure demographic scenario  
In the pure demographic scenario, all gains in life expectancy are assumed to be spent in 
bad health while the number of years spent in good health remains constant. The 
extension of lifespan will not affect an average individual’s health status at any given 
age, and consequently his or her age-related expenditure on health care will not change 
over time. One can approximate this situation by assuming that health care cost per 
capita for each year of age remains constant in GDP per capita-adjusted terms over the 
whole projection period. Based on this assumption, the projection is then made in the 
following manner.  
First, for the time horizon of the projection exercise (2007-60), the age-related 
expenditure profiles (showing the average health care spending per capita for each year 
of age (from 0 to 100 or less, according to data availability) are assumed to grow in line 
with the macroeconomic cost driver, i.e. GDP per capita. Therefore: 
n a g n a g Ypc c c ∆ = , , , '           [ 1 ]  
where: 
c’g, a, n is cost per capita of a person of a given gender g and age a in a given year n of 
the projection period adjusted to the GDP per capita growth; 
cg, a is constant cost per capita of a person of a given gender g and age a; 








































Ypc     [2] 
Yn is GDP in year n; 
pg, a, n is the projected population of a given gender g and age a in a given year n. 
Second, this unit cost for each year is multiplied by the projected population of each year 
of age (using the baseline population projection) 
  n a g n a g n a g p c S , , , , , , ' =       [ 3 ]    
where: 
Sg, a, n is spending on health care realised by people of a given gender g and age a in a 
given year n. 68 
Next, the resulting total health care spending is divided by the GDP projected using the 
rates of change agreed by the Ageing Working Group in order to obtain share of health 








         [ 4 ]  
where: 
Tn is the share of total health care spending in GDP in a given year n.  
1.2.  High life expectancy scenario 
High life expectancy scenario presents the budgetary effects of an alternative 
demographic scenario which assumes life expectancy to be higher for all ages than in the 
baseline scenario (gap growing gradually up to 1 year in 2060). In terms of methodology, 
the scenario does not differ from the pure demographic scenario, apart from the fact that 
the baseline demographic projections (structure of the population evolving over the 
projection period and the consequent evolution in the macroeconomic assumptions) used 
as input data are replaced with the alternative, high life expectancy, variant.  
1.3.  Scenarios on health status: constant health and improved health 
To capture possible changes in the health care status (morbidity) of populations over 
time, an additional assumption is required to run the constant health scenario and the 
improved health scenario. This is achieved by ‘linking’ changes in life expectancy to 
changes in morbidity (proxied by the age-related expenditure profile). In other words, for 
each year and for each age/gender, the age-related expenditure profile is shifted outwards 
– i.e. providing modified values of cost per capita, which are then applied in the same 
manner as the pure demographic scenario described above to the projected population. 
As regards the scale of the outward shift in the age-related expenditure profile: 
For the constant health scenario, it is directly proportional to the increase in life 
expectancy for each cohort; 
For the improved health scenario, the same outward shift is assumed to be multiplied by 
a factor of 2. 
First, the change in life expectancy in relation to the base year is found for each year of 
the projections (for example, total life expectancy for a 65-year-old man in Germany is 
expected to increase from 16.82 years in 2007 to 22.03 years in 2060, thus by 5.21 
years)
43:  
                                                 
43   In the constant health scenario the total number of years spent in bad health during a person’s life 
time is assumed to remain the same while life expectancy increases, so the morbidity rate must evolve 
in line with mortality rate for each age cohort. Thus, if between time t and t+1, total life expectancy 
increases by n years for a cohort of age x, healthy life expectancy for that very same age cohort must 
also increase by n years in order for the dynamic equilibrium hypothesis to be valid. If healthy life 
expectancy increases by n years, then the health status (and consequently health care spending) of this 
cohort of age x at time t+1 will be the same as the health status (and health care spending) of cohort 
of age x-n at time t. 69 
  2007 , , , , , , a g n a g n a g e e e − = ∆        [ 5 ]  
where:  
eg, a, n is life expectancy of an average person of a given gender g and age a in year n. 
Second, for each year of projection, the respective reference age on the original age 
profile curve is obtained by subtracting the change in life expectancy from the concerned 
age cohort
44. This is done only for those sections of the age-profile where the cost per 
capita is growing
45 (for example for the age cohort of 65 years-old, the value of cost per 
capita for that age in 2060 will be the same as the value of cost per capita for the age 
cohort of 65-5.21 = 59.79 ≈ 59.8 years in 2007).  
Third, the precise value of cost per capita assigned to that reference age is picked up:  
  2007 , , , , , , n a g e a g n a g c c ∆ − =        [ 6 ]  
where: 
cg, a, n is cost per capita assigned to a person of a given gender g and age a in a given 
year n of the projection period; 
cg, a-∆eg,a,n, 2007 is cost per capita assigned to a person of a given gender and age a-∆eg,a,n 
(specified with a precision to a decimal part of a year) in the base year (2007). 
Fourth, the resulting value of cost per capita is used as an input value to the basic 
calculations presented earlier in equations [1] – [4].   
The procedure described above is also used to run the projections according to improved 
health scenario, with a difference that in the latter the shift of the age profile is twice as 
large as in constant health scenario.  Thus, equation [6] may be rewritten in the 
following way: 
  2007 , 2 , , , , , n a g e a g n a g c c ∆ − =       [ 7 ]  
1.4.  Death-related costs scenario  
The methodology to calculate spending on health care taking into account the number of 
remaining years of life is a further improvement of the methodology used in the pure 
                                                 
44    Changes in life expectancy and therefore shifts in the age profile from one year to another are 
sometimes very small (in a range of a tenth part of a year). However, the data gathered by the 
Member States does not provide detailed information on costs per capita by single year of age (the 
most detailed item available is a 5-year average), so an additional calculation needs to be performed. 
To solve this problem, the intermediate values can be obtained by simple extrapolation/trend-
smoothening method from the existing average figures. This way it is possible to assign a concrete 
value of cost per capita to each tenth part of a year of age. 
45   For the young and the oldest old the reference age remains the same over the whole projection period. 70 
demographic scenario. The difference lies in the way the unit cost of health care is 
calculated.  
In the death-related costs scenario, the population of each gender and year of age is 
divided into subgroups according to the number of remaining years of life using 
mortality rate as a weighting factor (e.g. number of people aged n expected to die within 
two years from year t is calculated as population aged n in year t multiplied by the 
probability of dying within two years which is expressed as: probability of surviving year 
t by persons aged n times probability of surviving year t+1 by persons aged n+1 times 
probability of dying in year t+2 by persons aged n+2).  
Each subgroup is assigned a different unit cost, being an adjustment of the ‘normal’ unit 
cost with the ratio of health care expenditure borne by a person of a given age and gender 
who is in her terminal phase of life to health care expenditure borne by a survivor. The 
number of people in each subgroup is thus multiplied by its respective cost per capita 
which gives total spending of each subgroup and the sum of total spending borne by the 
subgroups is total spending on health care in a given year.  
In a formalised way, the methodology can be presented as follows.  
First, the total population of each gender and age is divided into subgroups, according 
to the number of remaining years of life. Consequently, there are z subgroups of 
decedents (those who are going to die within 0, or 1, or 2, …, or z years) and one group 
of survivors (those who are going to survive the z
th year). In order to obtain the size of 
each subgroup, the probability of dying in each gender, age and year of projection period 
are calculated.  
The probability that a person of gender g and age a will die in the x
th year after a given 
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where: 
i n i a g M + + , ,  is the mortality rate of people of gender g aged a+i in the i
th year after given 
year n and: ) ... 2 , 1 , 0 ( z x∈  
where z is the highest number of years considered as time ‘close to death’ and for which 
data on costs is available.  
 
The probability that a person of gender g and age a in a given year n will survive z
th year 
can be expressed in a following way: 
∏
=
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So, number of persons of a given gender g and age a that are going to die in x
th year from 
a given year n can be expressed in the following way: 
n a g x n a g x n a g p d Nd , , , , , , , , ⋅ =       [ 1 0 ]  
where:  
n a g p , ,  is projected population of a given gender g and age a in a given year n 
 
The number of those who are going to survive x
th year is: 
n a g n a g n a g p s Ns , , , , , , ⋅ =      [ 1 1 ]  
Second, the unit health care cost of each person in a population is calculated. Contrary 
to the usual approach, per capita cost is not the same for all the individuals, but varies 
depending on whether a person is in her terminal phase of life. One must find the cost per 
capita of a person of a given gender g and age a, who is going to die within x years’ time 
from a given year n, as well as the cost per capita of a person of the same gender g and 
age a surviving the x
th year.   
The ratio between the two costs is taken as the input data from the country-specific 
information and background studies and may be expressed as: 
a g
x a g






             [ 1 2 ]  
where: 
x a g cd , ,  is health care cost per capita of a person of a given gender g and age a dying in 
the x
th year from the current year; 
a g cs , is health care cost per capita of a person of the same gender g and age a surviving 
the period considered as time ‘close to death’ from the current year. 
To obtain the two costs, one must use the average cost per capita of a person of a given 
gender g and age a as given in the ‘age-related expenditure profiles’ provided to the 
AWG by Member States. It may be defined as an average of the per capita costs borne by 
all the subgroups of decedents and survivors, weighted by the size of each subgroup: 
2007 , ,
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It must be borne in mind that the unit costs of decedents and survivors are calculated for 
the base year 2007 (thus index 2007 used in the equations) and are kept constant over the 
whole projection period. 
Substituting for  x a g cd , ,  using [12], one gets: 
2007 , ,
0
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As in pure demographic scenario and scenarios on health status, for the time horizon of 
the projection exercise (2007-60) the age-related expenditure profiles (showing the 
average health care spending per capita for each year of age (from 0 to 100 or less, 
according to data availability) are assumed to grow in line with the same cost 
assumption, i.e. GDP per capita). Therefore: 
  n n x a g n x a g Ypc cd cd ∆ ⋅ = , , , , , , '         [ 1 7 ]  
where: 
cd’g, a, x, n is cost per capita of a person of a given gender g and age a who is going to die 
within x years, in a given year n of the projection period adjusted to the GDP per capita 
growth; 73 
∆Ypcn is GDP per capita rate growth in year n, as in [2]  
The same procedure applies to construct cs’g ,a, n on the basis of csg, a ,n , i.e. to adjust the 
per capita cost of the subgroup of survivors. 
Third, by multiplying the size of each subgroup by its respective cost per capita, the 
total cost can be calculated. Total expenditure on health care borne by those of a given 
gender g and age a, who are going to die within x years’ time from a given year n can be 
expressed in the following way: 
n x a g n x a g n x a g cd Nd ed , , , , , , , , , ⋅ =       [ 1 8 ]  
and total expenditure of those of gender g and age a who are going to survive z
th year: 
n a g n a g n a g cs Ns es , , , , , , ⋅ =       [ 1 9 ]  
Adding total expenditures of all the subgroups (those dying within 0,1,2,…, z years time 
plus those surviving z
th year) gives total expenditure on health care borne by entire 
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Finally, total expenditure on health care borne by entire population in a given year n 
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1.5.  Income elasticity scenario  
The projections of health care spending follow similar methodology as the pure 
demographic scenario with a change in the way cost per capita is evolving over the 
projection period. Income elasticity is taken into account by replacing equation [1] by the 
following one:   
n n a g n a g Ypc c c ε ∆ = , , , '       [ 2 2 ]  
where: 
c’g, a, n is cost per capita of a person of a given gender g and age a in a given year n of 
the projection period adjusted to the GDP per capita growth; 
cg, a is constant cost per capita of a person of a given gender g and age a; 74 
∆Ypcn is GDP per capita rate growth in year n;  
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ε ε n n       [ 2 3 ]  
In the specific case where income elasticity of demand converges from 1.1 in 2007 to 1 
in 2060, the value will be the following 
2007 2060
1 1 . 1
) 2007 ( 1 . 1
−
−
⋅ − − = n n ε       [ 2 3 a ]  
After unit cost has been calculated, the following equations [3]-[4] do not change. 
1.6.  Labour intensity scenario  
The only difference between this scenario and pure demographic scenario is the change 
in the development pattern of unit costs. GDP per capita is replaced by GDP per worker, 
thus equation [1] takes the following form: 












































Ypw     [25] 
wg, a, n is the projected number of people employed of a given gender g and age a in a 
given year n. 
The following equations [3]-[4] do not change. 
1.7.  EU12 cost convergence scenario  
The projections of health care spending follow similar methodology as the pure 
demographic scenario with a change in the way cost per capita is evolving over the 
projection period. Real convergence between EU15 and RAMS12 countries is assumed 
by replacing equation [1] by the following one:   
n n a g n a g f Ypc c c ∆ = , , , '        [ 2 6 ]  
where: 75 
c’g, a, n is cost per capita of a person of a given gender g and age a in a given year n of 
the projection period adjusted to the GDP per capita growth; 
cg, a is constant cost per capita of a person of a given gender g and age a; 
∆Ypcn is GDP per capita rate growth in year n; 
fn is a hypothetical rate of growth of unweighted average EU12 unit cost (calculated in 
the base year) in a given year n with respect to the base year if it was to converge to 
unweighted average EU15 level by 2060 (calculated in the base year). Therefore: 
2007 2060
) 2007 (




RAMS a g EU a g
n
c c
n f      [ 2 7 ]  
where: 
15 , , EU a g c  is unweighted EU15 average cost per capita of a given gender g and age a 
calculated in the base year;   
12 , , RAMS a g c  is unweighted RAMS12 average cost per capita of a given gender g and age a 
calculated in the base year. 
 
After unit cost has been calculated the following equations [3]-[4] apply unchanged. 
1.8.  Fast cost growth scenario  
The projection of health care spending follow similar methodology as the pure 
demographic scenario, apart from the fact that the yearly rate of growth in unit costs 
follows slightly different pattern: during the first ten years of projection period (2008-
2017) it increases 1 p.p. faster than GDP per capita and afterwards it comes back to the 
basic GDP per capita path: 
n n a g n a g r c c ⋅ = −1 , , , ,        [ 2 8 ]  
where: 
cg, a, n is part of cost per capita of a person of a given gender g and age a in a given year 
n of the projection period;  
r n is the rate of change in cost per capita in a given year n. It is calculated according to 














n   [29] 
where: 76 
rYpcn is GDP per capita rate of growth in year n. 
1.9.  Technology scenario 
Based on the results of econometric exercise analysing past trends in health care 
expenditure the coefficients illustrating two effects, lower income elasticity and extra 
yearly increase of unit cost, are estimated. Given the expected process of convergence to 
a steady state, both effects are assumed to disappear over time: income elasticity reaches 
the value of 1 and extra unit cost growth goes down to zero. According to two different 
variants, the year of full convergence is either 2060 (over entire projection period) or 
2038 (over 30 years). 
Every year, basic unit cost rate of growth is affected by the elasticity coefficient and 
extra component of growth:  
) ( ' , , , n n n a g n a g x Ypc c c + ∆ = ε       [ 3 0 ]  
where: 
c’g, a, n is cost per capita of a person of a given gender g and age a in a given year n of 
the projection period adjusted to the assumed rate of growth; 
cg, a is constant cost per capita of a person of a given gender g and age a; 
∆Ypcn is GDP per capita rate growth in year n;  
εn is income elasticity of demand, converging from ε2007 in the base year to 1 by 2060 or 
2038; 
xn is an extra component added to the rate of growth of unit costs, converging from x2007 
in the base year to 0  by 2060 or 2038.   
ε2007  and x 2007  are the outcomes of the econometric specification (see Table 6 and 
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if the convergence is assumed to be completed by 2038. 
After unit cost has been calculated, the following procedure is the same as in the pure 






2.  DETAILED RESULTS OF THE PROJECTIONS ON HEALTH CARE 
Table 10 Pure demographic scenario : projected spending on health care as % of GDP 
2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060
Change 
2007-2060
BE 7,6 7,7 7,9 8,0 8,2 8,5 8,7 8,8 8,9 9,0 9,0 9,1 1,5
BG 4,7 4,8 4,8 4,9 4,9 5,0 5,2 5,3 5,4 5,4 5,4 5,4 0,7
CZ 6,2 6,3 6,6 6,8 7,1 7,3 7,6 7,8 8,0 8,2 8,4 8,5 2,3
DK 5,9 6,0 6,2 6,4 6,6 6,8 6,9 6,9 7,0 7,1 7,1 7,1 1,2
DE 7,4 7,6 7,8 8,1 8,3 8,6 8,8 9,1 9,3 9,4 9,4 9,4 2,0
EE 4,9 5,0 5,1 5,2 5,3 5,4 5,5 5,7 5,8 6,0 6,1 6,2 1,2
IE 5,8 5,9 6,0 6,1 6,3 6,5 6,8 7,0 7,3 7,5 7,7 7,8 2,0
EL 5,0 5,1 5,2 5,3 5,5 5,6 5,8 6,0 6,2 6,3 6,4 6,4 1,5
ES 5,5 5,6 5,7 5,8 6,0 6,3 6,6 6,9 7,1 7,2 7,3 7,3 1,8
FR 8,1 8,2 8,4 8,6 8,7 9,0 9,2 9,3 9,4 9,5 9,5 9,5 1,4
IT 5,9 5,9 6,1 6,2 6,4 6,6 6,8 6,9 7,0 7,1 7,1 7,1 1,2
CY 2,7 2,8 2,8 2,9 3,0 3,1 3,2 3,2 3,3 3,4 3,5 3,6 0,9
LV 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,6 3,6 3,7 3,8 3,9 4,0 4,0 4,1 4,1 0,7
LT 4,5 4,5 4,7 4,8 4,9 5,0 5,2 5,3 5,5 5,5 5,6 5,7 1,2
LU 5,8 5,9 6,0 6,1 6,3 6,5 6,7 6,8 6,9 7,0 7,1 7,1 1,3
HU 5,8 5,8 5,9 6,1 6,3 6,5 6,8 7,0 7,1 7,3 7,4 7,5 1,7
MT 4,7 4,9 5,3 5,7 6,1 6,5 7,0 7,4 7,6 7,9 8,1 8,5 3,8
NL 4,8 4,9 5,1 5,3 5,4 5,6 5,7 5,8 5,9 5,9 5,9 6,0 1,1
AT 6,5 6,6 6,8 7,0 7,3 7,5 7,7 7,9 8,1 8,2 8,2 8,2 1,7
PL 4,0 4,1 4,2 4,4 4,5 4,7 4,8 5,0 5,1 5,2 5,3 5,4 1,3
PT 7,2 7,3 7,5 7,7 7,9 8,1 8,4 8,6 8,9 9,1 9,2 9,4 2,2
RO 3,5 3,5 3,6 3,7 3,9 4,0 4,2 4,4 4,5 4,7 4,8 4,9 1,4
SI 6,6 6,7 7,0 7,2 7,4 7,7 7,9 8,2 8,3 8,4 8,5 8,6 1,9
SK 5,0 5,1 5,3 5,6 5,8 6,1 6,4 6,6 6,9 7,1 7,2 7,3 2,3
FI 5,5 5,6 5,8 6,0 6,3 6,5 6,6 6,7 6,8 6,8 6,8 6,9 1,4
SE 7,2 7,2 7,4 7,5 7,6 7,7 7,8 7,9 8,0 8,0 8,1 8,1 0,9
UK 7,5 7,6 7,8 7,9 8,2 8,4 8,7 9,0 9,2 9,4 9,6 9,7 2,2
NO 5,6 5,7 5,8 6,1 6,3 6,6 6,8 6,9 7,0 7,2 7,2 7,3 1,6
EU27 6,7 6,8 6,9 7,1 7,2 7,5 7,7 8,0 8,2 8,4 8,5 8,6 1,9
EU15 6,9 7,0 7,1 7,3 7,5 7,7 8,0 8,2 8,4 8,5 8,6 8,7 1,8
EU12 4,7 4,7 4,8 5,0 5,2 5,4 5,6 5,7 5,9 6,0 6,2 6,3 1,6  
Source: European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009) 
Table 11 High life expectancy scenario : projected spending on health care as % of 
GDP 
2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060
Change 
2007-2060
BE 7,6 7,7 7,9 8,1 8,4 8,6 8,8 9,0 9,2 9,2 9,3 9,3 1,7
BG 4,7 4,8 5,0 5,0 5,2 5,3 5,4 5,6 5,6 5,7 5,7 5,7 1,0
CZ 6,2 6,4 6,7 7,0 7,3 7,6 7,9 8,2 8,4 8,6 8,7 8,9 2,7
DK 5,9 6,0 6,2 6,5 6,7 6,9 7,0 7,1 7,2 7,2 7,3 7,3 1,4
DE 7,4 7,6 7,9 8,2 8,5 8,8 9,0 9,3 9,5 9,7 9,7 9,7 2,3
EE 4,9 5,1 5,3 5,4 5,5 5,7 5,9 6,1 6,2 6,4 6,5 6,6 1,7
IE 5,8 5,9 6,0 6,2 6,4 6,7 6,9 7,2 7,4 7,7 7,9 8,0 2,2
GR 5,0 5,1 5,3 5,5 5,6 5,8 6,0 6,2 6,4 6,5 6,6 6,7 1,7
ES 5,5 5,6 5,7 5,9 6,2 6,5 6,8 7,0 7,3 7,4 7,5 7,5 2,0
FR 8,1 8,3 8,5 8,7 8,9 9,1 9,3 9,5 9,6 9,7 9,8 9,8 1,7
IT 5,9 5,9 6,1 6,3 6,5 6,7 6,9 7,1 7,2 7,2 7,3 7,2 1,4
CY 2,7 2,8 2,8 2,9 3,0 3,1 3,2 3,3 3,4 3,5 3,6 3,6 0,9
LV 3,5 3,5 3,6 3,7 3,8 3,9 4,0 4,1 4,2 4,2 4,3 4,3 0,9
LT 4,5 4,6 4,8 5,0 5,1 5,2 5,4 5,6 5,7 5,8 5,9 6,0 1,5
LU 5,8 5,9 6,1 6,3 6,5 6,7 6,9 7,1 7,2 7,3 7,3 7,4 1,6
HU 5,6 5,9 6,0 6,3 6,5 6,8 7,0 7,2 7,4 7,5 7,7 7,8 2,2
MT 4,6 4,9 5,3 5,7 6,2 6,7 7,2 7,6 7,8 8,1 8,3 8,7 4,1
NL 4,8 4,9 5,1 5,3 5,5 5,7 5,8 5,9 6,0 6,1 6,1 6,1 1,3
AT 6,5 6,6 6,9 7,1 7,4 7,6 7,8 8,1 8,3 8,4 8,4 8,4 1,9
PL 4,0 4,2 4,3 4,5 4,7 4,9 5,1 5,2 5,3 5,4 5,5 5,6 1,6
PT 7,2 7,3 7,5 7,7 8,0 8,2 8,5 8,8 9,1 9,3 9,5 9,7 2,5
RO 3,5 3,7 3,8 4,0 4,1 4,3 4,5 4,7 4,9 5,1 5,2 5,3 1,8
SI 6,6 6,8 7,1 7,4 7,7 7,9 8,2 8,5 8,7 8,8 8,9 8,9 2,3
SK 5,0 5,2 5,5 5,8 6,1 6,4 6,7 7,0 7,2 7,4 7,5 7,6 2,6
FI 5,5 5,7 5,9 6,1 6,3 6,5 6,7 6,8 6,9 6,9 7,0 7,0 1,5
SE 7,2 7,3 7,4 7,6 7,7 7,9 8,0 8,1 8,2 8,3 8,3 8,3 1,1
UK 7,5 7,6 7,9 8,1 8,3 8,6 9,0 9,2 9,4 9,7 9,9 10,0 2,6
NO 5,7 5,8 5,9 6,1 6,2 6,3 6,4 6,4 6,4 6,5 6,5 6,5 0,8
EU27 6,7 6,8 7,0 7,2 7,4 7,7 7,9 8,2 8,4 8,5 8,6 8,7 2,0
EU15 6,9 7,0 7,2 7,4 7,6 7,9 8,1 8,4 8,6 8,7 8,8 8,8 2,0
EU12 4,6 4,8 5,0 5,2 5,4 5,6 5,8 6,0 6,1 6,3 6,4 6,5 1,9  
Source: European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009) 
 79 
Table 12 Constant health scenario : projected spending on health care as % of GDP 
2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060
Change 
2007-2060
BE 7,6 7,7 7,7 7,7 7,8 7,9 8,0 8,1 8,1 8,0 8,0 7,9 0,3
BG 4,7 4,7 4,7 4,7 4,6 4,6 4,7 4,7 4,8 4,8 4,7 4,7 0,0
CZ 6,2 6,3 6,4 6,5 6,6 6,8 6,9 7,0 7,1 7,2 7,3 7,3 1,1
DK 5,9 6,0 6,0 6,1 6,2 6,3 6,3 6,3 6,3 6,3 6,3 6,2 0,3
DE 7,4 7,5 7,7 7,8 7,9 8,0 8,2 8,3 8,4 8,5 8,4 8,3 0,9
EE 4,9 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,1 5,2 5,2 5,3 5,3 0,4
IE 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,9 6,0 6,1 6,2 6,4 6,5 6,6 6,7 6,8 1,0
EL 5,0 5,0 5,1 5,2 5,2 5,3 5,4 5,5 5,6 5,7 5,7 5,7 0,7
ES 5,5 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,7 5,9 6,1 6,3 6,4 6,5 6,5 6,5 1,0
FR 8,1 8,2 8,2 8,3 8,4 8,5 8,6 8,6 8,6 8,6 8,6 8,5 0,4
IT 5,9 5,9 5,9 6,0 6,1 6,2 6,3 6,4 6,5 6,5 6,4 6,3 0,5
CY 2,7 2,7 2,7 2,7 2,7 2,7 2,7 2,7 2,8 2,8 2,8 2,8 0,1
LV 3,5 3,5 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,5 0,1
LT 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,6 4,7 4,7 4,8 4,8 4,8 0,3
LU 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,9 6,0 6,1 6,1 6,2 6,3 6,3 6,2 6,2 0,4
HU 5,8 5,7 5,6 5,6 5,7 5,7 5,8 5,8 5,9 6,0 6,0 6,0 0,2
MT 4,7 4,9 5,1 5,3 5,6 5,9 6,2 6,4 6,5 6,6 6,7 6,9 2,2
NL 4,8 4,9 5,0 5,1 5,2 5,3 5,3 5,4 5,4 5,4 5,3 5,3 0,4
AT 6,5 6,6 6,7 6,8 6,9 7,0 7,1 7,2 7,3 7,4 7,3 7,2 0,7
PL 4,0 4,0 4,0 4,0 3,9 3,9 3,9 3,8 3,7 3,6 3,5 3,5 -0,6
PT 7,2 7,3 7,3 7,3 7,4 7,5 7,6 7,8 7,9 8,0 8,1 8,1 0,9
RO 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,6 3,7 3,7 3,8 3,9 4,0 4,1 4,2 0,7
SI 6,6 6,7 6,8 6,9 7,0 7,2 7,3 7,5 7,6 7,6 7,6 7,6 1,0
SK 5,0 5,1 5,2 5,3 5,4 5,6 5,7 5,8 6,0 6,1 6,2 6,2 1,2
FI 5,5 5,6 5,6 5,7 5,8 5,8 5,9 5,9 5,8 5,8 5,7 5,7 0,2
SE 7,2 7,2 7,2 7,2 7,3 7,3 7,3 7,3 7,3 7,3 7,3 7,2 0,0
UK 7,5 7,6 7,6 7,6 7,7 7,8 8,0 8,2 8,3 8,4 8,5 8,5 1,0
NO 5,6 5,6 5,7 5,8 5,9 6,1 6,2 6,2 6,3 6,3 6,3 6,3 0,6
EU27 6,7 6,7 6,8 6,8 6,9 7,0 7,1 7,3 7,4 7,5 7,6 7,6 0,8
EU15 6,9 6,9 7,0 7,0 7,1 7,2 7,4 7,5 7,6 7,7 7,7 7,6 0,8
EU12 4,7 4,7 4,7 4,7 4,7 4,8 4,8 4,8 4,9 4,9 4,9 4,9 0,3  
Source: European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009) 
Table 13 Improved health scenario : projected spending on health care as % of GDP 
2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060
Change 
2007-2060
BE 7,6 7,6 7,5 7,4 7,4 7,4 7,4 7,4 7,3 7,2 7,1 7,0 -0,6
BG 4,7 4,7 4,6 4,5 4,3 4,3 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,1 -0,6
CZ 6,2 6,2 6,2 6,2 6,2 6,2 6,3 6,3 6,3 6,4 6,4 6,4 0,2
DK 5,9 5,9 5,9 5,9 5,9 5,9 5,8 5,8 5,7 5,6 5,6 5,5 -0,5
DE 7,4 7,5 7,5 7,5 7,5 7,6 7,6 7,7 7,7 7,7 7,6 7,4 0,0
EE 4,9 4,9 4,9 4,8 4,7 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,6 4,7 -0,3
IE 5,8 5,8 5,7 5,6 5,6 5,7 5,7 5,8 5,8 5,9 5,9 6,0 0,1
EL 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,1 0,1
ES 5,5 5,5 5,4 5,4 5,4 5,5 5,6 5,7 5,8 5,9 5,9 5,9 0,3
FR 8,1 8,2 8,1 8,0 8,0 8,0 8,0 8,0 8,0 7,9 7,7 7,7 -0,5
IT 5,9 5,9 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,9 5,9 5,9 5,9 5,8 5,7 -0,1
CY 2,7 2,7 2,6 2,5 2,5 2,4 2,4 2,4 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,3 -0,4
LV 3,5 3,4 3,3 3,3 3,2 3,1 3,1 3,1 3,1 3,1 3,1 3,1 -0,3
LT 4,5 4,4 4,3 4,3 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 4,2 -0,3
LU 5,8 5,8 5,7 5,7 5,6 5,6 5,7 5,7 5,7 5,6 5,5 5,4 -0,3
HU 5,8 5,6 5,4 5,3 5,2 5,2 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,1 -0,7
MT 4,7 4,8 4,9 5,0 5,2 5,4 5,6 5,7 5,7 5,7 5,7 5,8 1,1
NL 4,8 4,9 4,9 4,9 4,9 5,0 5,0 5,0 4,9 4,9 4,8 4,7 -0,1
AT 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,6 6,6 6,6 6,7 6,6 6,5 6,4 -0,1
PL 4,0 3,9 3,7 3,3 3,0 2,7 2,4 2,1 1,8 1,7 1,7 1,8 -2,2
PT 7,2 7,2 7,1 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,0 7,1 7,1 7,2 7,2 7,2 0,0
RO 3,5 3,5 3,4 3,4 3,3 3,4 3,4 3,4 3,5 3,5 3,6 3,6 0,1
SI 6,6 6,6 6,7 6,7 6,7 6,7 6,8 6,9 6,9 6,9 6,8 6,8 0,2
SK 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,1 5,1 5,1 5,2 5,3 5,3 5,3 0,4
FI 5,5 5,5 5,4 5,4 5,4 5,4 5,4 5,4 5,3 5,2 5,1 5,0 -0,5
SE 7,2 7,2 7,1 7,0 7,0 6,9 6,9 6,8 6,7 6,6 6,6 6,5 -0,7
UK 7,5 7,5 7,4 7,4 7,3 7,3 7,4 7,5 7,6 7,6 7,6 7,5 0,1
NO 5,6 5,6 5,5 5,5 5,6 5,6 5,7 5,6 5,6 5,6 5,5 5,4 -0,2
EU27 6,7 6,7 6,6 6,6 6,6 6,6 6,6 6,6 6,7 6,7 6,6 6,6 -0,2
EU15 6,9 6,9 6,8 6,8 6,8 6,8 6,9 6,9 6,9 6,9 6,9 6,8 -0,1
EU12 4,7 4,6 4,4 4,3 4,1 4,0 3,9 3,8 3,8 3,7 3,8 3,8 -0,8  
Source: European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009) 
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Table 14 Death-related costs scenario : projected spending on health care as % of GDP 
2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060
Change 
2007-2060
BE 7,6 7,5 7,7 7,8 8,0 8,2 8,4 8,6 8,7 8,7 8,7 8,8 1,2
BG 4,7 4,7 4,7 4,8 4,8 5,0 5,1 5,2 5,3 5,3 5,3 5,3 0,6
CZ 6,2 6,2 6,4 6,6 6,9 7,1 7,4 7,6 7,8 7,9 8,1 8,2 2,0
DK 5,9 5,9 6,0 6,2 6,4 6,6 6,7 6,7 6,8 6,8 6,9 6,9 0,9
DE 7,4 7,4 7,6 7,9 8,1 8,3 8,5 8,8 8,9 9,0 8,9 8,9 1,5
EE 4,9 4,9 5,0 5,1 5,1 5,2 5,4 5,5 5,7 5,8 5,9 6,0 1,0
IE 5,8 5,8 5,9 6,0 6,2 6,4 6,6 6,8 7,0 7,2 7,4 7,5 1,7
EL 5,0 4,9 5,1 5,2 5,3 5,5 5,7 5,8 6,0 6,1 6,2 6,2 1,2
ES 5,5 5,5 5,6 5,7 5,9 6,1 6,4 6,6 6,8 7,0 7,0 7,0 1,5
FR 8,1 8,1 8,2 8,4 8,5 8,7 8,9 9,0 9,1 9,2 9,2 9,2 1,1
IT 5,9 5,8 5,9 6,1 6,2 6,4 6,6 6,7 6,8 6,9 6,9 6,9 1,0
CY 2,7 2,7 2,8 2,8 2,9 3,0 3,1 3,1 3,2 3,3 3,4 3,5 0,7
LV 3,5 3,4 3,5 3,5 3,6 3,6 3,7 3,8 3,9 4,0 4,0 4,0 0,6
LT 4,5 4,4 4,6 4,7 4,8 4,9 5,0 5,2 5,3 5,4 5,5 5,5 1,0
LU 5,8 5,7 5,8 6,0 6,1 6,3 6,5 6,6 6,7 6,7 6,8 6,8 1,0
HU 5,8 5,6 5,7 5,9 6,1 6,3 6,5 6,6 6,7 6,9 7,0 7,1 1,3
MT 4,7 4,8 5,0 5,4 5,7 6,1 6,4 6,5 6,7 6,8 7,0 7,3 2,6
NL 4,8 4,8 5,0 5,1 5,3 5,5 5,6 5,7 5,7 5,7 5,8 5,8 0,9
AT 6,5 6,5 6,7 6,9 7,1 7,3 7,5 7,7 7,8 7,9 7,9 7,8 1,4
PL 4,0 4,0 4,1 4,3 4,4 4,6 4,7 4,8 5,0 5,1 5,2 5,2 1,2
PT 7,2 7,2 7,3 7,4 7,6 7,8 8,1 8,3 8,5 8,7 8,8 8,9 1,7
RO 3,5 3,4 3,5 3,6 3,8 3,9 4,1 4,3 4,4 4,5 4,7 4,7 1,2
SI 6,6 6,6 6,8 7,0 7,2 7,5 7,7 7,9 8,0 8,1 8,2 8,2 1,6
SK 5,0 5,0 5,2 5,4 5,7 5,9 6,2 6,4 6,6 6,8 6,9 7,0 2,0
FI 5,5 5,5 5,7 5,9 6,1 6,3 6,4 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,6 6,6 1,1
SE 7,2 7,1 7,2 7,3 7,4 7,5 7,6 7,7 7,8 7,8 7,9 7,9 0,7
UK 7,5 7,4 7,5 7,6 7,8 8,0 8,3 8,4 8,5 8,6 8,6 8,6 1,1
NO 5,6 5,5 5,7 5,9 6,1 6,4 6,5 6,7 6,8 6,9 7,0 7,0 1,4
EU27 6,7 6,6 6,7 6,9 7,0 7,2 7,5 7,7 7,8 8,0 8,1 8,1 1,4
EU15 6,9 6,8 7,0 7,1 7,3 7,5 7,7 7,9 8,0 8,1 8,1 8,2 1,3
EU12 4,7 4,6 4,7 4,9 5,0 5,2 5,4 5,6 5,7 5,8 6,0 6,0 1,4  
Source: European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009) 
Table 15 Income elasticity scenario : projected spending on health care as % of GDP 
2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060
Change 
2007-2060
BE 7,6 7,7 8,0 8,2 8,4 8,7 8,9 9,1 9,3 9,4 9,4 9,5 1,8
BG 4,7 4,8 5,0 5,1 5,2 5,4 5,5 5,7 5,8 5,8 5,9 5,9 1,2
CZ 6,2 6,4 6,7 7,1 7,4 7,7 8,0 8,3 8,5 8,7 8,9 9,0 2,8
DK 5,9 6,0 6,3 6,5 6,7 6,9 7,1 7,2 7,3 7,3 7,4 7,4 1,5
DE 7,4 7,6 7,9 8,3 8,5 8,8 9,1 9,4 9,6 9,7 9,8 9,8 2,4
EE 4,9 5,1 5,3 5,4 5,6 5,7 5,9 6,1 6,3 6,4 6,5 6,6 1,7
IE 5,8 5,9 6,1 6,2 6,5 6,7 7,0 7,3 7,6 7,8 8,0 8,1 2,3
EL 5,0 5,1 5,3 5,5 5,7 5,9 6,1 6,3 6,5 6,6 6,7 6,8 1,8
ES 5,5 5,6 5,8 6,0 6,2 6,5 6,8 7,1 7,4 7,5 7,6 7,6 2,1
FR 8,1 8,3 8,5 8,7 8,9 9,2 9,4 9,6 9,7 9,8 9,9 9,9 1,8
IT 5,9 6,0 6,1 6,3 6,5 6,7 7,0 7,1 7,3 7,3 7,3 7,3 1,5
CY 2,7 2,8 2,9 3,0 3,1 3,2 3,3 3,4 3,5 3,6 3,7 3,8 1,1
LV 3,5 3,6 3,7 3,8 3,8 3,9 4,1 4,2 4,3 4,3 4,4 4,4 1,0
LT 4,5 4,6 4,8 5,0 5,2 5,3 5,5 5,7 5,9 6,0 6,0 6,1 1,6
LU 5,8 5,9 6,1 6,3 6,5 6,8 7,0 7,2 7,3 7,4 7,4 7,5 1,7
HU 5,8 5,8 6,0 6,3 6,6 6,8 7,1 7,3 7,5 7,7 7,9 8,0 2,2
MT 4,7 4,9 5,4 5,8 6,3 6,8 7,3 7,7 8,0 8,2 8,5 8,9 4,2
NL 4,8 4,9 5,1 5,3 5,6 5,7 5,9 6,0 6,1 6,2 6,2 6,2 1,3
AT 6,5 6,6 6,9 7,2 7,4 7,7 7,9 8,2 8,4 8,5 8,5 8,5 2,1
PL 4,0 4,2 4,4 4,5 4,8 5,0 5,2 5,3 5,4 5,6 5,7 5,7 1,7
PT 7,2 7,4 7,6 7,8 8,1 8,3 8,7 9,0 9,2 9,5 9,6 9,8 2,6
RO 3,5 3,6 3,8 3,9 4,1 4,3 4,5 4,7 4,9 5,0 5,2 5,3 1,8
SI 6,6 6,8 7,1 7,4 7,7 8,0 8,3 8,6 8,8 8,9 9,0 9,0 2,4
SK 5,0 5,2 5,5 5,9 6,2 6,5 6,8 7,1 7,4 7,6 7,7 7,8 2,9
FI 5,5 5,7 5,9 6,2 6,4 6,7 6,9 7,0 7,0 7,1 7,1 7,2 1,7
SE 7,2 7,3 7,5 7,6 7,8 7,9 8,1 8,2 8,3 8,4 8,4 8,5 1,3
UK 7,5 7,6 7,9 8,1 8,4 8,7 9,0 9,3 9,5 9,8 10,0 10,1 2,6
NO 5,6 5,7 5,9 6,2 6,4 6,7 6,9 7,1 7,3 7,4 7,5 7,5 1,9
EU27 6,7 6,8 7,0 7,2 7,4 7,7 8,0 8,3 8,5 8,7 8,9 9,0 2,3
EU15 6,9 7,0 7,2 7,4 7,7 7,9 8,2 8,5 8,7 8,8 8,9 9,0 2,1
EU12 4,7 4,8 5,0 5,2 5,4 5,7 5,9 6,1 6,3 6,4 6,6 6,7 2,0  
Source: European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009) 
Table 16 EU12 cost convergence scenario : projected spending on health care as % of 
GDP 
2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060
Change 
2007-2060
BG 4,7 4,9 5,1 5,3 5,6 5,9 6,3 6,8 7,2 7,7 8,3 8,9 4,2
CZ 6,2 6,4 6,6 6,9 7,2 7,5 7,8 8,1 8,4 8,6 8,9 9,1 2,9
EE 4,9 5,1 5,3 5,5 5,7 6,0 6,4 6,7 7,1 7,5 7,9 8,3 3,4
CY 2,7 2,9 3,1 3,5 3,8 4,2 4,6 5,1 5,7 6,3 6,9 7,6 4,9
LV 3,5 3,6 3,8 4,1 4,4 4,8 5,3 5,8 6,4 7,0 7,7 8,6 5,1
LT 4,5 4,6 4,9 5,1 5,4 5,8 6,2 6,7 7,1 7,6 8,1 8,7 4,2
HU 5,8 5,8 6,0 6,3 6,6 6,9 7,3 7,6 7,9 8,2 8,5 8,8 3,1
MT 4,7 5,0 5,5 6,0 6,6 7,2 7,8 8,3 8,7 9,1 9,6 10,1 5,4
PL 4,0 4,2 4,5 4,8 5,2 5,6 6,1 6,5 7,0 7,6 8,2 8,9 4,9
RO 3,5 3,6 3,9 4,3 4,6 5,1 5,6 6,2 6,7 7,4 8,1 8,8 5,3
SI 6,6 6,8 7,0 7,3 7,5 7,8 8,1 8,4 8,7 8,9 9,0 9,2 2,6
SK 5,0 5,1 5,4 5,8 6,1 6,5 6,9 7,4 7,8 8,2 8,6 9,1 4,1
EU12 4,7 4,8 5,0 5,4 5,7 6,1 6,5 6,9 7,4 7,9 8,4 9,0 4,3  
Source: European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009) 81 
Table 17 Labour intensity scenario : projected spending on health care as % of GDP 
2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060
Change 
2007-2060
BE 7,6 7,6 7,6 7,9 8,3 8,7 9,0 9,2 9,4 9,5 9,7 9,7 2,1
BG 4,7 4,5 4,5 4,6 4,8 5,0 5,2 5,5 5,8 6,1 6,2 6,3 1,6
CZ 6,2 6,3 6,5 6,8 7,3 7,6 8,0 8,4 8,9 9,4 9,8 10,0 3,8
DK 5,9 6,0 6,3 6,7 7,0 7,3 7,5 7,6 7,6 7,6 7,6 7,7 1,7
DE 7,4 7,5 7,5 7,8 8,2 8,7 9,1 9,6 9,8 10,0 10,1 10,2 2,8
EE 4,9 4,8 5,0 5,2 5,4 5,6 5,7 6,0 6,3 6,7 7,0 7,2 2,3
IE 5,8 5,9 6,0 6,1 6,4 6,6 6,9 7,2 7,7 8,1 8,5 8,7 2,9
EL 5,0 5,0 5,1 5,2 5,4 5,7 6,1 6,5 6,8 7,1 7,3 7,3 2,4
ES 5,5 5,5 5,5 5,5 5,8 6,1 6,5 7,0 7,6 8,0 8,2 8,1 2,6
FR 8,1 8,3 8,4 8,7 9,0 9,4 9,7 10,0 10,1 10,2 10,3 10,3 2,1
IT 5,9 5,9 5,9 6,0 6,2 6,4 6,8 7,2 7,5 7,7 7,7 7,7 1,8
CY 2,7 2,7 2,7 2,8 2,9 3,1 3,2 3,3 3,4 3,6 3,8 3,9 1,2
LV 3,5 3,3 3,4 3,6 3,7 3,8 4,0 4,2 4,4 4,7 5,0 5,1 1,6
LT 4,5 4,4 4,4 4,5 4,8 5,1 5,4 5,7 6,0 6,3 6,7 6,9 2,5
LU 5,8 5,5 5,2 5,4 5,6 6,0 6,3 6,5 6,6 6,7 6,8 6,9 1,1
HU 5,8 5,8 5,8 5,9 6,2 6,5 6,9 7,3 7,7 8,1 8,5 8,8 3,0
MT 4,7 4,9 5,2 5,7 6,2 6,6 7,1 7,5 7,9 8,4 9,0 9,7 5,0
NL 4,8 4,9 5,0 5,3 5,7 6,0 6,3 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,6 6,6 1,8
AT 6,5 6,6 6,7 7,0 7,4 7,8 8,1 8,5 8,7 8,9 9,0 9,1 2,6
PL 4,0 3,9 4,0 4,2 4,4 4,6 4,9 5,1 5,4 5,8 6,1 6,4 2,4
PT 7,2 7,3 7,4 7,5 7,7 8,0 8,4 8,9 9,3 9,8 10,1 10,3 3,1
RO 3,5 3,5 3,6 3,7 3,9 4,2 4,5 4,8 5,2 5,6 6,0 6,2 2,7
SI 6,6 6,7 7,0 7,4 7,8 8,4 8,9 9,5 10,0 10,4 10,6 10,7 4,1
SK 5,0 5,0 5,0 5,1 5,5 5,8 6,3 6,7 7,3 7,8 8,3 8,6 3,7
FI 5,5 5,6 5,9 6,2 6,5 6,9 7,1 7,2 7,2 7,3 7,4 7,5 2,0
SE 7,2 7,3 7,4 7,6 7,9 8,1 8,3 8,4 8,5 8,6 8,8 8,9 1,7
UK 7,5 7,7 7,8 8,1 8,4 8,8 9,1 9,3 9,5 9,7 10,0 10,3 2,8
NO 5,6 5,7 5,9 6,2 6,6 7,1 7,4 7,7 7,9 8,0 8,1 8,3 2,6
EU27 6,7 6,7 6,8 7,0 7,3 7,6 8,0 8,4 8,7 9,0 9,2 9,4 2,7
EU15 6,9 6,9 7,0 7,2 7,5 7,9 8,3 8,6 8,9 9,1 9,3 9,4 2,5
EU12 4,7 4,6 4,7 4,9 5,1 5,4 5,7 6,0 6,4 6,9 7,2 7,5 2,8  
Source: European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009) 
Table 18 Fast cost growth scenario  : projected spending on health care as % of GDP 
2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060
Change 
2007-2060
BE 7,6 7,9 8,4 8,6 8,8 9,1 9,3 9,5 9,6 9,6 9,7 9,7 2,1
BG 4,7 4,9 5,2 5,2 5,3 5,4 5,5 5,7 5,7 5,8 5,8 5,8 1,1
CZ 6,2 6,5 7,0 7,3 7,6 7,9 8,1 8,4 8,6 8,8 9,0 9,1 2,9
DK 5,9 6,2 6,6 6,8 7,1 7,2 7,4 7,4 7,5 7,6 7,6 7,6 1,7
DE 7,4 7,8 8,4 8,7 8,9 9,2 9,5 9,7 9,9 10,0 10,1 10,1 2,7
EE 4,9 5,2 5,5 5,5 5,6 5,7 5,9 6,1 6,2 6,4 6,5 6,6 1,6
IE 5,8 6,1 6,4 6,6 6,8 7,0 7,3 7,5 7,8 8,0 8,2 8,4 2,5
EL 5,0 5,2 5,6 5,7 5,9 6,0 6,2 6,4 6,6 6,7 6,8 6,9 1,9
ES 5,5 5,8 6,1 6,2 6,5 6,7 7,0 7,3 7,6 7,7 7,8 7,8 2,3
FR 8,1 8,5 9,0 9,2 9,4 9,6 9,8 10,0 10,1 10,1 10,2 10,2 2,1
IT 5,9 6,1 6,5 6,7 6,8 7,0 7,2 7,4 7,5 7,6 7,6 7,6 1,7
CY 2,7 2,8 3,0 3,1 3,2 3,3 3,4 3,5 3,6 3,7 3,8 3,8 1,1
LV 3,5 3,6 3,8 3,8 3,9 4,0 4,1 4,2 4,2 4,3 4,3 4,4 0,9
LT 4,5 4,7 5,0 5,1 5,2 5,3 5,5 5,7 5,8 5,9 6,0 6,1 1,6
LU 5,8 6,0 6,4 6,6 6,8 7,0 7,1 7,3 7,4 7,5 7,6 7,6 1,8
HU 5,8 5,9 6,3 6,5 6,7 7,0 7,2 7,4 7,6 7,8 7,9 8,1 2,3
MT 4,7 5,1 5,6 6,1 6,5 7,0 7,5 7,9 8,2 8,4 8,7 9,1 4,4
NL 4,8 5,1 5,4 5,6 5,8 6,0 6,1 6,2 6,3 6,4 6,4 6,4 1,5
AT 6,5 6,8 7,3 7,5 7,8 8,0 8,3 8,5 8,7 8,8 8,8 8,8 2,3
PL 4,0 4,2 4,5 4,7 4,8 5,0 5,2 5,3 5,4 5,6 5,7 5,7 1,7
PT 7,2 7,5 8,0 8,2 8,4 8,7 9,0 9,2 9,5 9,7 9,9 10,0 2,8
RO 3,5 3,6 3,9 4,0 4,1 4,3 4,5 4,7 4,8 5,0 5,1 5,2 1,7
SI 6,6 6,9 7,5 7,7 7,9 8,2 8,5 8,7 8,9 9,0 9,1 9,2 2,5
SK 5,0 5,2 5,7 6,0 6,2 6,5 6,8 7,1 7,3 7,5 7,7 7,7 2,8
FI 5,5 5,8 6,2 6,5 6,7 6,9 7,1 7,2 7,2 7,3 7,3 7,3 1,8
SE 7,2 7,5 7,9 8,0 8,1 8,3 8,4 8,5 8,5 8,6 8,7 8,7 1,5
UK 7,5 7,8 8,4 8,5 8,7 9,0 9,4 9,6 9,8 10,0 10,2 10,4 2,9
NO 5,6 5,9 6,3 6,5 6,8 7,0 7,2 7,4 7,6 7,7 7,7 7,8 2,2
EU27 6,7 7,0 7,4 7,6 7,8 8,0 8,3 8,5 8,8 9,0 9,1 9,2 2,5
EU15 6,9 7,2 7,6 7,8 8,0 8,2 8,5 8,8 9,0 9,1 9,2 9,3 2,4
EU12 4,7 4,8 5,2 5,4 5,5 5,7 5,9 6,1 6,3 6,5 6,6 6,7 2,0  







Table 19 Technology scenario (convergence over 30 years) : projected spending on 
health care as % of GDP 
2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060
Change 
2007-2060
BE 7,6 8,1 8,8 9,5 10,2 10,8 11,2 11,4 11,6 11,6 11,7 11,8 4,1
BG 4,7 4,8 5,1 5,3 5,6 5,9 6,1 6,2 6,3 6,4 6,4 6,4 1,7
CZ 6,2 6,5 7,1 7,7 8,3 8,8 9,3 9,6 9,8 10,0 10,2 10,4 4,2
DK 5,9 6,3 7,0 7,6 8,2 8,7 8,9 9,1 9,1 9,2 9,3 9,3 3,3
DE 7,4 7,9 8,8 9,5 10,3 10,9 11,4 11,7 12,0 12,1 12,1 12,1 4,7
EE 4,9 5,0 5,4 5,7 6,0 6,2 6,5 6,7 6,9 7,0 7,1 7,3 2,3
IE 5,8 6,2 6,7 7,2 7,8 8,3 8,7 9,1 9,4 9,6 9,9 10,1 4,2
GR 5,0 5,2 5,7 6,1 6,5 6,9 7,3 7,5 7,7 7,9 8,0 8,0 3,1
ES 5,5 5,9 6,4 6,9 7,4 7,9 8,4 8,7 9,0 9,2 9,3 9,3 3,8
FR 8,1 8,7 9,5 10,2 10,9 11,5 11,9 12,1 12,3 12,3 12,4 12,4 4,3
IT 5,9 6,3 6,9 7,4 7,9 8,4 8,8 9,0 9,2 9,2 9,2 9,2 3,4
CY 2,7 2,9 3,1 3,4 3,6 3,8 4,0 4,1 4,2 4,4 4,5 4,5 1,8
LV 3,5 3,5 3,7 3,9 4,1 4,3 4,4 4,6 4,7 4,7 4,8 4,8 1,4
LT 4,5 4,6 4,8 5,1 5,5 5,7 6,0 6,2 6,4 6,5 6,6 6,6 2,2
LU 5,8 6,1 6,5 7,0 7,5 8,0 8,3 8,5 8,7 8,8 8,8 8,9 3,1
HU 5,8 6,0 6,5 7,0 7,5 7,9 8,3 8,6 8,8 9,0 9,2 9,3 3,5
MT 4,7 5,1 5,9 6,6 7,4 8,1 8,8 9,3 9,6 9,9 10,3 10,7 6,0
NL 4,8 5,1 5,7 6,3 6,8 7,2 7,5 7,6 7,7 7,7 7,8 7,8 2,9
AT 6,5 6,9 7,6 8,3 9,0 9,5 10,0 10,3 10,5 10,6 10,6 10,7 4,2
PL 4,0 4,2 4,5 4,9 5,2 5,5 5,8 5,9 6,1 6,2 6,3 6,4 2,4
PT 7,2 7,7 8,4 9,1 9,7 10,3 10,8 11,1 11,4 11,7 11,9 12,1 4,9
RO 3,5 3,6 3,8 4,0 4,3 4,6 4,9 5,1 5,3 5,4 5,6 5,7 2,2
SI 6,6 6,9 7,5 8,1 8,7 9,3 9,8 10,1 10,3 10,4 10,5 10,6 4,0
SK 5,0 5,1 5,5 6,0 6,5 7,0 7,4 7,7 8,0 8,2 8,4 8,4 3,5
FI 5,5 5,8 6,5 7,1 7,7 8,2 8,5 8,6 8,7 8,7 8,7 8,8 3,3
SE 7,2 7,6 8,2 8,8 9,4 9,8 10,1 10,2 10,3 10,4 10,5 10,5 3,3
UK 7,5 8,0 8,7 9,4 10,0 10,7 11,2 11,6 11,8 12,1 12,3 12,5 5,0
NO 5,6 6,0 6,6 7,3 7,9 8,5 8,9 9,1 9,3 9,4 9,5 9,6 3,9
EU27 6,7 7,1 7,8 8,4 9,0 9,5 10,0 10,3 10,5 10,6 10,8 10,8 4,1
EU15 6,9 7,3 8,0 8,7 9,3 9,8 10,3 10,6 10,8 10,9 11,0 11,1 4,2
EU12 4,7 4,8 5,2 5,6 6,0 6,3 6,6 6,8 7,0 7,2 7,3 7,5 2,8  
Source: European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009) 
Table 20 Technology scenario (convergence by 2060) : projected spending on health 
care as % of GDP 
2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060
Change 
2007-2060
BE 7,6 8,1 8,8 9,7 10,5 11,4 12,2 12,9 13,4 13,8 14,0 14,1 6,5
BG 4,7 4,8 5,1 5,4 5,7 6,1 6,5 6,8 7,1 7,4 7,5 7,5 2,8
CZ 6,2 6,5 7,1 7,7 8,5 9,3 10,0 10,7 11,3 11,8 12,2 12,4 6,2
DK 5,9 6,3 7,0 7,8 8,5 9,2 9,8 10,2 10,6 10,9 11,0 11,1 5,2
DE 7,4 7,9 8,8 9,7 10,6 11,6 12,5 13,3 13,9 14,4 14,6 14,6 7,2
EE 4,9 5,0 5,4 5,7 6,1 6,5 6,9 7,4 7,8 8,1 8,4 8,6 3,6
IE 5,8 6,2 6,7 7,4 8,0 8,8 9,5 10,2 10,8 11,4 11,8 12,1 6,3
GR 5,0 5,2 5,7 6,2 6,7 7,3 7,9 8,5 8,9 9,3 9,5 9,6 4,7
ES 5,5 5,9 6,4 7,0 7,6 8,3 9,1 9,8 10,4 10,9 11,1 11,2 5,6
FR 8,1 8,7 9,5 10,4 11,3 12,2 13,0 13,7 14,2 14,6 14,8 14,9 6,8
IT 5,9 6,3 6,9 7,5 8,2 8,9 9,6 10,2 10,7 11,0 11,1 11,1 5,3
CY 2,7 2,9 3,2 3,4 3,7 4,0 4,3 4,6 4,9 5,1 5,3 5,4 2,7
LV 3,5 3,5 3,7 3,9 4,2 4,5 4,8 5,1 5,3 5,5 5,6 5,7 2,3
LT 4,5 4,6 4,8 5,2 5,6 6,0 6,5 6,9 7,3 7,6 7,8 7,9 3,4
LU 5,8 6,1 6,5 7,1 7,8 8,4 9,1 9,6 10,0 10,3 10,5 10,6 4,8
HU 5,8 6,0 6,5 7,0 7,7 8,3 8,9 9,5 10,0 10,4 10,8 11,0 5,2
MT 4,7 5,2 5,9 6,7 7,6 8,6 9,6 10,4 11,1 11,7 12,2 12,8 8,1
NL 4,8 5,1 5,7 6,4 7,0 7,6 8,2 8,6 8,9 9,2 9,3 9,3 4,5
AT 6,5 6,9 7,7 8,5 9,3 10,1 10,9 11,6 12,2 12,6 12,7 12,8 6,3
PL 4,0 4,2 4,5 4,9 5,3 5,8 6,2 6,6 7,0 7,3 7,5 7,6 3,6
PT 7,2 7,7 8,5 9,3 10,1 10,9 11,6 12,4 13,1 13,6 14,1 14,3 7,1
RO 3,5 3,6 3,8 4,1 4,4 4,8 5,2 5,6 6,0 6,3 6,5 6,7 3,2
SI 6,6 6,9 7,6 8,2 9,0 9,8 10,6 11,3 11,9 12,3 12,6 12,7 6,1
SK 5,0 5,1 5,5 6,1 6,7 7,3 7,9 8,5 9,1 9,6 9,9 10,0 5,1
FI 5,5 5,9 6,5 7,2 7,9 8,6 9,2 9,7 10,0 10,3 10,4 10,5 5,0
SE 7,2 7,6 8,3 9,0 9,7 10,4 11,0 11,5 11,9 12,2 12,5 12,6 5,4
UK 7,5 8,0 8,8 9,5 10,4 11,3 12,2 13,0 13,6 14,2 14,6 14,9 7,4
NO 5,6 6,0 6,6 7,4 8,2 9,0 9,7 10,3 10,8 11,1 11,4 11,5 5,8
EU27 6,7 7,1 7,8 8,5 9,3 10,1 10,9 11,6 12,1 12,6 12,8 13,0 6,3
EU15 6,9 7,3 8,1 8,8 9,6 10,4 11,2 11,9 12,5 12,9 13,2 13,3 6,4
EU12 4,7 4,8 5,2 5,6 6,1 6,6 7,1 7,6 8,0 8,4 8,7 8,9 4,2  
Source: European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009) 
Table 21 Reference scenario : projected spending on health care as % of GDP 83 
2007 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2055 2060
Change 
2007-2060
BE 7,6 7,7 7,9 8,1 8,2 8,4 8,6 8,7 8,8 8,8 8,8 8,8 1,2
BG 4,7 4,8 4,9 5,0 5,0 5,1 5,3 5,4 5,4 5,5 5,5 5,4 0,7
CZ 6,2 6,4 6,7 6,9 7,1 7,4 7,6 7,8 8,0 8,1 8,3 8,4 2,2
DK 5,9 6,0 6,2 6,4 6,6 6,7 6,8 6,8 6,9 6,9 6,9 6,9 1,0
DE 7,4 7,6 7,9 8,1 8,3 8,5 8,8 9,0 9,2 9,2 9,2 9,2 1,8
EE 4,9 5,1 5,2 5,3 5,4 5,5 5,6 5,8 5,9 6,0 6,1 6,1 1,2
IE 5,8 5,9 6,0 6,1 6,3 6,5 6,7 6,9 7,1 7,3 7,5 7,6 1,8
EL 5,0 5,1 5,3 5,4 5,5 5,7 5,9 6,0 6,2 6,3 6,3 6,4 1,4
ES 5,5 5,6 5,7 5,9 6,1 6,3 6,6 6,8 7,0 7,1 7,2 7,2 1,6
FR 8,1 8,2 8,4 8,6 8,7 8,9 9,1 9,2 9,3 9,3 9,4 9,4 1,2
IT 5,9 5,9 6,1 6,2 6,4 6,5 6,7 6,9 7,0 7,0 7,0 6,9 1,1
CY 2,7 2,8 2,8 2,9 2,9 3,0 3,1 3,1 3,2 3,2 3,3 3,3 0,6
LV 3,5 3,5 3,6 3,7 3,7 3,8 3,9 3,9 4,0 4,0 4,1 4,1 0,6
LT 4,5 4,6 4,7 4,9 5,0 5,1 5,2 5,3 5,4 5,5 5,6 5,6 1,1
LU 5,8 5,9 6,1 6,2 6,4 6,5 6,7 6,8 6,9 7,0 7,0 7,0 1,2
HU 5,8 5,8 5,9 6,0 6,2 6,4 6,5 6,7 6,8 6,9 7,0 7,0 1,3
MT 4,7 4,9 5,3 5,6 6,0 6,4 6,9 7,2 7,4 7,6 7,7 8,0 3,3
NL 4,8 4,9 5,1 5,3 5,4 5,6 5,7 5,8 5,8 5,9 5,8 5,8 1,0
AT 6,5 6,6 6,8 7,0 7,2 7,4 7,6 7,8 8,0 8,1 8,0 8,0 1,5
PL 4,0 4,1 4,3 4,4 4,5 4,6 4,7 4,8 4,9 4,9 5,0 5,0 1,0
PT 7,2 7,3 7,5 7,6 7,8 8,0 8,3 8,5 8,7 8,9 9,0 9,1 1,9
RO 3,5 3,6 3,7 3,8 3,9 4,1 4,3 4,4 4,6 4,7 4,8 4,9 1,4
SI 6,6 6,8 7,1 7,3 7,5 7,8 8,0 8,2 8,3 8,4 8,5 8,5 1,9
SK 5,0 5,2 5,4 5,7 6,0 6,2 6,5 6,7 6,9 7,1 7,2 7,2 2,3
FI 5,5 5,6 5,8 6,0 6,1 6,3 6,4 6,5 6,5 6,5 6,4 6,5 1,0
SE 7,2 7,3 7,4 7,5 7,6 7,7 7,8 7,9 7,9 8,0 8,0 8,0 0,8
UK 7,5 7,6 7,8 8,0 8,1 8,4 8,7 8,9 9,1 9,2 9,3 9,4 1,9
NO 5,6 5,7 5,8 6,0 6,2 6,5 6,6 6,8 6,9 6,9 7,0 7,0 1,3
EU27 6,7 6,8 6,9 7,1 7,2 7,4 7,7 7,9 8,1 8,2 8,4 8,4 1,7
EU15 6,9 7,0 7,2 7,3 7,5 7,7 7,9 8,1 8,3 8,4 8,4 8,5 1,6
EU12 4,7 4,8 4,9 5,1 5,2 5,4 5,5 5,7 5,8 5,9 6,0 6,0 1,4  
Source: European Commission and Economic Policy Committee (2009) 
 
 